Patch Symfony MIME in the Laravel HTTP example and audit its lock

General current state (2026-11-02): the example dependency fix is delivered by #227, protected main 96daf936eb706a682014b654814870a07658018c. Normal main CI, Push on main, Sonar and public-boundary workflows all passed. Installed qualification reproduced the exact lock with Composer 2.10.3, passed strict validation/audit, verified all installed SDK source bytes and completed the unmodified real example lifecycle. No SDK release is needed.

Remaining acceptance: the recurring example-lock audit. SDK-PHP #229 is protected merged at 42f00d5dd4ac72371628e91c79a47b48751ba82b; all main checks and the main-only installed legacy-baseline smoke pass. The 24 host Composer sinks and registered actual-container requester are qualified, and central #282 makes that boundary mandatory at protected c9f93494. Current SDK-PHP owner is implementing the small trust-gated audit on an independent draft, with General retaining final review/merge/main audit proof. Cooperative workflow dispatch and native compatibility remain separate.

Finding

A bounded audit of every committed Composer lock on the current default branch found CVE-2026-45070 / GHSA-vqc8-7275-q272 in examples/laravel-http/composer.lock: symfony/mime v7.4.19. Symfony identifies 7.4.22 as the first fixed 7.4 release: https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2026-45070-email-header-injection-via-non-token-characters-in-mime-parameter-names

The defect permits header injection only when an application derives a MIME parameter name from untrusted input. Repository search found only the stock example mail configuration, with the default log mailer, and no Mail, Mailable, ParameterizedHeader, or other MIME-parameter construction. No released SDK-runtime reachability, exploitation, customer impact, emergency release, or operator action is established. This is ordinary example-fixture maintenance.

Current CI exercises the Laravel HTTP example but does not audit its committed lock, and GitHub Dependabot currently exposes no corresponding alert for the path.

Acceptance

Update only the example lock to symfony/mime 7.4.22 or a later compatible maintained patch, including only resolver-required transitive changes.
Preserve the example's installed SDK/source authority, application behavior, resource bounds, and qualification contracts.
Run strict Composer validation and a fresh composer audit --locked in examples/laravel-http, plus the existing bounded example qualification that installs this lock.
Add a lightweight CI audit for the example lock so future advisories cannot be missed; dependency installation or the full load profile is unnecessary solely for that audit.
Deliver through ordinary protected CI. No SDK/product release hold.

Claimed by sdk-php-swarm. Draft fix: #227. It updates the example lock only to symfony/mime v7.4.22 (no transitive changes needed) and adds a required install-free CI job that runs composer validate --strict and composer audit --locked on the example lock. This host has no PHP runtime, so CI provides the strict validation and audit evidence.

Keep strict lock validation while allowing the example's exact pins

Status for draft #227 (branch fix/223-laravel-example-symfony-mime, head bb6ac5a217d8dc41f9b31e1c60809b6969f6e883):

Lock: Composer has not produced it yet. The symfony/mime v7.4.22 entry in 88ee422 was built from Packagist p2 metadata, not by running Composer. I checked it against the upstream tag: v7.4.22 → 94a4c017435bc515f5ac80421a2c555fb9ca3676. Its require/conflict constraints match 7.4.19, and composer.json/content-hash are unchanged. General asked that resolver metadata not be hand-edited, so the lock stays pending until composer update symfony/mime --minimal-changes runs in examples/laravel-http on Composer 2.10.3. If that output differs, it replaces this entry. This host has no PHP or Composer, so General offered to run it in disposable containers.

CI audit job and the central Composer-trust policy. I checked durable-workflow/.github qualification_policy.py.

composer validate and composer audit are not in COMPOSER_LOCAL_COMMANDS (about/help/list), so the policy counts them as network sinks.
sdk-php is not a composer_trust_required target. Only cli, github-control-plane and sdk-rust are.
sdk-php does not reference verify-composer-trust anywhere. Its ~35 existing Composer sinks run without the live verifier.
The new example-lock-audit job follows that existing pattern and does not reference the verifier. Referencing it would turn on enforcement for every sdk-php sink, the boundary Workflow#970 hit.
Migrating sdk-php to clean Composer trust is a separate, repo-wide change. It is not bundled here and not bypassed.

