gambitproject · rahulsavani · Jul 10, 2026 · Jul 10, 2026 · Jul 10, 2026 · Jul 10, 2026
diff --git a/build_support/catalog/catalog.am b/build_support/catalog/catalog.am
@@ -1,6 +1,24 @@
 CATALOG_FILES = \
 	catalog/books/myerson1991/fig2_1.efg \
 	catalog/books/myerson1991/fig4_2.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_1.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_10.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_10__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_11.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_11__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_12.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_12__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_15.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_15__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_1__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_2.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_2__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_9.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_9__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_2.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_2__original_layout.ef \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_8.efg \
+	catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_8__original_layout.ef \
 	catalog/books/vonstengel2022/fig10.1.efg \
 	catalog/books/vonstengel2022/fig10.12.efg \
 	catalog/books/vonstengel2022/fig10.5.efg \
@@ -23,6 +41,7 @@ CATALOG_FILES = \
 	catalog/journals/ijgt/selten1975/fig2.efg \
 	catalog/journals/ijgt/selten1975/fig3.efg \
 	catalog/journals/mor/vonstengelforges2008/fig1.efg \
+	catalog/journals/mor/vonstengelforges2008/fig1__Original_Layout.ef \
 	catalog/journals/mor/vonstengelforges2008/fig6.efg \
 	catalog/journals/mor/vonstengelforges2008/fig6__Original_Layout.ef \
 	catalog/journals/mor/vonstengelforges2008/fig9.efg \

diff --git a/build_support/catalog/catalog_hierarchy.yaml b/build_support/catalog/catalog_hierarchy.yaml
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ labels:
   books/myerson1991: "Myerson (1991) — Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict"
   books/vonstengel2022: "von Stengel (2022) — Game Theory Basics"
   books/watson2013: "Watson (2013) — Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory"
+  books/shohamleytonbrown2008: "Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008) — Multiagent Systems, Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations"
   journals/geb/gilboa1997: "Gilboa (1997)"
   journals/geb/wichardt2008: "Wichardt (2008)"
   journals/ijgt/nau2004: "Nau et al. (2004)"

diff --git a/build_support/catalog/gtdraw_settings.yaml b/build_support/catalog/gtdraw_settings.yaml
@@ -44,3 +44,31 @@ overrides:
       2: '#DD79E0'
       3: '#1616BC'
       4: '#985003'
+
+  books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_8:
+    scale_factor: 1.0
+    level_scaling: 1.0
+    sublevel_scaling: 1.0
+    width_scaling: 1.0
+    horizontal: false
+    mirror: false
+    shared_terminal_depth: false
+    color_scheme: colorblind
+    edge_thickness: 1.0
+    action_label_position: 0.5
+    action_label_position_by: player
+    action_label_dist: 1.0
+    vary_action_label_positions: false
+    vary_action_label_positions_by: all
+    font_family: rmfamily
+    font_bold: false
+    font_italic: false
+    font_size: normalsize
+    node_size: 1.5
+    label_bg: false
+    label_bg_color: white
+    label_bg_opacity: 0.8
+    iset_fill: true
+    iset_fill_opacity: 0.2
+    iset_boundary: none
+    legend_position: top-left
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_1.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_1.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.1 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.1 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+This is a sharing game. Imagine a brother and sister sharing two indivisible and identical presents
+from their parents. First the brother suggests a split, which can be one of three: he
+keeps both, she keeps both, or they each keep one. Then the sister chooses whether
+to accept or reject the split. If she accepts they each get their allocated present(s),
+and otherwise neither gets any gift.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "2-0" "1-1" "0-2" } 0
+p "" 2 2 "" { "no" "yes" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { 0 0 }
+t "" 2 "" { 2 0 }
+p "" 2 3 "" { "no" "yes" } 0
+t "" 3 "" { 0 0 }
+t "" 4 "" { 1 1 }
+p "" 2 4 "" { "no" "yes" } 0
+t "" 5 "" { 0 0 }
+t "" 6 "" { 0 2 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_10.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_10.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.10 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.10 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+This is an example of an imperfect-information game.
