debark prepares software for offline installation and verifies bundles before passing their repositories to apt. This policy explains how to report a vulnerability and which parts of the project are in scope.
For technical details, see the security model, threat model, and independent verification guide. Known limitations records validation coverage.
During pre-1.0 development, security fixes land on the default branch and ship in the next release. Superseded pre-1.0 releases do not receive separate backports. See CHANGELOG.md for release history.
| Line | Security maintenance |
|---|---|
main (pre-1.0) |
Fixes land here and ship in the next tag |
| Superseded pre-1.0 releases | No separate backport line |
Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting or Security → Report a vulnerability in this repository. Please do not disclose vulnerability details in a public issue.
If private reporting is unavailable, open a public issue asking for a private contact channel without including the vulnerability details. The project does not currently publish a dedicated security email address.
Include:
- Output of
debark version --json, or the tested source revision. - The affected component: CLI, engine, desktop app, or release workflow.
- A minimal reproduction, expected behavior, and actual result.
- Your assessment of impact, if available.
- Whether you would like public credit when the fix is disclosed.
Use a synthetic fixture where possible. Even in a private report, omit unrelated secrets, private signing keys, and sensitive machine inventory.
Maintainers acknowledge and investigate reports on a best-effort basis. There is no round-the-clock response commitment. For confirmed reports, the project coordinates a fix and disclosure date with the reporter and includes credit in release notes when requested.
- Build correctness: unintended package omission or substitution, or a repository, lock, manifest, or signature that misrepresents its contents.
- Verification and installation: accepting a tampered bundle, bypassing required trust checks, or exposing an unverified repository to apt/dpkg.
- Trust handling: signatures, key selection, digests, canonicalization, and archive provenance.
- Desktop security: unsafe handling of package metadata, file paths, frontend bindings, or CLI invocation.
- Release integrity: build, packaging, signing, and reproducibility failures in the project's release pipeline.
- Misleading provenance or redistribution findings: reporting a stronger claim than the evidence supports.
Vulnerabilities in apt, dpkg, GPG, container runtimes, or upstream repositories should also be reported to their maintainers. Report a debark integration flaw here if its use of those components creates a vulnerability.
A vulnerable .deb faithfully transferred without modification is not by
itself a debark vulnerability. A bundle signature authenticates the covered
content; it does not certify that the packaged software is safe. Incorrect
claims made by debark about that content remain in scope.
The existing threat model excludes denial of service against an operator's own machine from explicitly trusted attacker-controlled input unless it demonstrates a verification bypass. See the threat model for the full trust boundaries, exclusions, and residual risks.
Security fixes and capabilities needed to authenticate a bundle remain part of the Apache-2.0 community project. See the free/paid policy.
debark has no telemetry, analytics, crash-reporting uploads, or update checks. Online operations contact the archives, vendor URLs, and container registries needed for the requested work. Snapshots and metadata can still contain sensitive information; review them before sharing.