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Stop retrying a connected account that has failed 2953 times - #206

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Aug 18, 2026
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ralyodio merged 1 commit into
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Investigating why x/reddit/facebook weren't posting turned up something worse than a flake.

What's actually happening

Split is perfect, and it's not random:

auth_mode platforms 7-day result
oauth bluesky, discord, telegram posting fine, 0 consecutive failures
cookie reddit, x, facebook_page, linkedin 0 successes, every one failing
  • reddit — 383 attempts, 0 posted, 2,953 consecutive failures. Broken since 2026-08-14, when Reddit moved its composer to shreddit web components; 292 failures on shreddit-composer[name="body"] alone.
  • x (5/5 failed), facebook_page (5/6), linkedin (1/1) — all connected ~18:08 today, all failing on stale selectors, none has ever posted.
  • A separate 84-failures-per-platform block on 2026-08-17→18 was unrelated: openai: 429 You have no credits remaining. That cleared on its own at 09:53 today.

The bug this PR fixes

sp_account.consecutive_failures was incremented on failure and reset on success — and never read by anything.

The browser path does disable an account, but only on a recognised login wall. That's the cookies-are-dead failure. A site redesign produces a plain selector timeout instead, which no rule looked at, so the worker launched a real browser at a dead account every cadence tick for four days.

Both post paths now stop at 10 consecutive failures and set token_expired — already the UI's "reconnect" status, and one account selection skips.

The rule is its own dependency-free module: the Next server and the Playwright worker both need it, and the server must not pull the browser stack into its bundle to read one number.

What this does NOT fix

The selectors. The real fix is reconnecting those four over OAuth — already implemented here (app/api/sp/oauth/{reddit,x,linkedin,facebook}/start) and demonstrably the only mode that works. Driving somebody else's redesigned DOM will keep breaking; their API won't.

Tests

vitest run: 1648 passed / 0 failed. tsc --noEmit clean.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

sp_account.consecutive_failures was incremented on every failure and reset on
every success, and then never read by anything. So an account whose posting had
stopped working entirely was retried on every cadence tick, indefinitely.

One Reddit account is at 2,953 consecutive failures with zero successes. Over
the last seven days it was attempted 383 times and posted 0 times, each attempt
launching a real browser. Nothing surfaced this: the campaign looked healthy,
the account still read `active`, and the only trace was a `last_error` on rows
nobody had reason to open.

The browser path does disable an account, but only when it recognises a login
wall. That is the failure you get when cookies die. It is not the failure you
get when a site redesigns: then the selector simply stops matching and every
attempt fails with a plain timeout, which no rule looked at. Reddit moved its
composer to shreddit web components on 2026-08-14 and the account has failed on
`shreddit-composer[name="body"]` 292 times since.

So both post paths now stop at a ceiling of 10 consecutive failures and set
status token_expired — the status the UI already renders as "reconnect", and
one that account selection skips, so the retries stop and the user finds out.

The rule lives in its own dependency-free module because the Next server and
the Playwright worker both need it, and the server must not pull the browser
stack into its bundle to read one number.

This does not fix the selectors. The accounts that work are the OAuth ones;
every failing account is cookie-auth, and reconnecting those over OAuth — which
this codebase already implements for reddit, x, linkedin and facebook — skips
the browser entirely.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ThreatCrush Security Scan

35 finding(s)

HIGH/CRITICAL: 3 | MEDIUM: 23 | LOW: 9

Severity Rule Location
HIGH tls-verification-disabled lib/onion.ts:47
HIGH secret-generic-credential lib/sp/platforms/facebook.ts:32
HIGH sh-remote-script-execution prober/deploy/provision.sh:30
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(app)/dashboard/admin/email-broadcast/EmailBroadcastForm.tsx:125
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(app)/dashboard/projects/[id]/autoblog/articles/[articleId]/page.tsx:214
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:67
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:97
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:104
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:110
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/recent/page.tsx:186
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/recent/page.tsx:190
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/c/[project]/[slug]/page.tsx:77
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/c/[project]/page.tsx:57
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/careers.js/route.ts:228
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/careers.js/route.ts:285
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/layout.tsx:129
MEDIUM js-open-redirect app/login/form.tsx:39
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/r/[token]/page.tsx:176
MEDIUM js-open-redirect app/signup/form.tsx:43
MEDIUM js-open-redirect components/billing/buy-credits-modal.tsx:98
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink components/json-ld.tsx:8
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink components/report/markdown-view.tsx:15
MEDIUM redos-nested-quantifier lib/careers/jobs.ts:139
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink lib/careers/page-templates.ts:198
MEDIUM redos-nested-quantifier lib/emailMarkdown.ts:130
MEDIUM redos-nested-quantifier lib/lx/articleGen.ts:98
LOW secret-generic-credential app/(marketing)/docs/autoblog-webhook/page.tsx:145
LOW secret-generic-credential lib/sp/platforms/linkedin.ts:25
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/careers-page-templates.test.ts:21
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/careers-widget-script.test.ts:19
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/careers-widget-script.test.ts:69
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/contract/ad-visitor-id.test.ts:51
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/contract/ad-visitor-id.test.ts:52
LOW secret-generic-credential tests/contract/posthog-integration.test.ts:13
LOW secret-generic-credential tests/lead-campaign.test.ts:16

Snippets are redacted; ThreatCrush never prints matched credential material.