+"
+
+p "" 1 2 "" { "L" "R" } 0
+p "" 2 3 "" { "A" "B" } 0
+p "" 1 1 "" { "l" "r" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { 0 0 }
+t "" 2 "" { 2 4 }
+p "" 1 1 0
+t "" 3 "" { 4 2 }
+t "" 4 "" { 0 0 }
+t "" 5 "" { 0 0 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_10__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_10__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 player 2 xshift -3.58 from 0,1 move L
+level 2 node 2 xshift 3.58 from 0,1 move R payoffs 0 0
+level 4 node 1 xshift -2.86 from 2,1 move A
+level 4 node 2 xshift 2.86 from 2,1 move B
+level 6 node 1 xshift -1.43 from 4,1 move l payoffs 0 0
+level 6 node 2 xshift 1.43 from 4,1 move r payoffs 2 4
+level 6 node 3 xshift -1.43 from 4,2 move l payoffs 4 2
+level 6 node 4 xshift 1.43 from 4,2 move r payoffs 0 0
+iset 4,1 4,2 player 1
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_11.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_11.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.11 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.11 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+The Prisoner's Dilemma game in extensive form.
+"
+
+p "" 1 2 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "c" "d" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { -1 -1 }
+t "" 2 "" { -4 0 }
+p "" 2 1 0
+t "" 3 "" { 0 -4 }
+t "" 4 "" { -3 -3 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_11__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_11__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 xshift -3.58 from 0,1 move C
+level 2 node 2 xshift 3.58 from 0,1 move D
+level 4 node 1 xshift -1.79 from 2,1 move c payoffs -1 -1
+level 4 node 2 xshift 1.79 from 2,1 move d payoffs -4 0
+level 4 node 3 xshift -1.79 from 2,2 move c payoffs 0 -4
+level 4 node 4 xshift 1.79 from 2,2 move d payoffs -3 -3
+iset 2,1 2,2 player 2
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_12.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_12.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.12 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.12 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+A game with imperfect recall, in particular absent-mindedness.
+"
+
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "L" "R" } 0
+p "" 1 1 0
+t "" 1 "" { 1 0 }
+t "" 2 "" { 100 100 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "U" "D" } 0
+t "" 3 "" { 5 1 }
+t "" 4 "" { 2 2 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_12__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_12__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+% Extensive-form game transcribed from the uploaded image
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+
+% Player 1's two decision nodes are in the same information set.
+level 0 node 1
+level 2 node 1 xshift -3 from 0,1 move L
+level 2 node 2 xshift 3 from 0,1 move R player 2
+
+level 4 node 1 xshift -1 from 2,1 move L payoffs 1 0
+level 4 node 2 xshift 1 from 2,1 move R payoffs 100 100
+level 4 node 3 xshift -1 from 2,2 move U payoffs 5 1
+level 4 node 4 xshift 1 from 2,2 move D payoffs 2 2
+
+iset 0,1 2,1 player 1
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_15.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_15.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.15 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.15 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+A game with imperfect information.
+This example shows how a requirement that a substrategy be a best response in
+all subgames is too simplistic for defining SPE in games with imperfect information.
