feat(migrations): create apify_scraper_runs ownership map (chat#1840)

supabase/migrations/20260703120000_create_apify_scraper_runs.sql

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+-- Ownership map for Apify scraper runs (recoupable/chat#1840).
+--
+-- GET /api/apify/runs/{runId} is admin-only because Apify run identifiers
+-- carry no account scope — the endpoint has nothing to authorize against, so
+-- account-key agents that start a scrape via POST /api/socials/{id}/scrape
+-- get Forbidden polling their own run. This records who started each run at
+-- start time, giving the results endpoint an ownership chain: owning account
+-- OR admin may poll. Written by the api scrape-start handler; read by the
+-- results validator.
+--
+-- Loose ids, no FKs (like email_send_log / error_logs — an ownership log
+-- shouldn't cascade-delete with accounts, and a dangling row just means the
+-- run degrades to admin-only). run_id is the natural key: one owner per run.
+-- social_id is denormalized for audit ("which profile was scraped").
+--
+-- RLS: enabled with no policies, matching neighboring service-written tables.
+-- The api reads/writes via the service role (bypasses RLS); anon/authenticated
+-- have no access.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS public.apify_scraper_runs (
+    run_id      TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    account_id  UUID NOT NULL,   -- account whose key started the run
+    social_id   UUID,            -- social profile the run scrapes (audit)
+    created_at  TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS apify_scraper_runs_account_id_idx ON public.apify_scraper_runs (account_id);
+
+ALTER TABLE public.apify_scraper_runs ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;