Trestle is a local CLI. It reads files in a repository you already have checked out, and it makes no network calls — no telemetry, no update check, no remote fetch of any kind. There is no server, no account, and nothing to log into.

That shape limits what a vulnerability here can be. The realistic categories:

• Path traversal: a crafted .trestle.yml or binding glob causing reads outside the repo root.
• Denial of service: input that makes check hang or exhaust memory, which matters because it is designed to run in CI on every pull request.
• Untrusted input handling: Trestle parses .d2 files and YAML. It compiles diagrams through D2, so a crash reachable only through that library is worth reporting to us and upstream.

Running trestle on a repository you do not trust is running a parser on untrusted input. That is worth knowing before you point it at somebody else's clone.

Open a private security advisory.

If you would rather not use GitHub for it, open a normal issue saying only that you have something to report, with no detail, and we will find a channel.

Please include a reproduction if you can — a minimal repo tree, the config and the command. This project's whole habit is verifying claims rather than reasoning about them, and a reproduction is what makes that possible.

Expect an acknowledgement within a week. This is a small project maintained in spare time; that is the honest timeline rather than an aspirational one.

The latest tagged release. There is no long-term support branch and no backporting — at this size, saying otherwise would be a promise nobody can keep.