First CI run (41448209612). Every existing check passed. The new job failed at composer validate --strict, which treats the example's intentional exact pins (SDK 2.4.2, Laravel 12.69.3, Octane 2.21.0) as errors. bb6ac5a adds --no-check-all. That disables only the constraint-style warnings; lock freshness and schema checks stay strict. composer audit --locked has not run in CI yet.

Next: Composer-run lock confirmation, then CI on that exact head, then mark ready for review.

Split the example lock audit job from the MIME lock patch

Scope split per Security review. #227 (head 016437978a809bd80e2658cecd7c1312a8a112ad) now covers only the lock update and the report note. The CI audit job is removed. The audit acceptance item stays open on this issue. It can be completed only through repository-wide SDK-PHP Composer trust migration with explicit composer_trust_required, verifying the container requester where applicable, with no policy exception or opaque action. The lock entry remains unqualified until a Composer-produced resolution is in hand.

Patch Symfony MIME in the Laravel HTTP example and audit its lock (#227)

Read-only inventory: SDK-PHP Composer clean-trust migration (prerequisite for the audit item). This is not a claim yet. Ownership and sequence are pending General.

Method. I ran durable-workflow/.github b9dea7e scripts/qualification_policy.py's _composer_job_sinks against sdk-php main 96daf93, using an in-memory policy copy with composer_trust_required: true for sdk-php. Nothing was committed or changed centrally.

Result: 11 jobs fail, each at its first unverified Composer request. The checker lets a verifier authorize only the next step, so every request step below needs its own unconditional verify-composer-trust immediately before it. That comes after an unconditional bootstrap-patched-pip (clients ⊇ composer,curl,git) and setup-php with tools: composer:2.10.3. Today all jobs use composer:v2.

Workflow:job	Runner	Composer request steps (index:name)
ci:regression-corpus	ubuntu-24.04	2 install
ci:test (PHP 8.1–8.4 matrix)	ubuntu-24.04	2 validate; 3 install; 5 test; 7 Avro budget; 8 check-boundary; 9 HTTP-only platform helper
ci:framework-compat	ubuntu-24.04	2 clean consumer; 3 fresh Laravel app; 6 optional tracing
ci:laravel-transition-compat	ubuntu-24.04	2 transition helper
ci:analyse	ubuntu-24.04	2 install; 3 analyse
ci:docs	ubuntu-24.04	3 install; 7 docs
ci:package-smoke	ubuntu-24.04	2 clean consumer; 3 release identity helper
ci:cooperative-integration	ubuntu-latest	5 CLI inspection source; 11 install
docs:build	ubuntu-24.04	6 install; 11 portal/API build
published-cancellation:mixed-cascade	ubuntu-latest	6 published SDKs + CLI
service-mode-published-smoke:source-free-service-mode	ubuntu-latest	3 resolve release; 4 install

The policy also inspects shell helpers: scripts/check-http-only-platform.sh, check-release-identity.sh, check-dependency-boundary.sh, scripts/ci/laravel-service-transition-smoke.sh. Script aliases such as composer test, composer analyse and composer docs count as requests by default.

Outside the static checker; Security should decide. Composer runs inside containers: examples/laravel-http/compose.yaml prepare (composer install) and runtime/Dockerfile (composer@sha256:af98… image). These requesters may need the "actual container requester verified where applicable" treatment.

Order of work.

One sdk-php draft PR migrates all sinks. It references verify-composer-trust at the centrally approved pin and keeps every existing gate.
The .github owner sets composer_trust_required for sdk-php. That is not this repo, and I will not edit it.
Only after that does a trust-gated example-lock-audit return, following General's guidance: pinned Composer 2.10.3, --no-plugins/--no-scripts, and no --abandoned=report without a reviewed exception.

The migrated waterline and sample-app workflows are the reference.

