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Portable Mods: executable mods stay disabled behind a documented, tested gate (#341) - #379
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…ted security gate #341. The decision and its reasons are recorded in docs/design/portable-mod-isolation.md: no supported platform has an isolation design that has been built, reviewed and attacked, so a Portable Mod remains an inert descriptor bound to the read-only, deny-by-default broker. The document audits what exists (inert descriptors, a frozen broker API, the provider-native plugin listing), states the threat model, explains why a worker, a child process, Node's permission model (by its own documentation not a protection against malicious code) and node:vm are not the boundary, and lists what an acceptable design must demonstrate per platform. tests/portableModGate.test.ts keeps the block: no dynamic import, require, new Function, eval, vm, worker threads or WebAssembly instantiation under src/agents/mods (the one process use is `claude plugin list --json`); descriptors stay inert and listed as not executable; the broker answers only requested, granted, read permissions, never approvals or conversation content, and its API cannot be extended. Adding a loader fails the test (checked by mutation).
This was referenced Oct 11, 2026
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Found by dispatch CI 38608819740 on the merge-only head 207de26: #379's gate allowed one process use under src/agents/mods (claudeDiscovery.ts listing plugins), and #347 moved that listing into claudePlugins.ts and added details, validate and enable/disable at the installed scope. Neither PR's own CI could see the other. The gate stays strict: every loader check is unchanged, the only child_process import allowed is execFile, a shell is refused, and each argv given to Claude's CLI must be one of the four reviewed forms verbatim. None of them loads or runs mod code in NMSh. view.ts used inline type imports (import('./controller.js').X), which the loader check rightly cannot tell from a runtime import(); they are ordinary type imports now. No runtime change.
This was referenced Oct 14, 2026
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#341. Decision: executable Portable Mods stay disabled. No platform NMSh supports has an enforced isolation design that has been built, reviewed and attacked. Based on
release/v0.18.0; docs and a test only, no product behavior change.docs/design/portable-mod-isolation.md: the three classes and their trust boundaries; an audit of what exists (inertPortableDescriptor, the frozen read-only deny-by-defaultModBroker, the provider-nativeclaude plugin list --jsoninventory, no loader); the threat model (fs/network/process/secrets, acting as the person, forged presentation, resource exhaustion, persistence, cross-target access, integrity/provenance/revocation); why a worker or child process, Node's permission model (its docs: "does not protect against malicious code"), andnode:vmare not the boundary; per-platform candidates (Linux namespaces + seccomp + Landlock; macOS Seatbelt with its deprecation caveat; host-import-only WebAssembly in a limited process) and the adversarial evidence each must produce; the exact block.tests/portableModGate.test.ts: no dynamicimport(),require,new Function,eval,vm, worker threads or WebAssembly instantiation undersrc/agents/mods(verified by mutation: adding animport()fails it); descriptors are'inert'and inventoried as not executable; the broker answers only requested ∩ granted ∩ read permissions, never approvals or conversation content, and its API has nothing butidentityandrequestand is frozen.Lifting the block means changing these tests in the same change that delivers isolation, its threat-model review and an adversarial suite in CI per platform.