Rayline CLI, the command-line client in the broader Rayline ecosystem, is
under active pre-release development. Only the latest release and main are
supported; security fixes are applied there.
Please do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities. Public reports can expose users before a fix is available.
Report privately using GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting:
- Go to the Security tab of this repository.
- Click Report a vulnerability.
- Provide a clear description, affected version, and reproduction steps.
If you cannot use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting, email security@rayline.ai.
When reporting, please include:
- the affected version and operating system;
- a description of the issue and its impact;
- step-by-step reproduction;
- any relevant logs with secrets and tokens removed.
We aim to acknowledge reports promptly, confirm and assess the issue, and keep you informed as we work on a fix and coordinate disclosure.
This section documents what Rayline's local security mechanisms protect against, what they do not protect against, and what residual risks remain.
Loopback is not a security boundary on a single-user machine. Any process running as the same OS user can connect to Rayline's local ports, read the router API key from a harness's process environment, or read key material from the filesystem (subject to file permissions). Rayline's local protections are defense-in-depth measures — they are not a hard isolation boundary.
For strong isolation (e.g., when running untrusted local code alongside Rayline), use OS-level isolation: a separate OS user account, a container, or a virtual machine.
The router API key authenticates harness sessions to the Rayline router. It is:
- Revocable server-side: keys are minted via
POST /v1/keysand revoked viaPOST /v1/auth/cli/revoke(seecrates/rayline-cli/src/status.rs, functionsmint_router_key_atandrevoke_rayline_session). - Withheld from harness environments: Claude Code, Codex and the other
harness spawns remove
RAYLINE_ROUTER_API_KEYfrom the inherited environment (crates/rayline-cli/src/codex.rs,withhold_router_key). Claude Code gets the key only asANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN; Codex reads it from a 0600config.tomlin its RaylineCODEX_HOME, never from its arguments or environment. - Residual risk: the key remains readable in Claude Code's process
environment via
/proc/<pid>/environon Linux (or equivalently viaps eww <pid>/proc_pidinfoon macOS), and in Codex'sconfig.toml, by any process running as the same UID. This is a known residual. Same-UID isolation requires OS-level controls.
If you run untrusted local code alongside Rayline (e.g., MCP servers from unknown sources, arbitrary shell commands), use OS-level isolation:
- Run Rayline under a dedicated OS user account, or
- Use a container or VM that separates Rayline from untrusted code.
Loopback and same-UID process boundaries are not sufficient isolation against a determined attacker with code execution on your machine.