ci: pin GitHub Actions to full commit SHAs#5
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Part of org-wide supply-chain hardening. Pinning all action references to immutable 40-character commit SHAs so a compromised upstream tag cannot silently affect our CI. The trailing # vX.Y.Z comment preserves the human-readable version for Dependabot. Generated by pinact.
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What
Pins all third-party (and in-org composite) GitHub Action
uses:references to a full-length 40-character commit SHA, with the original tag preserved in a trailing comment that Dependabot reads for updates.Why
Org-wide supply-chain hardening: the enterprise "require actions pinned to a full-length commit SHA" policy is enforcing, so any workflow with tag-pinned refs will fail CI. Mutable tags can also be repointed to a malicious commit by an attacker who compromises an action's repo (see the recent Megalodon campaign — 5k+ repos backdoored in a 6-hour window).
Behaviour change
None. Each action runs at the same commit as the tag it was already on.
Generated by
pinact.