Stratum is an epistemic decision ledger: it stores immutable, append-only events and derives everything else. Integrity of the record is the whole point, so the security posture is deliberately explicit.
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately — do not open a public issue for anything exploitable.
- Preferred: GitHub private vulnerability reporting (Security tab → Report a vulnerability).
- Email: mazze.leczzare@protonmail.com — PGP-signed reports welcome; the maintainer's public GPG keys are published at https://github.com/mazze93.gpg.
Expect an acknowledgement within a few days. There is no bug-bounty program; this is a personal-scope project, and reports are handled on a best-effort basis.
The main branch and the most recent tagged release receive fixes. Older tags do
not — this is a single-surface project (one deployed Worker, one CLI).
The record's trustworthiness rests on more than prose. Each layer below states what is true today and how to check it yourself.
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Commits are SSH-signed. The maintainer signs commits with an SSH signing key registered on the GitHub account, so authored commits show Verified in the GitHub UI. To check locally, list the registered signing keys at
https://api.github.com/users/mazze93/ssh_signing_keys, add them to anallowed_signersfile, and run:git -c gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile=allowed_signers log --show-signature -1
Not yet enforced.
maindoes not yet require signed commits in branch protection. Some older history, including Dependabot commits from before 2026-10, is unverified, and the requirement is staged until new Dependabot commits arrive verified. Until then, an unsigned commit can land through a reviewed PR. -
Tags are signed from v0.5.0. Release tags from
v0.5.0on are annotated and SSH-signed, and verify withgit tag -v <tag>against the sameallowed_signersfile.v0.4.0is a lightweight, unsigned tag. It is left as published, because a version tag is never moved. A tag ruleset blocks deleting or rewriting anyv*tag. -
Release artifacts are Sigstore-stamped (keyless, transparency-logged). Each tagged release bundles the CLI (
cli/package.json,cli/bin/,cli/lib/), the immutable traces, and the golden projection. It is signed with cosign using a short-lived, OIDC-bound certificate, and the signing event is recorded in the public Rekor transparency log. A SHA-256 checksum and a GitHub build-provenance attestation accompany it. See.github/workflows/release.yml.sha256sum -c stratum-<tag>.tar.gz.sha256 cosign verify-blob \ --bundle stratum-<tag>.tar.gz.sigstore.json \ --certificate-identity-regexp 'https://github.com/mazze93/stratum/.*' \ --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \ stratum-<tag>.tar.gz gh attestation verify stratum-<tag>.tar.gz --repo mazze93/stratum
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The npm package carries provenance.
@stratum-ledger/cliis published only from the release workflow, inside a GitHub environment that needs the maintainer's approval and accepts onlyv*tags. It is published with npm provenance, a Sigstore-signed statement that links the package to this repository, the exact commit, and the workflow run. Check it after installing:npm audit signatures
The first publish bootstraps with a short-lived token held only in that environment. After it, publishing moves to npm Trusted Publishing (OIDC) and the token is revoked.
SHA-1, stated plainly. Git identifies commits and tags by SHA-1, and GitHub does not host SHA-256 repositories, so commit and tag signatures sign SHA-1 ids. Git's collision-detecting SHA-1 makes known attacks detectable, but it is not a modern integrity guarantee on its own. That is why every release artifact also carries a SHA-256 checksum and a Sigstore signature over the artifact bytes, and why Stratum's own evidence bindings and storage chain use SHA-256 throughout.
The stratum Worker anchors the head digest of each log named in ANCHOR_LOGS
to checkmate's forward-only hub every 15 minutes, so a dropped tail or a
recomputed chain is refused there and recorded as a critical incident. It sends
one outbound pair of requests per log per tick, authenticated with an Access
service token held as the Worker secrets CHECKMATE_CLIENT_ID and
CHECKMATE_CLIENT_SECRET. Neither is ever logged. Until both exist the cron makes
no outbound call.
The hub runs in the same Cloudflare account, so it detects faults in Stratum's storage and code, not a compromise of the whole account. The perimeter is spelled out in docs/ADR-004-off-system-anchor.md §4.
- CodeQL static analysis (
security-extended) on every push and PR tomain, plus a weekly scheduled baseline —actions,javascript-typescript,python. - Secret scanning with push protection — a committed secret is blocked at push time.
- Dependabot — security advisories and weekly version updates, including the GitHub Actions the workflows pin.
- SHA-pinned Actions — every third-party action is pinned to a full commit SHA (not a mutable tag), and Dependabot keeps the pins current.
Wall-clock timestamp fields inside events are metadata, not evidence — the
projection ignores them (see docs/MEMORY_MODEL.md). Trust in when something
happened comes from the signing/transparency layer above, never from a
self-asserted field in the log.