Skip to content

Onboard new backport-pr re-usable github workflow (security-analytics) - #1740

Merged
peterzhuamazon merged 2 commits into
opensearch-project:mainfrom
peterzhuamazon:update-backport-workflow
Jul 31, 2026
Merged

Onboard new backport-pr re-usable github workflow (security-analytics)#1740
peterzhuamazon merged 2 commits into
opensearch-project:mainfrom
peterzhuamazon:update-backport-workflow

Conversation

@peterzhuamazon

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

Description

Onboard new backport-pr re-usable github workflow (security-analytics)

Issues Resolved

opensearch-project/opensearch-build#6270

By submitting this pull request, I confirm that my contribution is made under the terms of the Apache 2.0 license.
For more information on following Developer Certificate of Origin and signing off your commits, please check here.

- Replace old backport workflow with reusable workflow from opensearch-build
- Remove obsolete backport-related workflows

Signed-off-by: Peter Zhu <zhujiaxi@amazon.com>
…cs into update-backport-workflow

Signed-off-by: Peter Zhu <zhujiaxi@amazon.com>
@peterzhuamazon
peterzhuamazon merged commit ff1fd05 into opensearch-project:main Jul 31, 2026
9 of 10 checks passed
@github-project-automation github-project-automation Bot moved this from 👀 In Review to ✅ Done in Engineering Effectiveness Board Jul 31, 2026
@github-actions

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

PR Code Analyzer ❗

AI-powered 'Code-Diff-Analyzer' found issues on commit 937af0f.

Hard block: Issues at High severity or above will block this PR from merging.

PathLineSeverityDescription
.github/workflows/backport.yml12highReusable workflow referenced by mutable branch ref '@main' instead of a pinned commit SHA. Any change to 'opensearch-project/opensearch-build/.github/workflows/backport-pr.yml' on the main branch will automatically be picked up without review, enabling a supply chain attack if that repository is compromised or a malicious commit is merged there.
.github/workflows/backport.yml13highThe OPENSEARCH_CI_BOT_TOKEN secret is passed to an externally-owned, mutable reusable workflow triggered by 'pull_request_target' (which runs in the base repo context with full secret access). This combination is a well-known secret-exfiltration vector: a malicious actor who can modify the referenced external workflow could harvest the token.

The table above displays the top 10 most important findings.

Total: 2 | Critical: 0 | High: 2 | Medium: 0 | Low: 0


Pull Requests Author(s): Please update your Pull Request according to the report above.

Repository Maintainer(s): You can bypass diff analyzer by adding label skip-diff-analyzer after reviewing the changes carefully, then re-run failed actions. To re-enable the analyzer, remove the label, then re-run all actions.


⚠️ Note: The Code-Diff-Analyzer helps protect against potentially harmful code patterns. Please ensure you have thoroughly reviewed the changes beforehand.

Thanks.

Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

enhancement New feature or request

Projects

Status: ✅ Done

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

3 participants