+"
+
+p "" 1 2 "" { "L" "C" "R" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { 1 1 }
+p "" 2 1 "" { "U" "D" } 0
+t "" 2 "" { 0 1000 }
+t "" 3 "" { 0 0 }
+p "" 2 1 0
+t "" 4 "" { 1 0 }
+t "" 5 "" { 3 1 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_15__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_15__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 xshift -5.01 from 0,1 move L payoffs 1 1
+level 2 node 2 xshift -0.72 from 0,1 move C
+level 2 node 3 xshift 5.01 from 0,1 move R
+level 4 node 1 xshift -1.43 from 2,2 move U payoffs 0 1000
+level 4 node 2 xshift 1.43 from 2,2 move D payoffs 0 0
+level 4 node 3 xshift -1.43 from 2,3 move U payoffs 1 0
+level 4 node 4 xshift 1.43 from 2,3 move D payoffs 3 1
+iset 2,2 2,3 player 2
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_1__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_1__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 player 2 xshift -4.77 from 0,1 move 2-0
+level 2 node 2 player 2 xshift 0 from 0,1 move 1-1
+level 4 node 1 xshift -1.19 from 2,1 move no payoffs 0 0
+level 4 node 2 xshift 1.19 from 2,1 move yes payoffs 2 0
+level 2 node 3 player 2 xshift 4.77 from 0,1 move 0-2
+level 4 node 3 xshift -1.19 from 2,2 move no payoffs 0 0
+level 4 node 4 xshift 1.19 from 2,2 move yes payoffs 1 1
+level 4 node 5 xshift -1.19 from 2,3 move no payoffs 0 0
+level 4 node 6 xshift 1.19 from 2,3 move yes payoffs 0 2
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_2.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_2.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.2 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.2 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+This is an example of a perfect-information game in extensive form.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "A" "B" } 0
+p "" 2 2 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { 3 8 }
+t "" 2 "" { 8 3 }
+p "" 2 3 "" { "E" "F" } 0
+t "" 3 "" { 5 5 }
+p "" 1 4 "" { "G" "H" } 0
+t "" 4 "" { 2 10 }
+t "" 5 "" { 1 0 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_2__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_2__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 player 2 xshift -3.22 from 0,1 move A
+level 2 node 2 player 2 xshift 3.22 from 0,1 move B
+level 4 node 1 xshift -1.43 from 2,1 move C payoffs 3 8
+level 4 node 2 xshift 1.43 from 2,1 move D payoffs 8 3
+level 4 node 3 xshift -2.15 from 2,2 move E payoffs 5 5
+level 4 node 4 player 1 xshift 2.15 from 2,2 move F
+level 6 node 1 xshift -1.43 from 4,4 move G payoffs 2 10
+level 6 node 2 xshift 1.43 from 4,4 move H payoffs 1 0
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_9.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_9.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 5.9 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 5.9 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+This is the centipede game. In this game two players alternate in making decisions, at each
+turn choosing between going down and ending the game or going across and
+continuing it.
+This example is used to explain the criticisms of backward induction for finding subgame-perfect equilibrium.
+Note that centipede is also a parametrized game, with the parameter being the number of rounds.
+"
+
+p "" 1 1 "" { "A" "D" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { 1 0 }
+p "" 2 2 "" { "A" "D" } 0
+t "" 2 "" { 0 2 }
+p "" 1 3 "" { "A" "D" } 0
+t "" 3 "" { 3 1 }
+p "" 2 4 "" { "A" "D" } 0
+t "" 4 "" { 2 4 }
+p "" 1 5 "" { "A" "D" } 0
+t "" 5 "" { 4 3 }
+t "" 6 "" { 3 5 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_9__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig5_9__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 xshift -2.31 from 0,1 move A payoffs 1 0
+level 2 node 2 player 2 xshift 2.31 from 0,1 move D
+level 4 node 1 xshift -2.24 from 2,2 move A payoffs 0 2
+level 4 node 2 player 1 xshift 2.24 from 2,2 move D
+level 6 node 1 xshift -2.09 from 4,2 move A payoffs 3 1
+level 6 node 2 player 2 xshift 2.09 from 4,2 move D
+level 8 node 1 xshift -1.79 from 6,2 move A payoffs 2 4
+level 8 node 2 player 1 xshift 1.79 from 6,2 move D
+level 10 node 1 xshift -1.19 from 8,2 move A payoffs 4 3
+level 10 node 2 xshift 1.19 from 8,2 move D payoffs 3 5
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_2.efg b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_2.efg
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+EFG 2 R "Fig 6.2 from Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2008)" { "1" "2" }
+
+"
+Figure 6.2 from :cite:p:`ShoLeyB08`.
+This is a repeated game, where Prisoner's Dilemma is played twice.
