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115 changes: 115 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/claude.yml
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name: Claude

# Answers `@claude` in an issue, a pull request comment, an inline review comment or a review body,
# with the Claude Code GitHub Action (https://code.claude.com/docs/en/github-actions). Its main job is
# reviewing pull requests, including ones from outside contributors' forks.
#
# It signs in with the maintainer's Claude SUBSCRIPTION, not an API key: the repository secret
# CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN holds the long-lived token `claude setup-token` prints, and every run counts
# against that subscription's usage. To rotate it, run `claude setup-token` again and
# `gh secret set CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN`; deleting the secret turns this workflow off (the job fails).
#
# WHO CAN START IT. The `if:` lets only an owner, member or collaborator through, so a stranger's
# `@claude` on this public repository does not start a runner; the action then checks again that the
# commenter has write access, and refuses bot actors. What Claude READS is another matter: the issue or
# pull request text, every comment on it and, on a pull request, the contributor's whole tree. Mention
# `@claude` on an outsider's thread only after reading what is there.
#
# PULL REQUESTS FROM FORKS. Only a comment in the conversation (`issue_comment`) works there: it runs
# this file from the default branch with its secrets. GitHub gives a fork's review and inline review
# comment events no secrets, so `@claude` in a review on a fork's pull request fails for want of a token.
# The action checks out the pull request's HEAD and restores only `.claude/`, CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md and a
# few config files from the default branch. `.claude/skills` and `.claude/agents/*.md` are links into
# `.agents/`, and the nested module guides are not restored, so on a fork those come from the
# contributor. The job is therefore built so that the checkout's tooling does not run on its own, and
# whatever Claude is talked into, the token it holds cannot publish. The command rules below are
# prefix rules, not a boundary (an absolute path or another program gets past them); the real limits
# are the token's scope and the credential scrub:
#
# - The GitHub token is the job's own GITHUB_TOKEN (`github_token:` below), bounded by `permissions:`:
# it can comment on issues and pull requests and read CI, and it cannot push a commit, a branch or a
# tag. (The Claude GitHub App's token, the action's default, can write every repository in the
# organization, and release.yml publishes whatever `v*` tag is pushed.) Its comments are signed
# github-actions[bot], and it cannot push the `pr-N` branch the action would otherwise make of a fork.
# No `id-token: write`: with a token passed in, the action does not need OIDC, and an OIDC token from
# the default branch would satisfy this repository's Anthropic federation rule (issue-labels.yml).
# - Project hooks are off (`disableAllHooks`): the SessionEnd hook runs `tools/build-gc.sh`, which on a
# fork is the contributor's copy. Every hook in `.claude/settings.json` is tooling for the maintainer's
# Mac anyway.
# - Skills and subagents are off (`Skill`, `Agent`, `Task` disallowed, `disableSkillShellExecution`): on
# a fork they are the contributor's, and a skill can grant itself tools.
# - The obvious network and publishing commands are disallowed (`curl`, `wget`, `gh`, `git push`,
# `git tag`), and so are the repository's `tools/` scripts, which `.claude/settings.json` allows and
# which on a fork are the contributor's. Claude comments through the action's own tools, inline
# review comments included. For an author without write access the action also denies interpreters,
# shells, package managers and build tools, and turns git hooks off.
# - `Read` may not open /proc, where Claude's own environment (the subscription token) is readable.
# - `CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB` strips the Anthropic credentials from the commands Claude runs, and
# the sandbox step installs bubblewrap so those commands run in their own PID namespace and cannot read
# Claude's environment from /proc. GH_TOKEN stays in the environment; it is the short-lived job token.

on:
issue_comment:
types: [created]
pull_request_review_comment:
types: [created]
pull_request_review:
types: [submitted]
issues:
types: [opened]

concurrency:
group: claude-${{ github.event.issue.number || github.event.pull_request.number }}
cancel-in-progress: false

jobs:
claude:
if: |
(github.event_name == 'issue_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') &&
contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review_comment' && contains(github.event.comment.body, '@claude') &&
contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.comment.author_association)) ||
(github.event_name == 'pull_request_review' && contains(github.event.review.body, '@claude') &&
contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.review.author_association)) ||
(github.event_name == 'issues' &&
(contains(github.event.issue.body, '@claude') || contains(github.event.issue.title, '@claude')) &&
contains(fromJSON('["OWNER","MEMBER","COLLABORATOR"]'), github.event.issue.author_association))
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 60
permissions:
contents: read
pull-requests: write # inline review comments
issues: write # the progress comment, on an issue or a pull request's conversation
actions: read # lets Claude read a pull request's CI results
steps:
- name: Checkout repository
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
fetch-depth: 1
persist-credentials: false

# The same setup the action runs for `allowed_non_write_users`: bubblewrap gives the scrubbed
# commands their own PID namespace, and Ubuntu 24.04 needs unprivileged user namespaces allowed.
# This runs from the default branch's checkout: the action checks the pull request out later.
- name: Install the sandbox for Claude's commands
uses: ./.github/actions/apt-install
with:
packages: bubblewrap socat
- name: Allow unprivileged user namespaces for the sandbox
run: |
if [ -f /proc/sys/kernel/apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns ]; then
sudo sysctl -w kernel.apparmor_restrict_unprivileged_userns=0
fi

- name: Run Claude Code
env:
CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB: "1"
uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@f431adaf77e0fecf918431e75a2b5b45b85af002 # v1.0.283
with:
claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }}
github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
claude_args: >-
--settings '{"disableAllHooks":true,"disableSkillShellExecution":true}'
--disallowedTools "Skill" "Agent" "Task" "Bash(curl:*)" "Bash(wget:*)" "Bash(gh:*)"
"Bash(git push:*)" "Bash(git tag:*)" "Bash(tools/:*)" "Bash(./tools/:*)" "Read(//proc/**)"
--allowedTools "mcp__github_inline_comment__create_inline_comment"
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