Only the latest release published on the Releases page receives security fixes. Please upgrade before reporting an issue that may already be fixed.
Do not open a public issue for security problems.
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Include:
- the affected component (
server,desktop, or a crate undercrates/) and version, - a description of the issue and its impact,
- steps to reproduce or a proof of concept, if available.
You should receive an acknowledgement within a few days. Once a fix is released, the advisory will be published with credit to the reporter unless you ask otherwise.
Knowing what Warlay does and does not protect against helps triage reports:
- Accounts and sessions: passwords are hashed with Argon2id; access and refresh tokens are random 32-byte values stored server-side only as their SHA-256, and logins are rate limited. Access tokens are short lived and are sent as a bearer token to the REST API and the realtime WebSocket.
- Transport security: the client is built for one server address. With an
https://address the API and the realtime socket are protected by TLS and the server certificate is verified against the public Web PKI. A plainhttp://address is supported for private tests and offers no protection against an eavesdropper or an active man-in-the-middle. - Account recovery: without e-mail, through one-time recovery codes (8 per set, 50 bits each, only their hashes are stored). Using one sets a new password and signs the account out everywhere; the endpoint is rate limited per address and per account.
- Private chat: direct messages are end-to-end encrypted between clients (X25519 key agreement, HKDF-SHA256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305); the server stores and relays ciphertext. Safety numbers let users verify each other's keys. Room chat is not end-to-end encrypted.
- Helpers: the rendezvous and the UDP relay only serve players holding a
room ticket signed by the main server with the shared
helper_secret(keep it long, random and private). The relay forwards opaque datagrams. - Peer-to-peer tunnel: direct QUIC connections between players are encrypted but peers are not authenticated (there is no PKI for players).
- Self-update: the client only downloads installers published by this
repository's releases and verifies them against the release's
SHA256SUMS.txtbefore running them. - Legacy
hubmode (not used by the current client): its WebSocket sessions use an X25519 exchange and ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a server-issued pre-shared key, which does not authenticate the server on its own; use TLS. - Desktop client: runs elevated because Windows requires it for raw LAN
capture (
SIO_RCVALL). It exposes no local service, pipe or listening socket for other programs to talk to: the UI and the network code run in the same process.