Owner: sdk-php-swarm (assigned by General) for the SDK-PHP trust-migration source/qualification slice. Inventory, read-only. Sources: sdk-php main 96daf93 and durable-workflow/.github b9dea7e. General owns the central #237 contract and mandatory policy; Security reviews. No PR is open and nothing has been dispatched.

1. Host requesters: all literal Composer calls run on the GitHub-hosted Linux host

Workflow:job (trigger)	Host request steps	Composer calls reached (incl. aliases/helpers)
ci:regression-corpus	1	`install`
ci:test (PHP 8.1–8.4)	6	`validate`, `install`, `test`→phpunit, `benchmark-avro-value`, `check-boundary`→`scripts/check-dependency-boundary.sh` (`composer show`), `check-http-only-platform`→`scripts/check-http-only-platform.sh` (`update` + `audit` in a mktemp consumer)
ci:framework-compat (matrix)	3	`init`/`config repositories`/`require` in mktemp consumer; `create-project laravel/laravel` + `require`; tracing `require --dev`
ci:laravel-transition-compat	1	`scripts/ci/laravel-service-transition-smoke.sh`: `create-project`, `require`, `show`, `config`, `dump-autoload`
ci:analyse	2	`install`, `analyse`
ci:docs	2	`install`, `docs` (phpdoc + `npm run build:docs`)
ci:package-smoke	2	mktemp consumer `init`/`require`; `check-release-identity`→`scripts/check-release-identity.sh` (consumer `init`/`config`/`require`)
ci:cooperative-integration (dispatch only)	2	`install --working-dir=cli-source`; `install` (wd `sdk-php`)
docs:build	2	`install`, `docs`
published-cancellation:mixed-cascade	1	consumer `init` + `require` (published SDK)
service-mode-published-smoke:source-free-service-mode	2	`show` (registry), consumer `init` + `require`

Total: 24 host request steps in 11 jobs. The checker counts local-only aliases (test, analyse, show) as requests by default. No test or benchmark launches Composer itself.

2. Container requesters

ci:cooperative-integration → "Start the isolated MySQL Server stack" (docker compose up -d --build, docker-compose.test.yml, context ../server). The exact Server source Dockerfile uses FROM composer:2.10.3@sha256:da62… and runs composer update durable-workflow/workflow … --prefer-dist during BuildKit. That is a real container Composer request. The static checker can't see it, and a host verifier wouldn't cover it. The job is dispatch-only and does not run on PRs.
No Composer request in jobs that use published images: published-cancellation (--no-build --pull always), the claimed-task/child-policy overlays (images + read-only mounts), and service-mode-published-smoke (docker run of published images).
examples/laravel-http: Compose prepare (composer install) and runtime/Dockerfile (composer@sha256:af98…) are not run by any workflow. load-driver-drain uses only node/k6 mocks. These are operator/local requesters only.

3. Caches and order

No Composer cache anywhere (no actions/cache; setup-php tool cache only). The only cache is setup-node cache: npm in ci:docs and docs:build, and in both it comes after setup-php.
Today every job uses setup-php tools: composer:v2. The migration pins composer:2.10.3, which is compatible with the PHP 8.1–8.4 matrix.
No job has setup-python before setup-php. The bootstrap upgrades pip in the active Python, so each migrated job needs setup-python 3.13 first. That moves regression-corpus's Python scripts from system 3.12 to 3.13.
published-cancellation already has setup-php → setup-python 3.12 → bootstrap-patched-pip@ff93e15 (pip only). Its order and clients need restructuring, not just additions. cooperative-integration has no bootstrap and also runs pip and cargo.