+"
+
+p "" 1 6 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+p "" 2 1 "" { "c" "d" } 0
+p "" 1 7 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+p "" 2 4 "" { "c" "d" } 0
+t "" 1 "" { -2 -2 }
+t "" 2 "" { -5 -1 }
+p "" 2 4 0
+t "" 3 "" { -1 -5 }
+t "" 4 "" { -4 -4 }
+p "" 1 8 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+p "" 2 5 "" { "c" "d" } 0
+t "" 5 "" { -5 -1 }
+t "" 6 "" { -8 0 }
+p "" 2 5 0
+t "" 7 "" { -4 -4 }
+t "" 8 "" { -7 -3 }
+p "" 2 1 0
+p "" 1 9 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+p "" 2 2 "" { "c" "d" } 0
+t "" 9 "" { -1 -5 }
+t "" 10 "" { -4 -4 }
+p "" 2 2 0
+t "" 11 "" { 0 -8 }
+t "" 12 "" { -3 -7 }
+p "" 1 10 "" { "C" "D" } 0
+p "" 2 3 "" { "c" "d" } 0
+t "" 13 "" { -4 -4 }
+t "" 14 "" { -7 -3 }
+p "" 2 3 0
+t "" 15 "" { -3 -7 }
+t "" 16 "" { -6 -6 }
diff --git a/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_2__original_layout.ef b/catalog/books/shohamleytonbrown2008/fig6_2__original_layout.ef
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+player 1 name 1
+player 2 name 2
+level 0 node 1 player 1
+level 2 node 1 xshift -6.37 from 0,1 move C
+level 2 node 2 xshift 6.37 from 0,1 move D
+level 4 node 1 player 1 xshift -3.19 from 2,1 move c
+level 4 node 2 player 1 xshift 3.19 from 2,1 move d
+level 4 node 3 player 1 xshift -3.19 from 2,2 move c
+level 4 node 4 player 1 xshift 3.19 from 2,2 move d
+level 6 node 1 xshift -1.59 from 4,1 move C
+level 6 node 2 xshift 1.59 from 4,1 move D
+level 6 node 3 xshift -1.59 from 4,2 move C
+level 6 node 4 xshift 1.59 from 4,2 move D
+level 6 node 5 xshift -1.59 from 4,3 move C
+level 6 node 6 xshift 1.59 from 4,3 move D
+level 6 node 7 xshift -1.59 from 4,4 move C
+level 6 node 8 xshift 1.59 from 4,4 move D
+level 8 node 1 xshift -0.8 from 6,1 move c payoffs -2 -2
+level 8 node 2 xshift 0.8 from 6,1 move d payoffs -5 -1
+level 8 node 3 xshift -0.8 from 6,2 move c payoffs -1 -5
+level 8 node 4 xshift 0.8 from 6,2 move d payoffs -4 -4
+level 8 node 5 xshift -0.8 from 6,3 move c payoffs -5 -1
+level 8 node 6 xshift 0.8 from 6,3 move d payoffs -8 0
+level 8 node 7 xshift -0.8 from 6,4 move c payoffs -4 -4
+level 8 node 8 xshift 0.8 from 6,4 move d payoffs -7 -3
+level 8 node 9 xshift -0.8 from 6,5 move c payoffs -1 -5
+level 8 node 10 xshift 0.8 from 6,5 move d payoffs -4 -4
+level 8 node 11 xshift -0.8 from 6,6 move c payoffs 0 -8
+level 8 node 12 xshift 0.8 from 6,6 move d payoffs -3 -7
+level 8 node 13 xshift -0.8 from 6,7 move c payoffs -4 -4
+level 8 node 14 xshift 0.8 from 6,7 move d payoffs -7 -3
+level 8 node 15 xshift -0.8 from 6,8 move c payoffs -3 -7
+level 8 node 16 xshift 0.8 from 6,8 move d payoffs -6 -6
+iset 2,1 2,2 player 2
+iset 6,5 6,6 player 2
+iset 6,7 6,8 player 2
+iset 6,1 6,2 player 2
+iset 6,3 6,4 player 2