🔒 Fix Command/Argument Injection Vulnerability in SafeProcess.LaunchApp

[mleem97]

🎯 What:
A potential Command/Argument Injection vulnerability existed in SafeProcess.LaunchApp due to passing user-provided strings directly as concatenated command-line Arguments.

⚠️ Risk:
If an attacker controls the arguments string, they could inject arbitrary arguments, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution or unintended app behaviors. Also, exePath wasn't validated, meaning executables relative to PATH could be hijacked.

🛡️ Solution:
Refactored LaunchApp to take an IEnumerable<string> instead of a raw string for arguments, and mapped them to ProcessStartInfo.ArgumentList. This delegates the escaping to .NET/the OS. Also added validations via Path.IsPathRooted and File.Exists for exePath. Updated OpenFolder and OpenExplorerAndSelect in the same class to also use ArgumentList. Updated the only callsite in SettingsPage.axaml.cs.

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PR created automatically by Jules for task 5942240774046774104 started by @mleem97

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