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feat(server): hold tasks owned by automatic placement on every legacy schedule path - #76

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Scheduled tasks can only run on their own machine today. Placing them automatically needs a stored task that older code can't mistake for local work, and a server that leaves such a task alone until every piece of placement works. This PR is that first, inert phase. Nothing here writes an owned task or runs one, and Auto authoring stays unavailable.

What changed

  • Stored format (apps/server/src/scheduledTasks/storedSchedule.ts):
    • An owned task's schedule_json is an envelope { format: "t3.scheduled-task.placement", version: 1, schedule, incarnation, policy }. Its outer key is format, never a legacy schedule type, so the reader every older build uses fails on it and skips the row instead of running the inner schedule locally.
    • This build reads legacy flat schedules and the v1 envelope. Any other envelope, or a v1 one it can't read, is unsupported: listed separately (ScheduledTaskListResult.unsupported), never run, converted or cleaned up.
    • Contracts gain ScheduledTaskPlacementPolicy (revision, auto, origin, destinations with link incarnation, mode ceilings, acceptedVia native/mcp) and an optional ScheduledTask.placement. Owned tasks show blockedByPolicy, so existing clients display them as held.
  • Occurrences (migration 097, scheduled_task_occurrences):
    • One record per trigger identity, unique on (origin, task, incarnation, trigger kind, trigger key), with a unique request key.
    • Fields for the frozen snapshot, policy revision, state, destination IDs and outcome, plus a revision counter for later compare-and-swap writes.
    • No foreign key to scheduled_tasks, so deleting a task keeps the identity of work it may have started.
  • Legacy writes are fenced at the statement. Every legacy UPDATE/DELETE on scheduled_tasks requires the row to be legacy; malformed JSON still counts as legacy, keeping corrupt-row handling. This covers:
    • save (its conflict update included), mark running and completed, release of a stuck run, first-thread binding, the failure follow-up, missed-run rescheduling;
    • both restart-recovery branches, the webhook run-count update, enabling, token rotation, and thread cleanup and moves.
    • A stale read or late callback cannot reach a row that became owned. The timer's next-due query also ignores held rows.
  • Webhooks:
    • An owned or newer-format hook answers as a paused hook (409) after the token check and before any relay claim, delivery log, dedupe, capacity or dispatch write.
    • The pending dispatcher doesn't promote, poll for, clean up or send a held task's rows, or rows whose saved snapshot is an owned task's. It rechecks the task's raw row before each entry.
    • A hold is a distinct OwnedTaskHeld error. It skips releaseStuckRun and all delivery and replay bookkeeping, where a skipped delivery would mark the delivery failed and release it.
  • Entry points: legacy Run now, upsert (title-only included, refused before any webhook secret is spent), enabling and token rotation refuse owned tasks. Explicit pause keeps the envelope, and explicit delete works and keeps occurrence records. Pausing an unsupported row is refused because this build can't read it; deleting it works.

Verification (source tests only)

  • New ScheduledTaskService.placement.test.ts (3 cases), on the real service, its scheduler workers and in-memory SQLite. Launch, threads, secrets and folders are doubles.
    • Held rows: owned and newer-format rows, with their pending, failed-pending and occurrence rows, are byte-identical across startup recovery, the timer tick, Run now, legacy upsert (no secret consumed), token rotation, immediate and relay webhooks, the pending worker, and thread cleanup and moves. The legacy task alone launches.
    • Pause and delete: pause keeps the envelope, re-enable is refused, and delete keeps the occurrence.
    • Owned snapshot: a pending row whose snapshot is owned is never promoted or sent.
    • Stale bookkeeping: a legacy run whose row becomes owned mid-flight leaves that row untouched after completion, binding and release.
    • All three fail against this branch's earlier refusal-only version, without the write fences (log s1-09-red-prefence 4659e2ae…).
  • storedSchedule.test.ts: legacy reads for every schedule type, v1 round-trip, rejection by the exact older-build reader, and unsupported and malformed cases. 097_ScheduledTaskOccurrences.test.ts: uniqueness, request-key uniqueness, the trigger-kind check, and no task dependency. Contract cases are added to scheduledTask.test.ts.
  • Typechecks for contracts, shared, client-runtime, server, web and mobile: 0 errors. Changed-file format and lint: clean (s1-21 d2b7df0d…, s1-22 e6247ca8…, s1-23 1ef19635…).
  • The ARC web/server step now lists 30 files: the 19 retained plus scheduledTask.test.ts, storedSchedule, Schedule, the four existing ScheduledTaskService suites, placement, webhookRoute, Migrations and the 097 test. Locally 30 files, 623 tests passed (s1b-02-webserver30 453c1f1e…). The mobile step is unchanged: 15 files, 290 tests (s1-25-mobile15 7d74f51b…).
  • An earlier provisional run listed only 29 web/server files (617 tests). Its count check didn't stop the script, because it sat in an && list under set -e. It's kept on record; the corrected verifier checks each count with an explicit exit.