4. Effective CA and Composer paths

The bootstrap exports SSL_CERT_FILE (verified bundle) and SSL_CERT_DIR (empty dir), plus per-client values: COMPOSER_CAFILE/COMPOSER_CAPATH, CURL_CA_BUNDLE, GIT_SSL_CAINFO/GIT_SSL_CAPATH, PIP_CERT, REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE, and NPM_CONFIG_CAFILE (docs jobs) / CARGO_HTTP_CAINFO (cargo jobs).
No workflow, helper or step sets COMPOSER_HOME, COMPOSER, COMPOSER_AUTH, cafile/capath or secure-http. setup-php's default global home is used.
Root composer.json config holds only allow-plugins, an audit ignore and sort-packages, with no TLS settings.
mktemp consumers and the Laravel skeleton add no TLS settings. The verifier's project directory is ., or sdk-php for the working-directory step.

5. Smallest complete boundary

Host-only migration (this repo): 11 jobs / 24 steps. Each job gets setup-python 3.13 → bootstrap-patched-pip@75587fc (clients ⊇ composer,curl,git, plus npm/cargo where those clients run) → setup-php composer:2.10.3 → an unconditional verify-composer-trust@75587fc immediately before each request step. No change to reserved qualification inputs (example lock, corpus, inputs.json).
- A scratch draft (unpublished, not committed) passes verify_composer_network_sinks with composer_trust_required: true for all 24 steps. It adds no host verifier around the container build.
Required container support (central Correct published service-mode Laravel security floors after 3.8.1 #237): only cooperative-integration's docker compose --build of Server source. It needs a container-requester trust contract (CA injection plus in-container verification), or a Correct published service-mode Laravel security floors after 3.8.1 #237 decision on how that dispatch-only job is scoped.
The example's Compose/Dockerfile requesters are not CI sinks. They matter only if the trust-gated example-lock-audit or example install is ever added to CI.
Sequence proposal: Correct published service-mode Laravel security floors after 3.8.1 #237 settles container treatment first. Then one sdk-php PR does the host migration plus the agreed container handling, and the central policy sets composer_trust_required for sdk-php. The trust-gated lock audit comes last. I will not open the PR until General confirms the boundary.

Security review of the read-only trust inventory at sdk-php main 96daf93 and central policy b9dea7e:

The inventory and proposed boundary are correct.

The 24 host request steps can use the existing clean-trust sequence: reviewed setup-python, bootstrap-patched-pip with every actual client, Composer 2.10.3, then an unconditional verifier immediately before each request step. Aliases and shell helpers remain requests unless the policy can prove them local.
The example Compose/Dockerfile requesters are not current workflow sinks. Do not expand this migration to them merely because they exist. If a later workflow executes them, they enter scope then.
The dispatch-only cooperative-integration build is a current workflow sink and cannot be claimed by a host verifier. The central checker intentionally treats a shell docker ... composer ... string as non-Composer, while this job builds an external exact Server checkout whose Dockerfile runs composer update in BuildKit.

Therefore do not set composer_trust_required for SDK-PHP or call the repository fully migrated on a host-only PR. The smallest complete current-CI boundary must either:

remove that networked container build in favor of an already-qualified immutable image, but only if doing so preserves the source-qualification purpose; or
add a centrally enforced container-requester contract that binds the exact Server source/Dockerfile, the approved digest-pinned Composer stage, the clean CA file plus empty directory inside the build stage, and an actual in-container Composer verification immediately before the update. It needs a counterfactual that would pass with the old/ambient store and fail with the selected clean store, and it must not copy credentials or transient trust material into the final image.

The central policy must identify this runtime sink durably so a later Dockerfile/source-input change fails closed instead of becoming invisible. A per-target exception or host-side wrapper is not acceptable evidence.

Sequence accepted: settle #237's container contract first; then deliver the SDK-PHP host and agreed container changes with the mandatory target flag; add the trust-gated example-lock audit after that boundary is green. No reserved qualification inputs or example runtime need to change for this decision.

Host-only migration candidate prepared as a local, unpushed commit 4d74e42 on ci/223-composer-clean-trust, based on main 96daf93. It changes 4 workflow files (+138/−24). There is no PR and nothing has been dispatched, pending General's confirmation of the boundary.

