docs(adr): ADR-0135 mirrors the open half of cloud ADR-0024 — identity & access architecture

docs/adr/0135-identity-and-access-architecture.md

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+# ADR-0135: Identity and access architecture — the open half, mirrored from cloud ADR-0024
+
+**Status**: The DECISION is Accepted — it is `objectstack-ai/cloud` ADR-0024, accepted there on
+2026-06-25, and its mechanism half is implemented in this repository today. ⚠️ This **file** is a
+mirror awaiting the maintainer's hand-merge (`docs/adr/**` is a governed surface, AGENTS.md Prime
+Directive #14), so merging it settles the RECORD, not the decision. ⛔ Nothing below is decided
+here: a clause that cloud ADR-0024 did not decide is not decided by this file either.
+**Decided**: 2026-06-25, by the founder, in `objectstack-ai/cloud`
+`docs/adr/0024-identity-and-access-architecture.md` (Status: Accepted there).
+**Mirrored**: 2026-09-07, under the maintainer's ruling of 2026-09-02 on
+[#14496](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/14496) — verbatim and untranslated,
+「ok」 to option 2: mirror the open half, ⛔ do not move files, ⛔ do not renumber. Recorded by
+[#14506](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/14506).
+**Shape**: [ADR-0079](./0079-record-display-name.md) — the same cross-repo split, the same
+Provenance-section discipline.
+**Builds on**: [ADR-0068](./0068-unified-user-context-and-built-in-identity-roles.md) (the one
+platform-admin derivation this record's D5 leans on), [ADR-0092](./0092-sys-user-profile-field-delegation.md)
+(the identity write guard that keeps the generic data path out of a better-auth table),
+[ADR-0093](./0093-tenancy-mode-and-membership-lifecycle.md) and
+[ADR-0105](./0105-group-tenancy-posture-and-first-class-org-scope.md) (membership lifecycle and
+org scope), [ADR-0095](./0095-authz-kernel-tenant-layer-and-posture-ladder.md) and
+[ADR-0108](./0108-membership-grade-is-not-a-capability-channel.md) (authorization is derived in
+the environment, and a membership grade is not a capability channel).
+**Consumers**: `@objectstack/plugin-auth` (the whole package), `@objectstack/platform-objects`
+(the `identity/` object set), `@objectstack/core` (`security/resolve-authz-context.ts`).
+
+---
+
+## Provenance — read this before citing this file
+
+**This file records, in this repository, decisions taken in `objectstack-ai/cloud` ADR-0024 on
+2026-06-25.** The cloud record is the original. It is not superseded, not moved and not
+renumbered; it keeps the commercial half of the same decision, and where this file and the cloud
+record differ, **the cloud record is the decision and this file is the bug** — say so in an issue
+and this file gets corrected.
+
+Three facts make that disclosure load-bearing rather than decorative.
+
+1. **Why the record is split at all.** AGENTS.md Prime Directive #13 states the rule this file
+   obeys: *an ADR lives in the repository whose code it governs*; decisions that draw the
+   open/closed or commercial boundary live in `cloud`, and when such a decision's **mechanism
+   half** governs open code here, this repository carries its own ADR with its own number, a
+   Provenance section naming the cloud record and its date, and the commercial half left where it
+   was. That rule was itself adopted by the 2026-09-02 ruling cited above.
+
+2. **This file was written from the cloud record's decision list and from the code that
+   implements it**, by a seat that could not open the `cloud` repository. What is quoted here is
+   quoted from *this* tree; what is attributed to cloud ADR-0024 is attributed at the granularity
+   the ruling's execution card carried (its decision letters and their headings), never at
+   sentence granularity. Every mechanism claim below carries a symbol anchor into this tree, so a
+   reader can check the mechanism half without cloud access. The attribution half is what cloud
+   access would check.
