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Stop an all-owned campaign posting its own links as fallbacks - #205

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Aug 18, 2026
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Follow-up to #204, found in production minutes after the migration landed.

What went wrong

The "lives" campaign (39 hand-pasted owned links, no content sources) posted 6 links at 19:14Z and flagged every one via_fallback. maxFallbackItemsPerDay is 3, so the next tick would have selected nothing and the campaign would have gone silent — no error, no paused status, just no posts.

Cause: the migration backfills every existing list with the 70/30 default mix. A campaign with no shared content reads that as "30% short on shared", finds none, and covers with owned content — which the policy scores as a fallback. It isn't one.

The fix

A class the campaign has no inventory and no source for is not starved — it's not part of that campaign's mix. effectiveMix() narrows the mix to classes that have a link ready or an enabled source feeding them.

  • All-owned campaign → 100%-owned effective mix → posts on target forever, exactly as before sources existed.
  • Add a keyword source → shared re-enters the mix, the ratio applies, and covering an empty shared queue genuinely is a fallback bounded by the daily cap.

Production already repaired

Not waiting on this merge — the data was fixed at 19:16Z:

  • Lists with no sources set to a 100%-owned mix (3 rows).
  • The 6 mislabelled posts had via_fallback cleared so the rolling cap stopped counting them.

Confirmed the 19:29Z tick would proceed normally.

Tests

  • New regression test at both levels: the pure blend, and selectNextLink reproducing the exact production shape (50 owned posts, 1 owned link, 0 sources).
  • 4 existing blend tests encoded the old "empty class is always starved" assumption; they now pass hasSource explicitly, which is what those scenarios always meant.
  • vitest run: 1638 passed / 0 failed. tsc --noEmit clean.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

Found in production minutes after the sources migration landed. The "lives"
campaign — 39 hand-pasted owned links, no content sources — posted six links
and flagged every one of them via_fallback. maxFallbackItemsPerDay is 3, so the
following tick would have selected nothing and the campaign would have gone
silent with no error anywhere.

The migration backfills every existing list with the 70/30 default mix. A
campaign with no shared content then reads that as "30% short on shared", finds
no shared inventory, and covers with owned content — which is, by the letter of
the policy, a fallback. It is not one. A class the campaign has no inventory and
no source for is not starved; it is simply not part of that campaign's mix.

So the mix is now narrowed to the classes a campaign can actually supply: a
class survives if it has a link ready or an enabled source feeding it. An
all-owned campaign ends up with a 100%-owned effective mix and posts on target
forever, exactly as it did before sources existed. The moment the user adds a
keyword source, shared re-enters the mix and the ratio starts applying — and
then covering for an empty shared queue genuinely is a fallback, and the daily
cap genuinely should bound it.

Four existing blend tests encoded the old assumption that an empty class is
always starved. They now pass hasSource explicitly, which is what those
scenarios always meant.

Production data was repaired alongside this: lists with no sources were set to
a 100%-owned mix, and the six mislabelled posts had via_fallback cleared so the
rolling cap stopped counting them.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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ThreatCrush Security Scan

35 finding(s)

HIGH/CRITICAL: 3 | MEDIUM: 23 | LOW: 9

Severity Rule Location
HIGH tls-verification-disabled lib/onion.ts:47
HIGH secret-generic-credential lib/sp/platforms/facebook.ts:32
HIGH sh-remote-script-execution prober/deploy/provision.sh:30
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(app)/dashboard/admin/email-broadcast/EmailBroadcastForm.tsx:125
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(app)/dashboard/projects/[id]/autoblog/articles/[articleId]/page.tsx:214
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:67
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:97
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:104
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/blog/[slug]/page.tsx:110
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/recent/page.tsx:186
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/(marketing)/recent/page.tsx:190
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/c/[project]/[slug]/page.tsx:77
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/c/[project]/page.tsx:57
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/careers.js/route.ts:228
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/careers.js/route.ts:285
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/layout.tsx:129
MEDIUM js-open-redirect app/login/form.tsx:39
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink app/r/[token]/page.tsx:176
MEDIUM js-open-redirect app/signup/form.tsx:43
MEDIUM js-open-redirect components/billing/buy-credits-modal.tsx:98
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink components/json-ld.tsx:8
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink components/report/markdown-view.tsx:15
MEDIUM redos-nested-quantifier lib/careers/jobs.ts:139
MEDIUM js-unescaped-html-sink lib/careers/page-templates.ts:198
MEDIUM redos-nested-quantifier lib/emailMarkdown.ts:130
MEDIUM redos-nested-quantifier lib/lx/articleGen.ts:98
LOW secret-generic-credential app/(marketing)/docs/autoblog-webhook/page.tsx:145
LOW secret-generic-credential lib/sp/platforms/linkedin.ts:25
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/careers-page-templates.test.ts:21
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/careers-widget-script.test.ts:19
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/careers-widget-script.test.ts:69
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/contract/ad-visitor-id.test.ts:51
LOW js-dynamic-code-execution tests/contract/ad-visitor-id.test.ts:52
LOW secret-generic-credential tests/contract/posthog-integration.test.ts:13
LOW secret-generic-credential tests/lead-campaign.test.ts:16

Snippets are redacted; ThreatCrush never prints matched credential material.

