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FortiWeb attack logs can miss detections because quoted classifications/messages are truncated, rules consume different sanitized names and decision values, and the deployed web-shell expression fails SDK CEL compilation. This draft repairs the filter and all seven existing rules, and adds dedicated XSS, Known Exploits and Trojans detections.
The meeting follow-up validates the selected vendor IP at its original promotion, preserving invalid values under canonical
log.src/log.dstand rejecting expanded/mapped zero addresses before enrichment. It also recovers completeHTTP_agentvalues inlog.httpagentand removes relative HTTP request URIs from the SDK's filesystemtarget.path; they remain inlog.httpurl. Explicit absolute HTTP(S) URLs still usetarget.url. Alias precedence and actual network direction are preserved.Vendor decisions remain in
log.action; explicit blocks produceactionResult=denied. Alert and other decisions do not establish successful exploitation. Specific classified attacks have discrete triggers; generic attacks, upload violations and selected OWASP violations retain scoped history thresholds. All ten rule consumers were reviewed against actual filter output. SDK v1.1.31 protobuf and official wiki are authoritative.Validation:
git diff --check. Public fixtures are synthetic; customer payloads and identifiers remain private.The raw harness models documented transforms; it does not execute the closed EventProcessor, external enrichment or live alert publication. All sampled URLs are relative and usernames are placeholders. Unix-nanosecond event time remains vendor data pending a verified supported conversion. No production before/after alert-volume claim is made.
Stage filter and rules together, allow history windows to warm up, and verify parser throughput, alert IDs and burst behavior. Existing indexed truncation is not repaired. Custom consumers of root decision
actionmust migrate tolog.action; relativetarget.pathconsumers of the earlier draft must uselog.httpurl. Review shared grouping #2590 separately. Details:filters/audits/fortiweb.md.Draft only against official
utmstack/UTMStack:v11. No merge, auto-merge, deployment or customer configuration changes.