Shovo is a shared-list web app. Room IDs are URLs, so anyone with a room URL can access the room unless stronger access control is added.
A recommended production setup places Flask/uWSGI on localhost behind Nginx with HTTPS, HSTS, frame protection, basic content security policy, and static file serving.
- Environment files store deployment secrets and should be readable only by root and the service user.
- The production SQLite database stores app data and should be readable/writable only by the service user and administrators.
- Never commit production databases,
.envfiles, API keys, GitHub tokens, or credential URLs.
- No CSRF protection. Mutating endpoints accept JSON POST/PATCH/DELETE requests without CSRF tokens. Same-origin browser requests are the intended use, but formal CSRF protection should be added.
- No API rate limiting. Search, password verification, and mutating endpoints should have rate limits to reduce brute-force and abuse risk.
- Inline JavaScript is allowed by CSP. Some deployments may need
'unsafe-inline'for scripts. This should be removed after inline handlers/scripts are eliminated or nonce support is added. - Room IDs are bearer secrets for public rooms. Public rooms rely on unguessable/random room IDs or user-chosen names. User-chosen room names may be guessable.
- Continue hardening private-room authorization and session handling.
- Add rate limiting for
/api/room/verify-password,/api/search,/api/trending, and mutating list endpoints. - Add CSRF protection for all mutating endpoints.
- Tighten file permissions for the production SQLite database.
- Add safer deployment automation with pre-deploy tests, database backup, config tests, and post-deploy health checks.
- Reduce CSP script permissions where possible.
Open a private issue or contact the maintainer directly if a vulnerability exposes private room data, production secrets, or write access.