Please do not disclose a suspected vulnerability in a public issue, discussion, or pull request.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting flow for this repository:

https://github.com/lusipad/RocketX/security/advisories/new

Include the affected commit or release, operating system, deployment mode (Web or desktop), a minimal reproduction, impact, and any suggested mitigation. Remove passwords, Rocket.Chat tokens, Azure DevOps PATs, Codex authentication data, Memory content, private messages, and other real user data from the report.

You should receive an acknowledgement within seven days. The maintainer will coordinate reproduction, a fix, release timing, and disclosure through the private advisory. If private reporting is temporarily unavailable, open a public issue containing only a request for a private contact channel; do not include vulnerability details.

Security fixes target the latest published RocketX release. During pre-release development, fixes land on main; an untagged commit is not a supported release. Older releases may receive a fix when the impact is severe and a safe backport is practical, but this is not guaranteed.

The Rocket.Chat server is a separate upstream product. Report a Rocket.Chat server vulnerability through Rocket.Chat's own security process unless the flaw is caused by RocketX.

• RocketX authenticates through Rocket.Chat's public APIs and must not log or commit credentials.
• Codex authentication, sessions, and local Memory are owned by the user's local Codex installation. RocketX must not copy their secrets into source files, committed .env files, browser storage, screenshots, logs, or issue reports.
• DeepSeek credentials and DSH sessions are owned by the fixed local DSH runtime under RocketX's private DSH_HOME. DSH 0.1.0-rc.6 stores managed keys in .credentials.yaml, using an owner-only directory and 0600 file mode on POSIX; Windows relies on the current user's application-data ACL because POSIX modes are unavailable. API keys may only pass through DSH credentials APIs and must never be persisted or echoed by the WebView, bridge logs, screenshots, or issue reports.
• Third-party RocketX applications run behind manifest validation, explicit permissions, and a sandboxed Bridge. Remote applications cannot request process or Agent spawning permissions.
• The authenticated M9 LAN transport and legacy IP Messenger compatibility mode are separate trust domains. IP Messenger is unauthenticated, disabled by default, and must not be treated as a trusted identity channel.
• The bundled Compose credentials and permissive CORS setting are for local evaluation. Change credentials, restrict network exposure, configure TLS, and establish backups before non-local deployment.

Review pnpm-lock.yaml, apps/desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock, container image tags, the exact DSH runtime pin, and THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md when dependencies change. Release artifacts should be traced to a repository tag and the corresponding CI run; repository documentation alone is not proof that an artifact was published.