🔒 Fix insecure randomness seeding in seed_random#10
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…evice The seed_random function was generating seeds based on the current system time, which is highly predictable and insecure for PRNG usage. This commit replaces the high_resolution_clock with std::random_device to fetch hardware/OS-level entropy, shifting two 32-bit values to properly generate a secure 64-bit seed. Co-authored-by: perim <436583+perim@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: The vulnerability fixed
Replaced an insecure time-based seed source in
seed_randomwithstd::random_device.System time is predictable. An attacker can predict the sequence of pseudo-random outcomes from a time-seeded generator if they know roughly when it was initialized.
🛡️ Solution: How the fix addresses the vulnerability
The fix uses
std::random_deviceto provide a non-deterministic source of true entropy provided by the OS or hardware for generating the initial 64-bit seed.PR created automatically by Jules for task 9524878788825339724 started by @perim