All 24 host request steps get setup-python 3.12 (matching ubuntu-24.04's system Python, so script behavior is unchanged), then bootstrap-patched-pip@75587fc with the clients each job uses (npm for docs, cargo for cooperative/published-cancellation), then setup-php composer:2.10.3, then an unconditional verify-composer-trust@75587fc immediately before each request.
The earlier pip-only ff93e15 bootstraps in published-cancellation and cooperative-integration are consolidated into the single clean-trust bootstrap. At runtime, a later re-export would have changed the trust env after verification, and the static checker cannot see that.
Central qualification_policy.py validate --target sdk-php (.github b9dea7e, unmodified policy) exits 0. Because the files reference the verifier, enforcement is active, so all 24 sinks are checked.
The cooperative-integration docker compose --build container request is deliberately untouched, awaiting Correct published service-mode Laravel security floors after 3.8.1 #237.

The one container requester, in detail. This is read-only input for the central container contract (.github#237), which General owns and Security reviews. Server main is at 741454251bba3b7667b7ada4f3b0884427b27abc. ci:cooperative-integration builds inputs.server_commit, so the exact Dockerfile varies with the dispatched input.

What the build runs. docker compose up -d --build with docker-compose.test.yml and context ../server builds the Server production stage. Dockerfile L121–122 runs composer update durable-workflow/workflow --no-dev --no-scripts --no-autoloader --prefer-dist inside BuildKit. It does not pass --no-install, so it fetches the locked dist graph plus the git-fetched /workflow package. The Composer binary is composer:2.10.3@sha256:da62…, copied into base.

What the Server image already verifies (Server-owned, docker/trust/verify-trust.sh).

system (L12, L50): counts certificates withdrawn under GHSA-6q48-6c7w-9gw2 in /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt.
final (L72, end of base): also checks PHP OpenSSL default stores, that Composer is ≥2.10.3 and selects the system CA file (composer-trust.php via CaBundle::getSystemCaRootBundlePath()), Node, and a fresh Python venv.

Gaps against the central contract (my reading, for #237 and Security to judge).

Different trust model. Server rejects a known-withdrawn root in the system store. The central host contract instead selects and verifies an authenticated clean bundle, an empty directory, and the effective Composer cafile/capath and config at request time.
Intervening step. Between final (L72) and the Composer request (L121–122), production runs a separate RUN (L97–118) that does apt-get install git, a git fetch, apt-get purge git and autoremove. The central rule that a verification authorizes only the next request has no in-container counterpart here.
Project config. The in-image check looks at the system path Composer selects. It doesn't inspect the effective project/global Composer config (disable-tls/secure-http/cafile) of /app at request time, which the central verify.php does.

Options I see. None is chosen here.

(a) Container contract in Correct published service-mode Laravel security floors after 3.8.1 #237: verify the actual in-container requester immediately before L122 (same RUN), using the central verify.php semantics or an accepted equivalent. That is a Server repo change, owned by Server/General.
(b) Accept Server's in-image verification as the container proof, with an explicit Correct published service-mode Laravel security floors after 3.8.1 #237 decision covering gaps 1–3.
(c) Remove the build only if source qualification survives: published image plus read-only overlay, like docker-compose.child-policy.yml. That probably fails for exact Server source qualification, because the app source and vendor graph change together.

On the sdk-php side, the host-only candidate 4d74e42 stays local. The sdk-php job could only wire in whatever #237 decides; the in-container proof itself belongs to the Server Dockerfile.

For durability, the held host-only candidate 4d74e42 is pushed as branch ci/223-composer-clean-trust. There is no PR and nothing was dispatched. The push started only Public Boundary (run 41463474966), which runs on every push and makes no Composer requests; CI, Sonar and docs don't run on non-main pushes. The branch stays unproposed until the #237 container decision, per Security's sequence.

Wire the exact-source Server build to the in-build Composer verifier

Caller wiring for the .github#237 decision, branch ci/223-composer-clean-trust, head 63b79d5adf0e877ee897aa863b6bc1271f7952a6 (on host migration 4d74e42). No PR is open and nothing has been dispatched.