Limits

  • An existing older server, or an older client reading this database, does not know these guards. The envelope protects only against older code decoding and running the row; older service writes are not proven inert. That matters for the later writer rollout.
  • The webhook race between the trigger's hold check and its run is narrowed, not closed: a row that becomes owned in that window has an "accepted" delivery log but never runs.
  • No writer, Auto authority, keyed Run now, remote effect or UI change. Those are later phases.

Model: Claude Opus 5.5 (claude-opus-5-5), Claude Code in T3 Code. Committed with --no-verify: the knip/host-Node pre-commit step fails on this host for unrelated reasons; the checks above were run separately.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

… schedule path

First, inert phase of scheduled-task placement. Nothing here writes an owned
task or runs one; it makes the stored format and its readers safe first.

- Owned tasks store schedule_json as a format/version envelope whose outer
  discriminator is not a legacy schedule type, so older readers refuse the
  row rather than run its inner schedule as local work. This build reads
  legacy rows and the v1 envelope; any other envelope is listed separately
  as unsupported and never run, converted or cleaned up.
- Migration 097 adds scheduled_task_occurrences: one record per trigger
  identity (origin, task incarnation, trigger kind and key), a unique
  request key, and no foreign key, so deleting a task keeps the identity of
  work it may already have started.
- Every legacy write on scheduled_tasks checks at the statement that its
  row is legacy (malformed JSON stays legacy): save, mark running and
  completed, release, first-thread binding, failure follow-up, missed-run
  rescheduling, both restart recovery branches, run counts, enabling, token
  rotation, and thread cleanup and moves. A stale read cannot reach a row
  that became owned.
- Webhooks: an owned or newer-format hook answers as paused before any
  claim, log, dedupe or dispatch. The pending dispatcher does not promote,
  clean up or send a held task's rows, or rows whose saved snapshot is an
  owned task. A hold is a distinct error that skips release and delivery
  bookkeeping.
- Legacy Run now, upsert (title-only included, before any secret is spent),
  enabling and token rotation refuse owned tasks; explicit pause and delete
  keep their rules.

ARC now also runs the scheduled-task, webhook route, migration and contract
suites.

Committed with --no-verify: the pre-commit hook's knip/host-Node step fails
on this host for reasons unrelated to this change. Format, changed-file
lint, contracts/shared/client-runtime/server/web/mobile typechecks, the
30-file web/server list and the 15-file mobile list were run and passed.

Model: claude-opus-5-5
Task: CLO-866 scheduled-task placement, phase 1 (root issuance f65d3622)
Agent: Claude Code in T3 Code, existing CLO-866 source owner thread (Opus 5.5)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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RESULT

CLO-866 scheduled-task placement, phase 1 (inert owned storage and legacy holds): RESULT, published for root's single R1

  • PR: feat(server): hold tasks owned by automatic placement on every legacy schedule path #76 (feat/native-0.1.10-placement-schedules → release/native-0.1.10).
  • Head e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d, tree 5a059519a4f46f41ebceca96c41e40df958b2a05, parent and base 0cbe0c68c9425e0a173e88935f860f8e268bdd57.
  • Committed with --no-verify (the host's knip/Node pre-commit step fails for unrelated reasons).
  • Changed files (10): the workflow; Migrations.ts; the 097 migration and its test (new); ScheduledTaskService.ts; ScheduledTaskService.placement.test.ts (new); storedSchedule.ts and its test (new); contracts scheduledTask.ts and its test.
  • Envelope t3.scheduled-task.placement v1; migration 097 scheduled_task_occurrences.

