[kyle-sexton]

Refs: melodic-software/claude-code-plugins#12558

Summary

Adds generated-data to the reviewed allowedInputs of melodic-software/ci-workflows/.github/workflows/pr-review-cli.yml in components/runner-policy/policy.json.

Fix

melodic-software/ci-workflows#971 (merged) added the opt-in generated-data input. Without this entry, a caller that passes it fails runner-policy with "the reusable workflow call has inputs absent from its reviewed contract: generated-data" (seen on claude-code-plugins#12601). The input names a repository file listing generated data files the review skips. It carries no secret and does not affect runner routing.

Verification

• node --test components/runner-policy/runner-policy.test.mjs: 226/226 pass.

Related

• feat(pr-review-cli): add a generated-data input for files no review reads ci-workflows#971 (the input); ci(review): count the legacy FAILs file as read through generated-data claude-code-plugins#12601 (the caller opt-in, waiting on this through the sync). Same shape as fix(runner-policy): admit pr-review-cli's generated-copies input #940.

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_01VcupomBPg7kuobwLoNpxEW

[chatgpt-codex-connector]

Codex Review Summary

This comment shows the latest Codex review activity on this pull request.

Review	Status	Commit	Review trigger
📝 Code Review	✅ Completed 2026-11-03T02:28:29.888690Z	8c5b137	PR opened

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[github-actions]

claude-review reviewed cee0d3fc8d507e9eaae40e225b99349d8a38435f: 0 finding(s), 0 as inline comments.

No findings.

The PR adds one entry, generated-data, to the reviewed allowedInputs of pr-review-cli.yml in components/runner-policy/policy.json. I read the diff and the surrounding policy block at head.

• The entry sits beside the matching generated-copies input and keeps the list's existing shape.
• It is an input name only. No secret, routing, fixedRunsOn or SHA entry changes, so the entry doesn't widen what the policy admits beyond the one input.
• generated-copies appears in no other file in the repo, so no docs, tests or generated copies need updating to match.
• The PR closes no issue. It uses Refs: and has the required body sections.
• I did not run the test suite. The 226/226 pass result in the PR body is author-claimed and unverified.

[github-actions]

claude-security-review reviewed cee0d3fc8d507e9eaae40e225b99349d8a38435f: 0 finding(s), 0 as inline comments.

Security review: PR #944 (head cee0d3f)

Findings: 0. critical-findings: 0

The PR has one change. It adds "generated-data" to allowedInputs for the pr-review-cli.yml contract in components/runner-policy/policy.json, next to generated-copies.

What I checked:

• Secrets and permissions: The change adds no secret, no caller permission and no approved SHA. The allowedSecrets block and the fixedRunsOn: ["ubuntu-24.04"] / hosted-only routing are untouched.
• Public-repo denylist: The only denylisted reusable input is standards-ref (PUBLIC_REPOSITORY_DENYLISTED_REUSABLE_INPUTS, runner-policy.mjs:81). generated-data is not on it, so the visibility-scoped check at runner-policy.mjs:1796 is not triggered.
• Input type: The existing generated-copies entry has the same shape and sits in the same allowlist, so this is an ordinary allowlist addition, not a new class of input.
• Who can pass it: The input only lets a caller workflow pass a value. A caller workflow can be changed only by someone who can already change that repository's workflows. The runner-policy audit still checks the caller's other inputs, secrets and permissions.
• Untrusted-text path: I found no path where the input passes untrusted text into a credentialed lane.

What I could not check: the diff doesn't show what generated-data does in the ci-workflows reusable workflow. If it excludes paths from review, as generated-copies may, whoever sets the value could narrow what the review lane inspects. The allowlist change alone doesn't let that happen, and I found no control in this repository that it weakens. That is a point for the ci-workflows side to settle.

Trust controls: the touched file is the runner-policy contract. It does not widen who is trusted, token scope, the kill switch or any merge hold. Nothing in it is an instruction-surface deletion or a plugin manifest.

Not consulted: docs/contracts/instruction-exception-register/README.md. It isn't relevant to this diff.