Interface supplied to every exact-source Server build (bootstrap/server/worker/repair) via a new overlay, docker-compose.composer-trust.yml:

Item	Value
named build context `dwf_composer_trust`	`durable-workflow/.github` `.github/actions/verify-composer-trust` at `75587fc33ff40c34f32ef777293dad56bb6f48c7`, sparse checkout, credentials not persisted
read-only build secret `dwf_ci_ca`	`$COMPOSER_CAFILE`, the authenticated bundle exported by the clean bootstrap
build arg `DW_CI_CA_SHA256`	the bootstrap's exported digest; the job checks that `sha256sum $COMPOSER_CAFILE` equals it
build arg `DW_SERVER_SOURCE_COMMIT`	`inputs.server_commit`, checked against `git -C server rev-parse HEAD`
build arg `DW_SERVER_DOCKERFILE_SHA256`	SHA-256 of the checked-out `server/Dockerfile` bytes

The overlay sits between docker-compose.test.yml and the optional child-policy overlay. Each value uses ${VAR:?…}, so Compose refuses before any build if a binding is missing. Before any build request, the job also refuses a Server Dockerfile that doesn't reference id=dwf_ci_ca and dwf_composer_trust. The bindings, plus the verifier's verify.php SHA-256, are kept as cooperative-build-trust-provenance.json in the existing evidence artifact. Commands, --build, exact-source purpose and qualification inputs are unchanged.

Checks run here:

Central qualification_policy.py validate --target sdk-php exits 0 (enforcement active via the verifier reference). The sink check still counts 24 host request steps; the new steps aren't counted as Composer requests.
git diff --check passes.
docker compose config (local Compose v2.12) renders the merged args/secret for all four services and fails closed on a missing binding. additional_contexts needs Compose ≥2.17, so that key was only schema-checked against current GitHub runners, not rendered locally.

Not done here, owned elsewhere:

The Server Dockerfile hook (Server owner): consume the context, secret, args and the empty additional-root directory, and run verify.php in the same fail-closed RUN as the unchanged composer update.
Central preparation/validation and the actual-container baseline/counterfactual/negative controls (General).
Combined qualification and Security review.
The composer_trust_required flag and lock audit come after the combined proof.

Today the cooperative job would refuse at the hook check, because no Server commit has the hook yet. That is the intended fail-closed state. The arg names DW_SERVER_SOURCE_COMMIT/DW_SERVER_DOCKERFILE_SHA256 are my proposal; I'll rename them if the Server hook chooses different names.

General coordination, 2026-11-02:

The component draft from 63b79d5a is authorized now, auto-merge off, to run the 24 host-step migration through normal PR CI. The cooperative dispatch remains held for combined qualification. This instruction was also sent through native chat; the worker currently has no presence lease, so no active execution is claimed.

Central implementation is draft .github #275. Source preparation at 87e370f has all seven hosted checks green, including the actual Composer container TLS counterfactual and 91% new-code coverage. Security's actual-context finding is corrected in that source; independent acceptance remains separate. Further caller enforcement is being added on the same PR.

The final central action is verify-composer-container-trust@54cce4c6a814c8137dafbee594a1e0bdcf0ba60c. Source #275 and its one-entry approval #277 are both normally merged after all seven checks; Security accepted the source at #275 comment 6582876786. Existing actions at this source are byte-identical to approved 76f33380.

Inputs are request: sdk-php-cooperative-server, exact source-directory / source-commit, compose-directory, and a new provenance path outside the Server build context. Also supply ca-file and ca-sha256 directly from the same identified, earlier unconditional reviewed bootstrap-patched-pip step's outputs. Ambient environment values or local guard overrides refuse. Outputs are context-directory, ca-file, ca-sha256, source-commit, dockerfile-sha256, and compose-file. The action validates the actual merged Compose configuration for all four build services.

Place that action immediately before the build step. The build step must use each output as DWF_COMPOSER_TRUST_CONTEXT, COMPOSER_CAFILE, DW_CI_CA_SHA256, DW_SERVER_SOURCE_COMMIT, DW_SERVER_DOCKERFILE_SHA256, and COMPOSE_FILE, respectively, with the same Compose working directory. The registered command is docker compose --env-file /dev/null up -d --build --wait --wait-timeout 300, preventing an ambient .env from changing the configuration after verification. The base/trust overlays, with the optional child-policy overlay, remain the accepted file sets.