+
+3. **⚠️ A bare `ADR-0024` in this repository's code does NOT resolve to this record — it never
+   did, and this file does not change that.** `docs/adr/0024-mcp-connectors.md` is a real,
+   unrelated record in this registry, and the two numbering series are independent, which is
+   exactly why AGENTS.md forbids the bare form and requires `cloud ADR-NNNN`. The same trap sits
+   one number away: cloud ADR-0071 is the env-side SCIM mechanism, while this registry's `0071`
+   is the dataset semantic-layer depth record. Re-pointing the identity surface's existing bare
+   citations at this record is
+   [#14361](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/14361)'s job and ⛔ was
+   deliberately not done in the change that added this file: on the commit that introduced it,
+   `git grep -n -E "ADR-0024" -- packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src packages/platform-objects/src/identity`
+   minus the `cloud ADR-0024` spellings still measured **64** citing lines.
+
+---
+
+## Context
+
+An ObjectStack environment is a running system with its own database, its own metadata and its
+own users. Two questions had to be answered together, and answering either one alone produces an
+architecture that cannot hold: **where does an identity come from**, and **where is the decision
+made about what that identity may do**.
+
+The tempting answer for a multi-environment product is one central directory: users sign in once,
+the platform knows everybody, environments ask it. That answer forecloses the two properties this
+platform is built to keep — an environment that can be self-hosted with no vendor in the loop,
+and a customer whose employees already live in the customer's own identity provider. cloud
+ADR-0024 chose the other direction, and the mechanism half of that choice is what this repository
+implements: authentication runs *in* the environment, federation is something the environment's
+operator configures, and authorization is never delegated at all.
+
+---
+
+## Decision
+
+Each clause below is cloud ADR-0024's, restated in this repository's words, with the code that
+enforces it. The lettering is the cloud record's, kept so that a citation of `cloud ADR-0024 D5.2`
+and a citation of this record's D5.2 name the same clause.
+
+### D1 — Identity is per-environment, and never centralised
+
+Every environment authenticates its own users. The authentication stack runs **inside** the
+environment process; there is no central authentication service that an environment must reach in
+order to sign a user in. An environment cut off from every other ObjectStack deployment still
+works.
+
+The mechanism is better-auth, mounted by the environment's own plugin
+(`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts#AuthPlugin`) and built in-process
+(`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts#AuthManager`). It persists through the
+environment's **own** data engine rather than any remote store: the vendor's model names are
+bridged onto this platform's system objects by
+`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/objectql-adapter.ts#AUTH_MODEL_TO_PROTOCOL`, so the directory is
+a set of tables in the environment's database.
+
+### D2 — Two user populations, two sources of truth
+
+The people who reach an environment are not one population. Some identities are **owned by an
+external directory** — an identity provider the operator registered; others are **the
+environment's own**. Each population keeps its own source of truth, and the platform does not
+collapse the two into a single authority: the environment's tables hold a row for both, but for a
+managed identity that row is a mirror, and the directory that owns it remains the authority for
+the facts it owns.
+
+The distinction is a first-class column, not an inference:
+`packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-user.object.ts#source` carries exactly two values,
+`idp_provisioned` and `env_native`, and its declaration states the split it exists for —
+federated-SSO JIT provisioning on one side, local signup and app end-users on the other. The
+provider links that justify a value live in
+`packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-account.object.ts`.
+
+### D4 — Source-of-truth marking: managed vs env-native
+
+Which side of D2 a row is on must be **marked**, and the marking must be produced by the system
+rather than typed by an operator, because everything downstream gates on it.
+
+Two markings do that work, at two levels:
+
+- **The table** is marked as owned by the auth vendor —
+  `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-user.object.ts#managedBy`,
+  `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-member.object.ts#managedBy`,
+  `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-sso-provider.object.ts#managedBy` all declare
+  `better-auth`. Under [ADR-0092](./0092-sys-user-profile-field-delegation.md) that declaration is
+  what makes the generic data path fail-closed on those tables.
