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4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions .jules/sentinel.md
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## 2026-05-22 - Zip Slip in skills_import.py
**Vulnerability:** A path traversal vulnerability (Zip Slip) was found in `helpers/skills_import.py` where `zipfile.ZipFile.extractall()` was called without explicit validation of the member paths, allowing a malicious archive to write outside the intended extraction directory.
**Learning:** Even if modern Python versions of `extractall()` include some mitigations against basic `../` traversal, explicit path validation (checking `os.path.realpath` against the target directory, or using `str.startswith()` with absolute paths) is the most robust and secure pattern to follow. The codebase already implements this correctly in other places (like plugin installation and validation).
**Prevention:** Always validate each member of a ZIP archive in `z.namelist()` using `files.is_in_dir()` or a similar robust path containment check before extracting it. Do not rely solely on the default behavior of `extractall()`.
4 changes: 4 additions & 0 deletions helpers/skills_import.py
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -94,6 +94,10 @@ def _unzip_to_temp_dir(zip_path: Path) -> Path:
target.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_path, "r") as z:
for member in z.namelist():
member_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(target, member))
if not files.is_in_dir(member_path, str(target)):
raise ValueError(f"Unsafe path in archive: {member}")
z.extractall(target)

# If zip contains a single top-level folder, treat that as the root
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