Corner Player plays your own cameras and streams in a small window over other apps on an Android TV. Camera addresses often carry user names and passwords, and the window draws over other apps, so security is taken seriously.
If you discover a security vulnerability:
- Do NOT open a public issue.
- Use GitHub's Private Vulnerability Reporting for this repo.
- Include:
- A clear description of the issue
- Steps to reproduce
- Affected version(s)
- Any logs or screenshots (sanitized: no camera addresses, passwords, IP addresses or network names)
Please allow reasonable time for investigation and patching before public disclosure.
Responsible disclosure is required.
- Push cameras from a computer as a file (
install.sh config.json) rather than typing passwords on the TV. The app takes the file into its own private storage and deletes it. - Only the ADB shell can push that file: the app's config provider requires
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS. - On screen, addresses show only the scheme, host and port, never the user name or password in them.
- Keep config files out of git (
backup/is git-ignored), and never paste a camera address into an issue. - Prefer a camera account that can only view, not one that can change the camera's settings.
- Corner Player connects only to the addresses you give it: no telemetry, no update checks, no ads.
- Plain
http://andrtsp://are allowed so home cameras work. On a network you don't trust, RTSP streams and their passwords can be read in transit; use the camera's encrypted options where it has them. - Never forward cameras, ADB (port 5555) or network control (port 8765) to the internet. To watch from away, use a VPN to your home network.
- Off by default. Only when you switch it on does Corner Player listen, on port 8765, and it keeps listening after a restart until you switch it off.
- Every request needs the token shown on the TV, sent as
Authorization: Bearer <token>; it is compared in constant time, and requests are answered one at a time. New token replaces it. - It can open your cameras and inputs by name, or a stream address it is given, show a doorbell popup, and close the window; nothing else. It never returns camera addresses.
- It is plain HTTP: anyone who can read your network's traffic can read the token. Keep it on a network you trust.
- Bodies over 4 KB are refused; every parameter is checked, and a bad one is answered with an error rather than guessed at. Nothing in a request is ever passed to a shell.
POST /doorbellneeds the same token, and only works with network control on.- Corner Player never signs in to Ring, Nest or any doorbell's cloud and never asks for their passwords. Home Assistant (or your own automation) holds those; the TV only gets an event and, optionally, an address to show.
- A
urlin a doorbell request (for example Home Assistant's camera proxy with its short-livedaccess_token) is kept in memory for that popup only: never saved, never logged, and only its host is shown on screen. - A doorbell
urlmay not point at the TV itself (localhost,127.x,::1,0.0.0.0) or at a link-local address (169.254.x,fe80::), so a request can't make the TV fetch from its own services. It still fetches from any other address on your network that an authorised caller names, as/playdoes: that is what the token protects. - Doorbell names are cleaned of control characters and shortened before they are shown.
- A TV in standby is never woken by a doorbell event.
- The corner window never takes focus or the remote's keys, so it can't capture what you type in other apps.
- It is opaque and keeps pointer touches in its own corner (Android lets touches through only for windows at most 80 % opaque).
- Display over other apps is the only special permission;
install.shgrants it because many TVs hide the setting.
Security updates are applied to:
- The latest tagged release
Older versions may not receive patches.
Corner Player development guidelines:
- No hardcoded credentials, channels or stream addresses
- No debug backdoors, no remote logging, no analytics
- Never log or show a camera address with its user info
- Validate playlist and config input; never pass it to a shell
Pull Requests touching the config provider, address handling or the overlay will receive additional review.