trustless handles credentials by design, so security issues are taken seriously.
Please do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities. Use one of the private channels:
-
GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting (preferred) https://github.com/ikkun1222/trustless/security/advisories/new
-
Email fallback:
takahashi.iria+security@gmail.com- Encrypt with GPG if possible (key fingerprint available on request).
- If you must report without encryption, do not include real credential values — describe the vulnerability, not the secret.
- Affected version(s) and platform
- Steps to reproduce (minimal, no real secrets)
- Impact description (what an attacker could do)
- Suggested fix, if you have one
In scope:
- The
trustlessbinary (CLI,run/proxy/serve/oauthsubcommands) - Credential handling: injection, sanitization, DLP redaction, audit logging
- Config / pass / Bitwarden backend interactions
Out of scope:
trustless-win(separate product: https://github.com/ikkun1222/trustless-win)- Third-party services (pass, Bitwarden, OAuth providers) — report to their own programs
| Severity | First response | Fix target |
|---|---|---|
| Critical (credential exposure / remote code execution) | 48h | 7 days |
| High | 5 days | 30 days |
| Medium / Low | 10 days | best effort (next release) |
This is a personal, single-maintainer project. Timelines are best-effort targets, not contractual commitments. You will always receive an acknowledgment, even if a full fix takes longer.
Only the latest release is supported. No LTS branches are maintained.
- Binaries are distributed via GitHub Releases with SHA256SUMS. Starting with v0.5.1, releases are additionally signed with cosign (keyless, OIDC) — verify with
cosign verify-blob. - The default
servesetup runs a local HTTP proxy on127.0.0.1with DLP redaction (pattern_mode: maskrecommended overlogin production). - Secrets are never persisted by trustless itself; the pass / Bitwarden backend remains the store of record.