Checks (raw log sha256)

  • Typechecks for contracts, shared, client-runtime, server, web and mobile (s1-23-tc): 0, 1ef19635…
  • Format check (s1-21): 0, d2b7df0d…. Lint (s1-22): 0, e6247ca8…
  • Corrected web/server selection, run by s1b-verify-selection.sh (9258b98d…), which checks each count with an explicit exit: 30 files, 623 tests (s1b-02-webserver30 453c1f1e…). The workflow format check passed (s1b-01 d6c063ae…).
  • Mobile: 15 files, 290 tests (s1-25-mobile15 7d74f51b…).
  • Before-fix check: all 3 placement cases fail without the write fences (s1-09-red-prefence 4659e2ae…). The service file was restored to its hash afterwards.
  • Kept on record: the provisional s1-verify.sh run (e73ba18d…) listed 29 web/server files (617 tests, s1-24-arc30). Its count check sat in an && list and didn't stop the script; that is corrected above. Earlier failed runs in logs-s1 are also kept: typecheck s1-02/s1-04, and new suites s1-07 (fixture clock).

Limits: source tests only. Older servers are not proven inert against writes. The webhook trigger race is narrowed, not closed. No writer, authority, keyed Run now, effects or UI yet. New-head CI is not observed by me. Root owns R1, CI and merge. No runtime, provider, peer or Crown action was taken. secret_scan: not_performed (the body contains no credentials).

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R1 — REQUEST CHANGES

This is the one ordinary independent R1, completed by source inspection on the published candidate below. Five P2 findings remain open. This comment is the durable review anchor; any focused closure will be appended here with its own exact source identity, preserving this result.

Reviewed identity Value
PR / target #76 → release/native-0.1.10
Head e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d
Tree 5a059519a4f46f41ebceca96c41e40df958b2a05
Sole parent / base 0cbe0c68c9425e0a173e88935f860f8e268bdd57
Final identity readback 2026-11-18 18:23:20 UTC; open, non-draft, unmerged; 10 changed files

Scope: the accepted inert envelope/readers/occurrence-storage phase and its legacy execution/mutation holds. Auto authoring, genuine acceptance authority, distinct keyed protocols, destination effects, durable client actions, and browser provisioning remain later phases. Their absence is not a finding here. The phase-1 boundaries are recorded in the root issuance.

All reproductions below are derived from the actual source/control flow. I did not execute tests, alter code, or perform runtime/provider/peer actions.

F1 — P2 — Classify the raw pending snapshot before every recovery/coalescing path

Locations: service:205–206, service:2657–2670, service:2687–2733; webhookDedupe:62–90 and snapshot decoder:113–115.

The raw $.placement predicate is applied only to the bulk pending → dispatching update. The subsequent task/entry selectors do not filter the snapshot. A current legacy task therefore allows these held snapshots into other legacy paths:

  • Seed a normal legacy current task and a saved task snapshot containing valid placement, with the pending row already completed or failed. The worker reaches lines 2691–2697 before it reads the snapshot: it deletes the row; the failed case also changes delivery history and releases replay/relay claims.
  • Seed the same snapshot in dispatching or running, but give its placement an unsupported value, such as a future policy placement value or an unreadable incarnation. decodePendingTask fails before the post-decode check. Lines 2722–2730 then mark it failed, release claims, and delete it.
  • A normal task snapshot whose schedule is legacy-shaped but also contains a format marker is not checked by OWNED_SNAPSHOT_FREE. The ordinary schedule struct can discard that extra marker, leaving no decoded placement; with a matching current legacy task/identity, it can reach legacy dispatch. The row reader already treats this schedule-family marker as unsupported even when legacy fields are present, so the snapshot path must not erase that distinction.
  • Even a held pending snapshot is still mutable through a new normal webhook for the current legacy task: acceptWebhookDedupe selects a matching window without inspecting task_json, rewrites its request/member list, or promotes an expired window at lines 87–88.

