[khanhphamj]

What

Re-read all 41 English pages of https://docs.greennode.ai/ai-stack/agent-base and corrected the skills where the docs say something different or the skills were silent on something an agent builder needs. Docs-only: no assets/ template code changed, descriptions untouched.

Most important fix: in Runtime Inbound Auth IAM Permissions and JWT mode the platform strips Authorization before the container (only No authorization forwards it), and the Console now defaults a new Runtime to IAM. The skills told the agent to read the user JWT from Authorization behind a Runtime JWT, which would 401 every request.

Other items: key-level Rate Limit is shared by all models of the key (a fallback model does not bypass it), Memory event pagination from ≤ 5000 is documented, Outbound IP of a Private Runtime, vCR backendName / robot username / expiry, runtime env vars "non-sensitive config only", stateless contract, ephemeral filesystem (vStorage S3), gateway JWT settings (Discovery URL/JWKS, Principal claim), connector Header key/prefix, default scopes, M365 VNG bundle, Slack as Custom provider, 22 policy operators + AND, a Built-in Tools row in the decision guide. Full list in CHANGELOG.md (Unreleased).

Verified live (2026-11-09, temporary resources, all deleted): deleting a Policy Group does not detach it from a gateway as the docs say (the gateway keeps the dangling policyGroupId; unbind first with PATCH {"policyGroupId": null}), and the documented policy-group limits were not enforced on the test account (100 policies per group accepted, 429 errors.quota.policy at 101; 43 groups). The skills now say so. Gateway identity gw-<id> and runtime identity runtime-<id> noted.

Second live lab (2026-11-09, one account, one gateway, IAM inbound): a gateway with no Policy Group bound let every valid IAM caller's tools/call through (skills said 403; a 2026-10 run saw 403) — now written as a security rule (bind a group before callers can reach the gateway). Bound group with zero policies or a dangling id ⇒ deny; a deny was HTTP 200 + MCP tool error Request denied by policy. (no 403 seen); deny wins over allow in any order; bare iam / jwt principals rejected by the API (400) — use iam:*, jwt:*, *; policy changes apply in seconds, PATCH bind needs UPDATING → ACTIVE; targets at <gateway endpoint>/<target name>. Not tested: JWT-inbound gateways, non-owner callers, conditions, a real Runtime service account.

Not changed (needs a decision or a live check)

• BFF jwt mode and the Expo app send the user token only in Authorization, so they cannot work behind a Runtime JWT; the skills now say so, the code is untouched (small fix, needs web/frontend tests and a dev check).
• What grn / the API default to for inbound auth is not documented; agent.yaml.tpl, the deploy skill and the ci.yml smoke test still assume "No authorization" for grn deploy up.
• Built-in Tools: no template or recipe (session creation tool, token acceptance, REST base URL unverified).
• Open questions and docs inconsistencies: see the report in the shared notes folder (REPORT-docs-sync.md).

Checks

• uv run -q --python 3.12 --no-project python3 .github/scripts/check_skills.py — green (includes drift checks)
• .github/scripts/check_drift.py — green
• No template files changed, so template test suites were not re-run.

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