Postulo stores personal documents — CVs, cover letters, and employment history — so security reports are taken seriously.
Please report vulnerabilities privately rather than opening a public issue. Either:
- open a confidential issue on the Forgejo repository; or
- email the maintainer at tiago.agueda@tiagoagueda.com, which needs no account anywhere and is the right route if you would rather not register to report a problem.
Both reach the same person.
Please include the affected version or commit, what an attacker could achieve, and the steps to reproduce it. You can expect an acknowledgement within a week.
Security is one of Postulo's stated missions, not a section of its README: the application holds CVs, cover letters and employment histories, and it is built as if that were the only thing that mattered.
- No one sees another person's data unless that person granted it — explicitly, for a stated scope, revocably, and visibly to them at any time. Superusers can see and change any company, contact or listing, including private ones, but never anyone's notes, applications or documents. Every record has an owner -- a person, or for a company, a contact or a listing a group -- and every query is scoped to what the person may see; a request for a record nobody granted them is a 404, never a confirmation that it exists.
- Files are delivered only through a view that has checked who is asking, with
Cache-Control: no-store. - The browser runs under a strict content security policy: no inline script, no third-party origins.
- Nothing is fetched from the network on a page view. What is fetched without a person
asking is named in the wiki's Hardening page: the GeoNames city tables at first
start (
POSTULO_CONTAINER_GEONAMES_FETCH=0turns it off), plugin packages onplugins syncafter an upgrade, deliveries to the connections a person set up, and the update check whenPOSTULO_UPDATE_CHECKis on. Never from private addresses unless the operator allowed it. - The test suite contains security tests — ownership sweeps across every view and queryset, policy checks, path-traversal and redirect checks — and they fail the build.
- Dependencies are audited against known vulnerabilities in CI on every run and on a weekly schedule. That audit only knows what the advisory databases (PyPI, OSV) have published, and they lag the projects' own announcements -- Django 6.1.2 fixed four issues while the audit still passed on 6.1.1 (#986) -- so it is a net, not a guarantee: the maintainer also reads the direct dependencies' release notes (see below).
- A vulnerability report is handled before any feature work.
The process, so that it is the same every time and needs no thinking on a bad day:
- Notice. The
securityjob in CI audits every locked dependency on every push, and the Weekly workflow runs the same job every Monday; the maintainer is also subscribed to the security announcements of the direct dependencies (Django, django-allauth, django-ninja, Pillow, WeasyPrint, httpx, cryptography). A failing audit is a page, not a chore. The audit lags, so once a week, and before every release, also check by hand: the security announcements and the newest release notes of those same libraries (Django'sdjango-announcelist and release notes, django-allauth's changelog, the GitHub advisories of the others), and compare their latest patch version withuv.lock. A newer patch release with a security fix is a disclosure even whenpip-auditsays nothing: go on from step 2. - Assess within a day: does Postulo use the affected code path, and can it be reached from outside? Record the answer in a confidential issue.
- Fix: upgrade the dependency (
uv lock --upgrade-package NAME), run the suite, and if Postulo's own code needs a change make it in the same commit. - Release a patch version (
vX.Y.Z+1) through the release workflow, the same day for anything reachable without signing in, within the week otherwise. - Tell operators: a
Securitysection in that release's changelog entry, and a pinned issue on the repository that says what was affected, what to upgrade to, and whether anything else — rotating a token, say — is needed.
Postulo itself: a report about Postulo's own code follows the same steps from 2 onwards, with the reporter kept informed and credited if they wish.
The maintainer is Tiago Águeda, tiago.agueda@tiagoagueda.com. There is one of him, so an acknowledgement within a week is a promise he can keep rather than an aspiration; if a report is urgent, say so in the subject.
Until version 1.0, only the latest release and the main branch receive fixes. Upgrading
is one path per kind of install, never both: docker compose pull and up -d for the
published image, or git pull and up -d --build with docker/compose.build.yml for one
built from source. There is no reason to stay behind.
- There is no telemetry. Postulo makes outbound requests only for the features listed in Hardening in the wiki, under "Where the server is allowed to dial"; write egress rules and privacy notices from that list, not from the capture feature alone.
- Uploaded documents are never served directly by the web server; they are delivered through an ownership-checked view.
- Set a strong, unique
POSTULO_SECRET_KEYand serve the application over HTTPS.manage.py check --deployverifies the important settings.