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Security: qaxi/Agent2Telegram

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Agent2Telegram lets a Telegram user run a coding agent — which can execute commands — on the host machine. Security is therefore a first-class concern.

Threat model & built-in protections

  • Authorization: only Telegram user ids in allowed_user_ids may drive the agent. Everyone else is refused. Keep this list to the device owner(s) only.
  • No shell injection: messages are passed to the agent as a single argv element; the bridge never uses shell=True.
  • Secret handling: the bot token lives only in a 0600 config file (its directory is 0700) or the TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN env var. It is never logged and is redacted in doctor / /status.
  • No inbound exposure: the bridge uses Telegram long polling, so no port needs to be opened to the internet.

Hardening recommendations

  • Run the bridge under a dedicated, least-privileged OS user.
  • Keep the connected agent CLI updated and logged in only to the intended account.
  • Review allowed_user_ids periodically.

Reporting a vulnerability

Please open a private security advisory on GitHub (Security → Report a vulnerability) or contact the maintainer rather than filing a public issue. We aim to respond within a few days.

There aren't any published security advisories