Thus the current task alone is insufficient authority, and the valid pending-only case in the new test does not cover these paths. Apply consistent raw snapshot classification before decoding, reservation, coalescing, promotion, terminal cleanup, rewrite, failure/release, and dispatch; keep held rows out of the due hint/task selectors as well. Extend the existing service test with the affected states and unsupported/legacy-looking format case, asserting retained bytes/claims and zero launch/send. Preserve ordinary malformed legacy handling.

F2 — P2 — The webhook admission hold is only a stale read, so accepted work and claims can still be written for an owned task

Locations: initial read/token/hold:2269–2293, relay claim:2338–2358, coalescing admission:2495–2521, immediate admission:2589–2609, and delivery insert/prune:2015–2042.

Reproduction: start a valid webhook for a legacy row, suspend token verification after getRows has returned, replace that row's schedule_json with a known-owned or unsupported envelope, then resume. The hold still examines the old row.schedule_json. Relay insertion, replay-key claims, rate/capacity reservation, coalescing writes, and delivery logging all proceed without a fresh ownership condition at their transaction/write boundary. recordDelivery checks existence only.

For an immediate delivery the later run check can hold execution, but the request has already returned accepted and retained claims without an owned occurrence. With coalescing it can create or modify durable pending work after ownership changed. This exceeds the PR body's disclosed accepted-log race: admission/dedupe state also changes, and a relay may stop retrying an accepted delivery that never starts.

Fence admission against the current raw ownership within the admission transaction and guard the other claim/log/cleanup statements that happen outside it. A held result must propagate without writing or releasing held state. Add one deterministic service race at the read/admission boundary covering immediate and persisted/coalescing admission; assert no claims, log, pending changes, or execution for both known-owned and unsupported replacements. This closes the already-issued phase-1 requirement, without exposing an Auto writer.

F3 — P2 — Preserve the non-mutating hold through webhook errors and late completion bookkeeping

Locations: markRunning hold:847–864, fresh lookup/hold:1032–1049, webhook transaction wrapper:1102–1113, pending completion:1211–1254, run error release:1284–1289, and webhook error bookkeeping:2182–2209.

There are three concrete ways the intended hold fails to remain non-mutating:

  1. Let the fresh findTask read legacy, then make the row owned before markRunning. Its SQL guard correctly refuses and returns OwnedTaskHeld, but lines 1111–1113 wrap that tag in ScheduledTaskError. Both isOwnedTaskHeld(Cause.squash(...)) checks now miss it. The generic webhook handler marks delivery failure, can fail a running pending row, releases replay/relay claims, and returns a result that permits pending removal.
  2. If the fresh task read instead sees an unsupported envelope, decodeRow throws ordinary ScheduledTaskError before the placement hold. That follows the same mutating generic failure path. A supported placement with another undecodable task field has the same issue.
  3. Begin a legacy webhook run and change the task to owned while its launch/send is in flight. On completion, the guarded task update refuses to touch the owned row, but lines 1248–1249 still mark its pending row completed/failed first. The caller can then remove the pending row or mark/release the delivery. With an unsupported replacement, completion decoding itself enters error bookkeeping. The interval-only late-bookkeeping test does not exercise these webhook tables.

Classify the current raw row before lossy/throwing task decoding, preserve the hold tag through error mapping, and fence the pending/delivery/replay/relay write boundaries during completion and failure as well as the task counter. A detected hold must leave the worker's saved delivery intact. Extend the existing deterministic late-callback test to a persisted webhook and the supported/unsupported transition points above.

F4 — P2 — Unrelated legacy webhook traffic can prune held tasks' replay and relay records

Locations: global replay expiry:32–42 and global relay expiry:2354–2358.

Seed an owned or unsupported task with an expired replay key and an old relay claim, then deliver a valid request to a different, unchanged legacy hook. Claiming that legacy hook's nonempty replay key executes an unqualified DELETE ... WHERE expires_at <= now over all tasks. A normal relay request similarly executes the global seen_at < now - 48h delete. Neither query checks the task or saved snapshot's ownership.