@ralyodio
ralyodio merged commit a1a7d30 into master Aug 18, 2026
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ralyodio added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2026
* docs(promote): reconcile the architecture doc with #205 and #206

The architecture doc was written in #204 and hasn't moved since, but two PRs
landed under it the same day and both changed things it describes as settled.

#205 added effectiveMix(): the ownership mix is narrowed to the classes a
campaign can actually supply before any deficit is computed. §4.1 still
described the raw configured mix, which is the version that mislabelled six
production posts as via_fallback and was three posts from silencing the
campaign. Someone reading §4 to extend the blend would have rebuilt the bug,
so the rule and the reason it exists are now in the doc rather than only in
the PR that fixed it. §4.2 gets the corresponding scope limit: covering for a
class the campaign never had is not a fallback and is not capped as one.

#206 added lib/sp/accountHealth.ts, which partly satisfies §14's "pause
campaigns after repeated provider rejections" — at the account layer, not the
campaign layer. Noted as half-built, because the Reddit provider will still
need the campaign-level version: a subreddit rejection is a destination fact,
not an account one.

Docs only; no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Make a Promote publication happen at most once (#AC10, #AC14)

The sweep decided and published in one pass, "claiming" a campaign by pushing
next_run_at forward. That UPDATE carried no predicate on next_run_at, so it was
a read-then-write: two sweeps that both read the row both won it. And the
worker runs the sweep on a 60s interval *and* out-of-band whenever someone
clicks "Post now", so overlapping runs are designed in, not rare.

Nothing downstream was idempotent either. If the process died after
postViaAccount() published but before the promo_post insert, there was no
record it had happened — and last_promoted_at is only stamped at the end of the
campaign, so the same link was still least-recently-promoted on the next tick
and went out again. The user sees a duplicate; the logs show nothing.

promo_job makes the intended publication the unit of work, written down before
anything is sent. Two mechanisms:

- Plan before publishing. Jobs are keyed on sha256(list, link, account,
  destination, kind, slot), where the slot is the next_run_at value the sweep
  observed as due. A racing sweep reads the same due row, derives the same
  keys, loses to the unique index, and gets nothing back — so it publishes
  nothing. Keying on the wall clock instead would give each sweep its own key
  and rebuild the bug.
- Claim by compare-and-swap: update ... where id = ? and state = 'queued'. Read
  and write are one statement, so two workers cannot both see 'queued'.

The campaign-level claim keeps its place but now carries its predicate. It is
an optimization — it avoids duplicated work. The guarantee is in the job.

AT MOST ONCE, ON PURPOSE. A job still 'publishing' past a 10 minute lease is
failed, never retried. No provider we publish through accepts an idempotency
key, so an interrupted publish has genuinely unknown outcome — it may be live.
Re-running it is the duplicate this exists to prevent. The reaper closes it with
the outcome recorded as unknown and leaves it in history for a human; the credit
is not refunded, because refunding a post that did land is the other way to be
wrong. Retry stays available for failures that provably happened before the
publish call, which is what 'retrying' and attempt_count are for.

Stray jobs are closed rather than left queued: nothing reclaims a queued job, so
one stranded by a disconnected account or a credit pause would sit there forever
misreporting the campaign as backed up.

MIGRATION FIRST. planJobs() logs loudly and publishes nothing if promo_job is
missing, rather than failing the select and stopping every campaign in silence
the way source_mix did. That is a guard, not the fix — apply
20260819120000_promote_jobs.sql before this deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Claim a campaign on "still due" rather than an exact timestamp match

The claim predicate compared next_run_at to the exact string we read back. That
is correct only if a timestamptz round-trips to a byte-identical value through
PostgREST, and if it ever did not, the update would match nothing, no campaign
would be claimed, and Promote would stop posting entirely with nothing in the
logs that looks like a failure. That is the same silent-stop shape the
source_mix migration cost us a day for, and it is not worth risking to save a
predicate.

Re-asserting the condition the select already used gives the same atomicity
with none of that exposure: the minimum cadence is 300s, so whoever wins the
claim pushes next_run_at well into the future and the loser's `lte` cannot
match. The scheduling slot the idempotency key is built from is still the
observed next_run_at, so racing sweeps still agree on the slot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(promote): match §9.2 to the claim predicate that shipped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(promote): key promo_job.user_id to profiles, like every other promote table

promo_list.user_id references public.profiles(id). Pointing promo_job at
auth.users instead would let a job outlive the profile row the rest of the
feature is keyed to, and would cascade differently from its own campaign.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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