Only the latest release line gets security fixes. Older releases are not patched. Upgrade to the newest version from the releases page.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.2.x | yes |
| < 1.2 | no |
Please do not open a public issue. Report privately through GitHub's security advisories: Report a vulnerability.
Include the version, the local OS and the remote OS, what an attacker controls (a remote host, an SSH config entry, a workspace folder name, a local process), and steps to reproduce. We aim to acknowledge a report within a week and to agree on a disclosure date with you before anything is published.
If the issue is in upstream code that this fork shares (jeanp413/open-remote-ssh), report it here anyway; we will coordinate with upstream.
The extension handles credentials and runs commands on remote machines, so these areas are in scope:
- Credentials and keys: SSH passwords, key passphrases, private keys and the agent
socket (
src/ssh/*,src/authResolver.ts); known_hosts verification (src/ssh/hostfile.ts). - Remote command execution: the VS Code server install scripts (
src/scripts/*) and everything templated into them (src/serverSetup.ts), including user settings such asremote.SSH.serverDownloadUrlTemplateandremote.SSH.defaultExtensions. - tmux command lines: session names, paths and options built in
src/tmux/*and sent to the remote shell. Workspace and host names must never be able to inject shell syntax. - Clipboard image bridge: the remote paths and commands built in
src/clipboard/*. - Local listeners: the dynamic-forwarding SOCKS proxy and port tunnels the extension
opens on your machine. They bind to
127.0.0.1only; anything reachable from another host is a vulnerability.
Out of scope: the security of the VS Code server itself, of the remote host's sshd, and of tmux; please report those to their projects.
Logs go to the local "Remote - SSH" output channel only; nothing is sent anywhere.
- At Info and Error level: the remote authority being resolved (it names the host), each authentication method tried (for a key: its file name, type and public fingerprint), server install progress, persistent-terminal status, and error messages. Passwords, passphrases and key material are never logged.
- At Trace level only: the server install command and its output, the ProxyCommand being spawned, and the list of identity files found. The connection token is redacted from the install command and its output, and ProxyCommand arguments are replaced by their count. Trace lines appear only when VS Code's log level is set to Trace.
Check the channel before pasting it into a public issue: it contains host names, user names and remote paths.
- VS Code server download is verified by TLS only. The install script downloads the
server tarball from
remote.SSH.serverDownloadUrlTemplate(VSCodium's GitHub releases over HTTPS by default) and checks no checksum or signature. Whoever controls that URL, or a TLS-intercepting proxy the remote host trusts, controls the server that runs on the remote. - tmux is Unix-only. On Windows remotes the tmux layer is off and terminals are plain shells; there is no tmux attack surface there, and no persistence either.