R2 notes

[johnmcfarlane]

Mention when standard library requires rebuild (e.g.
Mention sanitizers as part of log and continue.

-fsanitize=...
-fno-sanitize-recover=all
-fsanitize-recover=all

GCC: -fsanitize-undefined-trap-on-error = use __builtin_trap instead of libubsan.
Clang: -fsanitize-trap=undefined

MSVC: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/reference/fsanitize?view=msvc-160

More links in the appendix!

[johnmcfarlane]

From this: -fsanitize-minimal-runtime

[johnmcfarlane]

Tenets:

• The current debate on cyber security reduces down to a perceived conflict between
  • 'safety' (usually meaning low-level cyber security) - assuming there are bugs and mitigating the effects of them, and
  • optimal - assuming there are no bugs.
• Places where this choice can be made include
  1. at the use site, e.g.:
     • Swift: &+ vs +
     • C++ std::vector::at vs std::vector::operator[],
  2. in regions of code, e.g.:
     • Rust: unsafe, and
  3. during code generation, e.g.:
     • C, C++: toolchain-specific flags,
     • Carbon, Zig: build modes.
• 3. is the only choice that makes sense:
  • Case-by-case opt-in to run-time checking normalises bugs; it opens the gate to acceptance of defective code.
  • The same code is often valuable both to users who prioritise performance, or hardening. Why should half of them always be let down?

[johnmcfarlane]

FORTIFY_SOURCE