+- **The row** is marked with its provenance — `sys_user.source`, stamped automatically as accounts
+  are linked and never edited by hand. Two writers keep it true, because the two creation paths do
+  not share a seam: better-auth's `account.create.after` hook in
+  `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts`, and an ObjectQL `afterInsert` hook on
+  `sys_account` in `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-plugin.ts` for adapter-level creates
+  that bypass the vendor hook. Both are idempotent, both fail open on the write, and both log
+  loudly when the stamp does not land — a row that silently keeps the wrong `source` is how a
+  managed user is offered the local-password action D5.2 exists to hide.
+
+### D5 — Identity comes from the IdP; authorization is decided in the environment
+
+Authentication may be delegated. **Authorization never is.** What a signed-in principal may do is
+derived from the environment's own grant tables at the moment it is asked, from evidence the
+environment stores — never from a claim the identity provider asserted, and never from a role
+string carried in on a token.
+
+`packages/core/src/security/resolve-authz-context.ts#resolveUserAuthzGrants` is that derivation,
+and `#hasPlatformAdminStanding` is its id-shaped projection: platform standing is an unscoped,
+in-window `sys_user_permission_set` grant of `admin_full_access`, held now — the ADR-0068 D2
+definition, read from this environment's tables. Organization grade is read the same way, from
+`sys_member`, through the one predicate every consumer asks
+(`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/invitation-role-cap.ts#isOrgAdminGrade`), and
+`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/member-role-canonical.ts#registerMemberRoleCanonicalization`
+normalises the stored spelling before any guard judges it.
+
+### D5.2 — The local user-management surface under SSO, split by population
+
+An environment that has adopted SSO still needs a user-management surface, and that surface is
+**split by the D2/D4 population**, not switched off wholesale:
+
+- **Managed identities hold no local credential**, so the actions that would mint or change one
+  are hidden for them rather than merely failing:
+  `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-user.object.ts#change_my_password` and
+  `#change_my_email` are visible only when the row's `source` is not `idp_provisioned`. The point
+  is not tidiness — a managed user who could self-mint a password would have a route around
+  enforced SSO.
+- **Break-glass keeps a local credential reachable.** An environment-native owner, or an
+  SSO-onboarded user setting an *initial* password, goes through
+  `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/set-initial-password.ts#runSetInitialPassword`; the admin-side
+  equivalent is `packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-user.object.ts#set_user_password`.
+  Gaining a local credential flips the row back to `env_native` (D4's stamp), so the owner never
+  loses self-service password management.
+- **An environment may never be left with zero administrators who can sign in.**
+  `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/last-admin-guard.ts#registerLastAdminGuard` holds that
+  invariant across every write shape that could take the last administrator away — a ban, a row
+  delete, and the revocations that leave the user row untouched — and it refuses for **every**
+  context, `isSystem` included, because the paths that actually lock an organization out are the
+  system ones.
+
+### D6 — SSO per production environment, configured in the environment
+
+A production environment federates login to the customer's own identity provider, and that
+federation is **configured in the environment** by its operator — not provisioned centrally.
+
+`packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-sso-provider.object.ts#SysSsoProvider` is the
+registered-provider table, backed by `@better-auth/sso`, env-global and admin-only. Every mutation
+routes through the vendor's own endpoints rather than the generic data layer, so config validation
+and secret handling run: `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/register-sso-provider.ts`, with the
+model bridged at the adapter layer (`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-schema-config.ts`
+records why the bridge sits there and not on the plugin's `schema` option).
+
+**Domain verification is opt-in** — the clause this repository's code cites as `ADR-0024 ②`. When
+the environment turns it on, `@better-auth/sso` mounts a DNS-TXT proof-of-ownership challenge and
+refuses a login through a provider whose email domain is not proven, which stops an organization
+admin from registering a provider for a domain they do not control. It is off by default, because
+turning it on changes the register-then-login flow. The surface is
+`packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-sso-provider.object.ts#request_domain_verification`,
+`#verify_domain` and `#domain_verified`.