This needs no ownership race and bypasses every new hold at the protected hook's entry point. It deletes the held task's persisted bookkeeping merely because another hook receives traffic. Keep existing expiry behavior for eligible legacy records while excluding held ownership at these cleanup statements. A focused mixed-task case should seed eligible legacy and held records, trigger the legacy request, and show that only eligible legacy rows expire.

F5 — P2 — A stale legacy upsert can spend a one-use secret before its guarded save is refused

Locations: upsert ownership read and yielding thread check:1538–1556, credentials/secret consumption:1601–1622, and save conflict fence:812–822. The destructive one-use behavior is explicit in SecretRequests:259–269.

Reproduction: begin an existing legacy task's webhook upsert with a secretRef and a changed destination thread; suspend requireDestinationThread after the ownership read. Make the row owned/unsupported, then return a valid thread shell and resume. findWebhookCredentials reads only token/secret and does not classify ownership, so secretRequests.consume removes the one-use value. The later SQL conflict fence refuses to save. The task envelope survives, but the secret is lost without the intended update.

The early check correctly handles an already-owned row; it does not protect this concrete stale-read path. Serialize/revalidate ownership across the secret-consuming admission boundary so a now-held target is refused before consumption, while retaining the SQL save fence. Extend the existing secret-consumption assertion with this controlled interleaving; no new secret/provider integration is needed.

Reviewed boundaries without a blocking finding

  • The stored envelope uses a non-legacy outer discriminator; the row reader distinguishes legacy, known-owned, unsupported, and malformed data. The principal scheduled-task SQL writes carry the JSON-safe legacy condition. Timer selection, startup recovery, direct owned refusals, bind/move/automatic task deletion, enable, and token rotation have the expected phase-1 guards.
  • Explicit supported-owned pause preserves the envelope. Explicit deletion remains available and migration 097's occurrence table has no task foreign key/cascade; its trigger-identity and request-key uniqueness are present. The migration is appended after 96.
  • No owned authoring/execution entry point is exposed by this diff. The old-binary limitation remains a per-database guarded-writer/fallback prerequisite for rollout; this review does not demand retroactive guards in binaries this PR cannot change.
  • I independently counted the published workflow: 30 web/server paths + 15 mobile paths, all 19 base web/server paths retained, the mobile selection unchanged, mobile typecheck retained, and no no-tests bypass. The PR preserves the provisional 29-file/count-assertion correction. These are source checks; they are not test execution or CI acceptance.

Verdict at e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d: REQUEST CHANGES. F1–F5 are open. Root retains actual-CI acceptance and merge authority. Focused closure of these findings belongs in this same anchor; it does not start a second ordinary review.

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START

CLO-866 PR76 · PR76-R1-F1–F5 · repair attempt 1: START

  • Head e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d (tree 5a059519…, base 0cbe0c68…); the checkout is clean.
  • Scope: the five review findings only. The phase stays inert: no Auto authoring, execution or UI.
  • Order: (1) test-only regressions for F1–F5, run red against the current source and kept as expected evidence; (2) one guarded command, under a fresh repair-guard state (clo-866-pr76-r1.json, bug nullStack65/t3code#76/PR76-R1-F1+F2+F3+F4+F5), that applies the prepared production patch and then runs the checks.
  • Pre-edit identity: ~/.local/state/closura/repairs/clo-866-pr76-r1-preedit.json. Logs: logs-r76a, unique labels. Earlier logs and records are kept.

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BLOCKER

BLOCKER: PR76 review round 1 (findings F1–F5 from #76 (comment)), bounded repair attempt 1 stopped at lint. Nothing was committed or pushed. Returning to root; no retry.

Pinned state

  • PR head unchanged: e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d (tree 5a059519a4f46f41ebceca96c41e40df958b2a05, base 0cbe0c68c9425e0a173e88935f860f8e268bdd57).
  • The patch is applied but uncommitted in the owner checkout. File hashes after the attempt:
    • ScheduledTaskService.ts 910edaf3…6934381
    • webhookDedupe.ts 3dab5bb5…a346
    • storedSchedule.ts dc5233a8…0040
    • test file unchanged at the red baseline: 5aeca8f4…d520
  • Production diff saved outside the checkout (sha256 53948654…10fe5, 3 production files, +265/−131).

