kbs: zeroize JWE key material to prevent recovery from memory#183
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Sensitive key material in the JWE encryption paths -- the ECDH shared secret, its KDF-derived wrapping key, and the CEK -- could survive in heap or stack memory after use, making it recoverable via a memory disclosure primitive, process core dump, or cold-boot attack. Wrap all of these in Zeroizing so they are overwritten on drop. Enable the zeroize feature on aes-gcm, aes, and polyval so the AES and GHASH key schedules are also cleared by the crates themselves. Note: the AES key schedule inside aes-kw's KekAes256 cannot be covered because it derives Copy, precluding ZeroizeOnDrop. Adapted from confidential-containers/trustee 2274aa44bc01f2e231fe5d0a1654203f820302ec to this fork's jwe.rs layout (P-256 only, concat-kdf crate, aes-kw Kek API, thread_rng/log). Purely internal hardening: no API, config, or wire-format change; externally unobservable. Signed-off-by: Jiale Zhang <xinjian.zjl@alibaba-inc.com>
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@jialez0 ，您好，您的请求已接收，请耐心等待结果。 |
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@jialez0 ，您好，未检测到有镜像需要构建，如需重新检测请评论 /start 。 |
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背景
吸收上游 confidential-containers/trustee 的 JWE 密钥材料 zeroize 安全加固，降低密钥在内存/core dump/cold-boot 场景下被恢复的风险。
2274aa44（kbs: zeroize JWE key material to prevent recovery from memory）改动内容
kbs/src/jwe.rs：将 ECDH 共享密钥z、KDF 派生的 wrapping key、CEK、以及 RSA 路径的 AES 对称密钥用zeroize::Zeroizing包装，drop 时清零。kbs/Cargo.toml：为aes-gcm/aes/polyval启用zeroizefeature（使 AES、GHASH key schedule 也被各自 crate 清零）；将zeroize依赖转为常驻（从encrypted-dbfeature 列表移除）。适配说明（相对上游）
按本 fork 的
jwe.rs布局重写（仅 P-256、使用concat_kdf::derive_key_into、aes_kw::KekAPI、thread_rng/log），而非直接 cherry-pick coco 的不同实现。兼容性
验证
cargo check -p kbs通过。cargo test -p kbs --lib jwe::—— 3 个 JWE 兼容性测试全部通过（EC ECDH-ES+A256KW / RSA-OAEP-256 / RSA1.5，均用 josekit 解密回验），证明加密逻辑未被破坏。