+
+⚠️ **The SCIM half of "SSO + SCIM per production environment" is not restated here.** Its
+mechanism record is `cloud ADR-0071`, mirrored into this repository by its own card; this file
+records only that the same environment-side posture applies to it — the SCIM models are bridged
+into the environment's tables by the same adapter map D1 names, and the D5.2 guard judges a SCIM
+deprovision exactly as it judges an admin one.
+
+### D7 — Portability and self-host are preserved
+
+Nothing above requires the vendor's cloud. Every mechanism in D1–D6 is in this repository under
+Apache-2.0, and each optional piece is switched on by an environment variable in a self-hosted
+deployment — `OS_SSO_ENABLED` for the external-IdP relying party,
+`OS_SSO_DOMAIN_VERIFICATION` for D6's opt-in check — resolved in
+`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts`. A self-hosted environment therefore reaches
+the same identity architecture as a hosted one; what a hosted environment adds is entitlement and
+lifecycle, which is cloud ADR-0024's half.
+
+### D9 — Environment users live in the environment; organization membership goes through better-auth
+
+A user of an environment is a row in that environment's `sys_user`, and their membership of an
+organization is a row in that environment's `sys_member` — backed by better-auth's organization
+plugin (`packages/platform-objects/src/identity/sys-member.object.ts#SysMember`), reached through
+the same adapter bridge as every other identity model
+(`packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/objectql-adapter.ts#AUTH_MODEL_TO_PROTOCOL`). Membership is
+therefore maintained by the auth stack's own endpoints, and read — never re-spelled — by the
+guards that judge administrative standing.
+
+---
+
+## What stays in `cloud` ADR-0024
+
+These clauses are the same decision's commercial half. They are **not** recorded here, and code in
+this repository that means one of them must keep citing `cloud ADR-0024`:
+
+| Clause | Subject |
+|---|---|
+| D3 | cloud-as-IdP hub |
+| D5.1 | the cloud operator-portal membership gate |
+| D8 | billing |
+| D10 | production/development metering and population lifecycle |
+| V1 | the roadmap and the commercial framing |
+
+⚠️ Consequence for [#14361](https://github.com/objectstack-ai/objectstack/issues/14361): a bare
+`ADR-0024` citation in this tree is **not** mechanically re-pointable at this record. Some of
+today's citations mean a clause above — `packages/plugins/plugin-auth/src/auth-manager.ts` cites
+`ADR-0024 V1` for the SSO default-role provisioning — and those keep the `cloud ADR-0024`
+spelling. The re-pointing is per-site and semantic.
+
+## What this record does NOT settle
+
+- **Anything cloud ADR-0024 did not decide.** This file adds no clause. Where the mechanism in
+  this tree is richer than the decision (the ADR-0092 write guard, the ADR-0095 tenant wall, the
+  ADR-0091 validity window), that richness belongs to those records, and is cited here only as the
+  thing D4 and D5 lean on.
+- **The attribution itself, against the cloud original.** See Provenance point 2: this file was
+  written without cloud access. A difference between it and cloud ADR-0024 is this file's bug.
+- **The SCIM mechanism** — `cloud ADR-0071` and its own mirror record.
+- **Whether any individual bare `ADR-0024` citation should move.** That is #14361's per-site call,
+  and the table above is why it cannot be a search-and-replace.
+
+## Consequences
+
+- A reader who follows an `ADR-0024` citation out of `plugin-auth` or `platform-objects/identity`
+  now has somewhere in *this* registry to land — once #14361 re-points the citations that mean the
+  open half. Until then the citation still resolves to `docs/adr/0024-mcp-connectors.md`, which is
+  the defect this record is a precondition for fixing, not one it fixes by itself.
+- The open half of the identity architecture becomes reviewable by anyone who can read this
+  repository, including a self-hosting customer who has no access to `cloud`.
+- `cloud` ADR-0024 gains a one-line pointer naming this record's number — filed as a `cloud` chore
+  by the seat that accepts this PR, since the number is only knowable once this file merges.