Please report security problems privately, through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, and not in a public issue. Say what you found, how to reproduce it and which version you ran; I'll answer as soon as I can and credit you in the fix if you'd like.
Apparition handles an Apple ID's sign-in, signing keys and a channel between your computer and your devices, so these matter most:
- the Apple ID password, a signing key or a session token leaving the places they are meant to stay (the log, a trace, another device, the network in the clear);
- pairing or the companion's encrypted channel accepting a device that was not approved;
- the debug server, the Store or the update path accepting a request, a file or a release that was not signed or approved;
- a downloaded release being used without its hash and signature being checked, or a library file you import without its hash (Apple's own download of the libraries is trusted for coming from Apple over HTTPS);
- a connection accepting a national interception certificate authority (below).
Every HTTPS connection Apparition makes is checked by the operating system, as usual, and first refused when its
certificates are, or were issued by, the national root CAs that Russia and Kazakhstan ask people to install (the
list, the certificates themselves and why are in core/vendor/isideload/src/tls.rs), even where the device trusts
them; a connection to Apple's own servers is also refused when any CA in either country issued a certificate in it.
Such a CA can read what goes through the connection, an Apple ID password included, and change it. The Apparition app
on a device does the same for what it downloads itself (Probe/NationalCAs.swift: app sources, GitHub releases, IPA
links and builds from the Store, which it then signs and installs), checking the chain the system built, root included,
and Apple's and GitHub's hosts against any CA in either country; it takes sources and app downloads only over https. That includes the desktop app's
update checks (signed-update, given the same check, for its DNS-over-HTTPS and ECH connections too) and the anisette
servers' provisioning WebSocket. No list of roots is compiled in anywhere: a CA the operating system stops trusting
stops working in Apparition with the system's own update. The one addition is Apple's two roots, trusted for Apple's
sign-in servers, which not every system carries.
Every release's files carry a build attestation (gh attestation verify <file> -R illixion/Apparition) and are
listed in a SHA256SUMS signed with the release keys in release-signers. The desktop app checks
the SHA256SUMS signature and each download's hash before it installs an update; the attestation is for you to
verify with gh. docs/RELEASES.md describes how.
Only the latest release is supported. Apple changes what it accepts without notice, so a fix often ships as a new release rather than a patch to an old one.