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Security: jhonsferg/warlay

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Only the latest release published on the Releases page receives security fixes. Please upgrade before reporting an issue that may already be fixed.

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue for security problems.

Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting. Include:

  • the affected component (server, desktop, or a crate under crates/) and version,
  • a description of the issue and its impact,
  • steps to reproduce or a proof of concept, if available.

You should receive an acknowledgement within a few days. Once a fix is released, the advisory will be published with credit to the reporter unless you ask otherwise.

Security model

Knowing what Warlay does and does not protect against helps triage reports:

  • Accounts and sessions: passwords are hashed with Argon2id; access and refresh tokens are random 32-byte values stored server-side only as their SHA-256, and logins are rate limited. Access tokens are short lived and are sent as a bearer token to the REST API and the realtime WebSocket.
  • Transport security: the client is built for one server address. With an https:// address the API and the realtime socket are protected by TLS and the server certificate is verified against the public Web PKI. A plain http:// address is supported for private tests and offers no protection against an eavesdropper or an active man-in-the-middle.
  • Account recovery: without e-mail, through one-time recovery codes (8 per set, 50 bits each, only their hashes are stored). Using one sets a new password and signs the account out everywhere; the endpoint is rate limited per address and per account.
  • Private chat: direct messages are end-to-end encrypted between clients (X25519 key agreement, HKDF-SHA256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305); the server stores and relays ciphertext. Safety numbers let users verify each other's keys. Room chat is not end-to-end encrypted.
  • Helpers: the rendezvous and the UDP relay only serve players holding a room ticket signed by the main server with the shared helper_secret (keep it long, random and private). The relay forwards opaque datagrams.
  • Peer-to-peer tunnel: direct QUIC connections between players are encrypted but peers are not authenticated (there is no PKI for players).
  • Self-update: the client only downloads installers published by this repository's releases and verifies them against the release's SHA256SUMS.txt before running them.
  • Legacy hub mode (not used by the current client): its WebSocket sessions use an X25519 exchange and ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a server-issued pre-shared key, which does not authenticate the server on its own; use TLS.
  • Desktop client: runs elevated because Windows requires it for raw LAN capture (SIO_RCVALL). It exposes no local service, pipe or listening socket for other programs to talk to: the UI and the network code run in the same process.

There aren't any published security advisories