@ralyodio
ralyodio merged commit b7a9e9e into master Aug 18, 2026
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ralyodio added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2026
* docs(promote): reconcile the architecture doc with #205 and #206

The architecture doc was written in #204 and hasn't moved since, but two PRs
landed under it the same day and both changed things it describes as settled.

#205 added effectiveMix(): the ownership mix is narrowed to the classes a
campaign can actually supply before any deficit is computed. §4.1 still
described the raw configured mix, which is the version that mislabelled six
production posts as via_fallback and was three posts from silencing the
campaign. Someone reading §4 to extend the blend would have rebuilt the bug,
so the rule and the reason it exists are now in the doc rather than only in
the PR that fixed it. §4.2 gets the corresponding scope limit: covering for a
class the campaign never had is not a fallback and is not capped as one.

#206 added lib/sp/accountHealth.ts, which partly satisfies §14's "pause
campaigns after repeated provider rejections" — at the account layer, not the
campaign layer. Noted as half-built, because the Reddit provider will still
need the campaign-level version: a subreddit rejection is a destination fact,
not an account one.

Docs only; no behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Make a Promote publication happen at most once (#AC10, #AC14)

The sweep decided and published in one pass, "claiming" a campaign by pushing
next_run_at forward. That UPDATE carried no predicate on next_run_at, so it was
a read-then-write: two sweeps that both read the row both won it. And the
worker runs the sweep on a 60s interval *and* out-of-band whenever someone
clicks "Post now", so overlapping runs are designed in, not rare.

Nothing downstream was idempotent either. If the process died after
postViaAccount() published but before the promo_post insert, there was no
record it had happened — and last_promoted_at is only stamped at the end of the
campaign, so the same link was still least-recently-promoted on the next tick
and went out again. The user sees a duplicate; the logs show nothing.

promo_job makes the intended publication the unit of work, written down before
anything is sent. Two mechanisms:

- Plan before publishing. Jobs are keyed on sha256(list, link, account,
  destination, kind, slot), where the slot is the next_run_at value the sweep
  observed as due. A racing sweep reads the same due row, derives the same
  keys, loses to the unique index, and gets nothing back — so it publishes
  nothing. Keying on the wall clock instead would give each sweep its own key
  and rebuild the bug.
- Claim by compare-and-swap: update ... where id = ? and state = 'queued'. Read
  and write are one statement, so two workers cannot both see 'queued'.

The campaign-level claim keeps its place but now carries its predicate. It is
an optimization — it avoids duplicated work. The guarantee is in the job.

AT MOST ONCE, ON PURPOSE. A job still 'publishing' past a 10 minute lease is
failed, never retried. No provider we publish through accepts an idempotency
key, so an interrupted publish has genuinely unknown outcome — it may be live.
Re-running it is the duplicate this exists to prevent. The reaper closes it with
the outcome recorded as unknown and leaves it in history for a human; the credit
is not refunded, because refunding a post that did land is the other way to be
wrong. Retry stays available for failures that provably happened before the
publish call, which is what 'retrying' and attempt_count are for.

Stray jobs are closed rather than left queued: nothing reclaims a queued job, so
one stranded by a disconnected account or a credit pause would sit there forever
misreporting the campaign as backed up.

MIGRATION FIRST. planJobs() logs loudly and publishes nothing if promo_job is
missing, rather than failing the select and stopping every campaign in silence
the way source_mix did. That is a guard, not the fix — apply
20260819120000_promote_jobs.sql before this deploys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* Claim a campaign on "still due" rather than an exact timestamp match

The claim predicate compared next_run_at to the exact string we read back. That
is correct only if a timestamptz round-trips to a byte-identical value through
PostgREST, and if it ever did not, the update would match nothing, no campaign
would be claimed, and Promote would stop posting entirely with nothing in the
logs that looks like a failure. That is the same silent-stop shape the
source_mix migration cost us a day for, and it is not worth risking to save a
predicate.

Re-asserting the condition the select already used gives the same atomicity
with none of that exposure: the minimum cadence is 300s, so whoever wins the
claim pushes next_run_at well into the future and the loser's `lte` cannot
match. The scheduling slot the idempotency key is built from is still the
observed next_run_at, so racing sweeps still agree on the slot.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(promote): match §9.2 to the claim predicate that shipped

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(promote): key promo_job.user_id to profiles, like every other promote table

promo_list.user_id references public.profiles(id). Pointing promo_job at
auth.users instead would let a job outlive the profile row the rest of the
feature is keyed to, and would cascade differently from its own campaign.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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