chore(deps): update dependency immutable@>=5.0.0 <5.1.5 to v5.1.8 [security]

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
immutable@>=5.0.0 <5.1.5 (source)	[5.1.5 → 5.1.8](https://renovatebot.com/diffs/npm/immutable@>=5.0.0 <5.1.5/5.1.5/5.1.8)

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Immutable.js List 32-bit trie overflow → unrecoverable DoS

CVE-2026-59879 / GHSA-v56q-mh7h-f735

More information

Details

Summary

List#set, List#setSize, List#setIn, List#updateIn (and the functional set / setIn / updateIn) mishandle an index or size in the range [2 ** 30, 2 ** 31):

• On an empty List the operation enters an uncatchable infinite loop (a tight CPU spin; a surrounding try/catch never regains control). Only killing the worker recovers it.
• On a populated List (≥ 32 elements — i.e. any array of ≥ 32 items turned into a List by fromJS) the loop allocates without bound → heap exhaustion → the process aborts (SIGABRT, exit 134, or kernel OOM-kill 137). A real crash, not a recoverable error.

The index may be a numeric string, so it can come straight from a request body, URL, or key-path. A single small unauthenticated request is enough.

There is also a companion silent data-corruption issue in setSize:

List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 31); // before fix => size 0  (silently cleared)
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 32 + 5); // before fix => size 5  (huge value wraps to 5)

Impact

Availability only. A reachable configuration is any endpoint that routes untrusted input into a List index or a setIn/updateIn key-path — which the extremely common state = fromJS(body); state.setIn(userPath, value) pattern does (config stores, document/collection editors, redux-immutable reducers, JSON-Patch endpoints, etc.).

No confidentiality or integrity impact, no RCE. The companion setSize bug can silently corrupt application state (wrong size) without crashing.

Reproduction (immutable 5.1.7)

import { fromJS, List } from 'immutable';

// 1) Populated List: OOM -> process abort (SIGABRT, exit 134) within ~2s
fromJS({ items: new Array(64).fill(0) }).setIn(['items', '1073741824'], 'x');

// 2) Empty List: hangs forever, uncatchable
List().set(2 ** 30, 'x');

// 3) Silent truncation
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 31); // => size 0
List([1, 2, 3]).setSize(2 ** 32 + 5); // => size 5

A remote 43-byte HTTP request ({"path":["items","1073741824"],"value":"x"}) is sufficient to abort a worker that applies it via state = state.setIn(path, value).

Any index in [2 ** 30, 2 ** 31) works (1073741824, 2000000000, …). An index in [2 ** 31, 2 ** 32) does not crash — it silently wraps (clearing the List) via the same root cause.

Root cause

List stores its values in a 32-wide trie (SHIFT = 5, so each level addresses 5 more bits) and uses signed 32-bit bitwise arithmetic throughout setListBounds() (src/List.js):

1. Infinite loop (the hang / OOM). The level-raising loop

while (newTailOffset >= 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT)) {
  newRoot = new VNode(
    newRoot && newRoot.array.length ? [newRoot] : [],
    owner
  );
  newLevel += SHIFT;
}

relies on 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT). A JavaScript shift count is taken mod 32, so once newLevel + SHIFT reaches 31 the term goes negative (1 << 31 === -2147483648) and at 32 wraps to 1 (1 << 35 === 8). The comparison then stays true forever and the loop never terminates. On a populated List, each iteration retains a new VNode ([newRoot]), so the heap fills and V8 aborts; on an empty List it spins on CPU without allocating.

2. Silent wraparound (the setSize corruption). The begin |= 0 / end |= 0 coercion (ToInt32) silently wraps large finite values ((2 ** 31) | 0 === -2147483648, (2 ** 32 + 5) | 0 === 5), producing a wrong resulting size instead of an error.

The threshold is 2 ** 30: that is the largest size for which 1 << (newLevel + SHIFT) stays a valid positive 32-bit integer throughout the loops (newLevel + SHIFT stays ≤ 30).

Remediation

The fix is contained to setListBounds() in src/List.js:

1. Validate up front, before the lossy | 0 coercion. Compute the intended origin and capacity in full precision and throw a clear, catchable RangeError when they exceed the addressable range (MAX_LIST_SIZE = 2 ** 30). Infinity/NaN are left to the existing | 0 → 0 behaviour (so setSize(Infinity) stays 0 and slice(0, Infinity) still means "to the end").

2. Stop the shift from wrapping. Replace 1 << exp in the level-raising loops with a helper that uses the cheap bitwise shift while it is exact (exp ≤ 30, the common path including every push/setSize/slice) and falls back to the non-wrapping 2 ** exp only for the rare deep trees reached when a negative origin (unshift / negative index) is normalized to a large positive capacity (exp can reach 35 there, where 1 << 35 would wrap to 8).

This turns every hang, the misleading "Maximum call stack size exceeded", the OOM/SIGABRT, and the silent setSize truncation into one descriptive RangeError, preserves all behaviour for sizes < 2 ** 30, and keeps the hot push path on the fast bitwise shift (the 2 ** exp branch is never reached by non-negative operations).

Is the new limit a breaking change?

No working code is affected. A List could never actually hold ≥ 2 ** 30 values before — the attempt hung, crashed, or silently corrupted the size. The limit was already implicit in the 32-bit trie; the fix only makes it explicit and catchable, mirroring native JS arrays (new Array(2 ** 32) → RangeError: Invalid array length). The single observable behaviour change is that setSize(hugeValue), which used to return a silently wrong size, now throws. 2 ** 30 ≈ 1.07 billion entries (~8 GB of pointers alone), far beyond any practical use.

Mitigations (for users who cannot upgrade immediately)

• Validate/clamp any externally supplied List index or setIn/updateIn key-path segment against a sane maximum before passing it to immutable.
• Reject numeric path segments ≥ 2 ** 30.
• Run request handling in a worker that can be restarted, and cap the heap (--max-old-space-size) so an abort is contained.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/security/advisories/GHSA-v56q-mh7h-f735
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59879
• https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/a1a1ee412dcaa380ab325196283d06594ffe4b84
• https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/commit/f0bc997d8eb9886aff2236635aa210a95a04304a
• https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v4.3.9
• https://github.com/immutable-js/immutable-js/releases/tag/v5.1.8
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v56q-mh7h-f735

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

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Release Notes

immutable-js/immutable-js (immutable@>=5.0.0 <5.1.5)

v5.1.8

Compare Source

• fix(List): guard oversized bounds in setListBounds. Fixes CVE GHSA-v56q-mh7h-f735
• perf(Map): index large hash-collision buckets for faster lookups. Fixes CVE GHSA-xvcm-6775-5m9r

v5.1.7

Compare Source

• fix(Repeat): lastIndexOf returned size instead of size - 1 by @​chatman-media in #​2227. Fixes CVE CVE-2026-29063

v5.1.6

Compare Source

• fix(reverseFactory): read reversedSequence.size in __iterator instead of this #​2196

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