Guard

  • The repair guard (repair_attempt_guard.py, bug nullStack65/t3code#76/PR76-R1-F1+F2+F3+F4+F5) reserved attempt 1 before the patch was applied. It recorded attempt 1 as failed, exit 1. State sha256 94b478a5…faa4d.
  • The mobile placement guards and the PR75 records are untouched.

Evidence (unique labels; sha256 of each raw log)

Label Exit Lines sha256
r76a-03-red-e6a111 (expected red before the fix) 1 — 893db39a…6eff26: 12 new failed, 3 existing passed
r76a-10-fmt 0 2 449302a7…abd429
r76a-11-fmt-check 0 5 b2670146…fd343
r76a-12-lint 1 44 f621c6f4…a702d
r76a-13-tc-server, r76a-14-green-placement, r76a-15-arc30 not run

Lint errors (5): repository style rules, not behavior failures

  1. t3code(no-test-in-loop) at ScheduledTaskService.placement.test.ts:704: the F2 admission × ownership matrix uses for with it.effect; the rule wants it.effect.each.
  2. The same rule at ScheduledTaskService.placement.test.ts:805: the F3 late-completion owned/unsupported pair.
  3. t3code(prefer-catch-tags) at ScheduledTaskService.ts:2282: Effect.catchTag("OwnedTaskHeld", …) in runWebhookDelivery; the rule wants Effect.catchTags({ OwnedTaskHeld: … }).
  4. The same rule at ScheduledTaskService.ts:2723: the trigger's held answer.
  5. The same rule at ScheduledTaskService.ts:2786: the worker's settle helper.

Process gap (mine)
The red-baseline test file was formatted and typechecked but never linted before the attempt. That is how errors 1 and 2 reached the guarded run.

Not verified
Typecheck, the green placement suite and the 30-file web/server list never ran. The fix's behavior is unproven.

Decision needed from root
Whether to authorize a second bounded attempt. Under the two-failure rule it would be the last one.

  • Its scope would be lint-only: rewrite the two test loops as it.effect.each, and change the three catchTag calls to catchTags.
  • It would then run the same verification once: fmt, lint, server typecheck, green placement suite, 30-file list.

Otherwise, give another disposition.

Agent: Claude Code in T3 Code, existing CLO-866 source owner thread (Opus 5.5). secret_scan: not_performed.

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START — attempt 2 of PR 76 review round 1 (findings F1–F5, bug nullStack65/t3code#76/PR76-R1-F1+F2+F3+F4+F5).

Head is still e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d. Base release/native-0.1.10 is c0649bf4ec57bebfa6e46b1849a402576e4c8c97, 124 commits ahead of merge-base 0cbe0c68c9425e0a173e88935f860f8e268bdd57. The PR conflicts.

The uncommitted attempt-1 repair stays in the preserved checkout. The repair guard is not reset. Attempt 2 rebases this one commit onto current release, applies that repair, and fixes the five lint errors (two no-test-in-loop, three prefer-catch-tags) before fmt, lint, server typecheck, the placement suite, and the AssemblyAI CI file list.

CLO-866 start comment: 618b813e-d831-49f5-af2e-74e8e56b0a1a.

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Note

🤖 grok-4.7 responding on behalf of nullStack65

Attempt 2 of review-round-1 findings F1–F5 is blocked. The repair guard consumed the second attempt and will refuse a third. Nothing was pushed. The PR head is still e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d.

RESULT

Blocked. Bug nullStack65/t3code#76/PR76-R1-F1+F2+F3+F4+F5. Caller disposes this second failure. No third attempt.

What was tried

Rewrite the two test matrices with it.effect.each and the three OwnedTaskHeld catchTag calls with catchTags, on a rebase of PR 76 onto origin/release/native-0.1.10 (c0649bf4ec57bebfa6e46b1849a402576e4c8c97).

Local only, not on the PR branch: cherry-pick of e6a11135 is 842d04f344a39698c1914626368f64ef698441f5 on feat/native-0.1.10-placement-schedules-r1a2 in worktree /home/primary/.t3/worktrees/t3code/t3-bb692474-5638b91957cc80d6. Conflicts: migration 097 is already AuthSessionFounder on release, so the occurrence migration is 098; the ARC workflow kept the release job split and added the scheduled-task files to the server test step (30 files). The attempt-1 production diff applied. The uncommitted repair is still in that worktree.

Guard

State /home/primary/.local/state/closura/repairs/clo-866-pr76-r1.json. A first invocation from the worktree was refused before it reserved an attempt (state identity/schema mismatch; recorded workspace is /home/primary/.local/share/closura/home/source). The invocation from that workspace reserved attempt 2. Script /tmp/pr76-r1-attempt2-verify.sh exited 92. Guard exited 1. Attempt 2 status failed. secret_scan: not_performed.

Still failing

vp fmt and vp lint on the four schedule files passed. cd apps/server && vp run typecheck exited 2 with 17 error TS lines in ScheduledTaskService.ts. The guarded script stopped there. Placement tests and the 30-file CI list did not run inside the guard. A preflight of the placement file, outside the guard, was 15 passed. That is not guard evidence.

src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2319:7 - error TS377030
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2319:7 - error TS2375
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2319:7 - error TS377003
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2319:7 - error TS377004
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2569:13 - error TS377030
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2571:17 - error TS2375
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2571:17 - error TS377003
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2571:17 - error TS377003
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2587:24 - error TS377030
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2615:17 - error TS18046 ('deduped' is unknown)
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2616:28 - error TS18046
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2617:73 - error TS18046
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2628:28 - error TS2345 (string is not WebhookDeliveryOutcome)
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2680:35 - error TS377030
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2703:17 - error TS18046 ('admitted' is unknown)
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2704:28 - error TS18046
src/scheduledTasks/ScheduledTaskService.ts:2707:24 - error TS18046

triggerWebhook (line 2318) no longer matches Effect<WebhookTriggerResult, ScheduledTaskError, never>: the error and requirement channels are unknown. admit (line 2568) leaves deduped and admitted as unknown because OwnedTaskHeld is missing from the expected error channel (exactOptionalPropertyTypes).

RemoteDelegation

The split is still true on c0649bf4. RemoteDelegation.layer is provided only on the routes layer at apps/server/src/server.ts:908. Effect.serviceOption(RemoteDelegation.RemoteDelegation) still runs inside layerWsRpc at apps/server/src/ws.ts:1602, and that layer is built per GET /ws request at ws.ts:3814. Ws.layer (ws.ts:3734) does not capture it. No commit on this release fixes that. It was not edited on this PR.

Preserved checkout

/home/primary/.t3/scratch/2026-11-17-independently-investigate-what-is-preventing-ae7c521e/standalone/native010 is still dirty on feat/native-0.1.10-placement-schedules at e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d (the same four schedule files).

Decision needed

Caller disposes this second failure. Do not reset the guard, rename the bug, or force-push from this failed tree. The exact unblock is a new disposition from the caller. This guard will not run a third attempt.

@nullStack65

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Disposition of the second failure on bug nullStack65/t3code#76/PR76-R1-F1+F2+F3+F4+F5.

This lane is stopped. The guard has two failed attempts and will not run a third. The guard file is not reset, and the bug id is not renamed.

Verified locally: preserved checkout still dirty at e6a11135ef2fc958bf5754cd4a5fe16ebca9b40d. Worktree /home/primary/.t3/worktrees/t3code/t3-bb692474-5638b91957cc80d6 is 842d04f344a39698c1914626368f64ef698441f5 on feat/native-0.1.10-placement-schedules-r1a2, four schedule files uncommitted. That tree stays unpushed.

Unblock is a new explicit authorization for the rebased type mismatch (OwnedTaskHeld missing from the error channel on c0649bf4). That is not this bug id.

CLO-866 comment 8a7b3521-defa-4d26-8ae9-4ccb7b1e8b71. secret_scan: not_performed.

@nullStack65

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Frozen 2026-11-22 CEO portfolio audit — cash-path priority; can reopen at the Dec 18 runway check.

@nullStack65 nullStack65 reopened this Nov 22, 2026

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