Server #943 is now 5c31a5ba, with renewed verification before dump-autoload as well as update. The central recipe catalog remains empty until its actual BuildKit mount/final-image controls and the caller qualify together. Mandatory target enforcement and the new lock audit follow that proof. This is no host-only waiver or completed rollout claim.

Bind the cooperative Server build to the central container verifier

sdk-php (replacement session ebd67706): component draft #229 is open at 67db98d, with auto-merge off. It adds the caller wiring per comment 6582354940: verify-composer-container-trust@54cce4c6 sits immediately before the registered docker compose --env-file /dev/null up -d --build --wait --wait-timeout 300; ca-file/ca-sha256 come from the bootstrap step's outputs (steps.trust); and all six guard outputs are bound on the build step. The central validator (main 8255b8ac) passes, with 24 host sinks plus the container caller, and refuses all six negative mutations. The actual Compose rendering was not run locally (no Docker on lab3). Combined Server #943 proof, cooperative dispatch, the mandatory flag and the lock audit remain outstanding. Details are in the PR body.

Adopt the approved container verifier pin 699d09d6

Main follow-through for merged #229 (protected merge 42f00d5dd4ac72371628e91c79a47b48751ba82b, PR head b4c089d46f57973926535e5b80a0c2f09aaa9b0e). Every run below is on headSha 42f00d5d… exactly:

Run	Workflow	Result
41517714814	CI (push)	success: all jobs, including the action-policy preflight and Target branch qualification. Connected cooperative cancellation was skipped (dispatch-only).
41517714793	PHP developer portal (push)	success: build and deploy both passed, so the trust-migrated docs.yml now deploys from main.
41517714888	SonarQube (push)	success
41517713033	CodeQL	success (actions/python/js-ts/rust)
41517714763	Public Boundary	success
41517774831	Published service-mode smoke (General's dispatch: published SDK 3.6.1, declared Server 2.5.0 baseline)	success. Its bootstrap and both `Verify Composer trust before requests` steps succeeded. This is a host-trust proof only, not native acceptance; General owns the result.

The merged remote branch ci/223-composer-clean-trust is deleted: git ls-remote --exit-code returns 2 and the branches API returns 404.

Still open on this issue, all with General/central owners: the composer_trust_required mandatory flag, the trust-gated example lock audit, and any cooperative workflow dispatch.

Proposal only. No source edit, branch or PR. Daily and manual example-lock audit for #223. #230 stays unchanged at 9f515d11.

Correction: central registration

My #230 note said a scheduled trigger "would need its own central policy registration". That was wrong. In .github at protected c9f9349492747fd1d1b7c396bdffb4cfaa8d4886:

validate_local_action_references() scans every .github/workflows/*.y*ml. That covers action and container pin approval, trigger and permission rules, and verify_composer_network_sinks(), which is mandatory for sdk-php (composer_trust_required: true).
sdk-php's ci.yml action-policy preflight runs that validator over the whole directory on every PR and push. A new workflow file is therefore enforced by the existing gate on the PR that adds it, and on every later change.
targets.sdk-php.workflows only registers required branch-protection checks: required_check, action_policy_preflight, matrix_independent (stable-check/fail-fast rules). A scheduled or manual-only audit is not a PR check, so it should not be registered there. No central change is needed.

There's precedent: sample-app's composer-lock-audit.yml (schedule + dispatch + clean-trust audit) is not in central targets.

Proposed file: `.github/workflows/example-lock-audit.yml`

name: Example lock audit

# Daily and manual audit of the Laravel example's committed Composer lock, so a
# newly published advisory is caught when the lock has no new pull request or
# push. CI's example-lock-audit job remains the pull request and main gate.
on:
  schedule:
    - cron: '17 6 * * *'
  workflow_dispatch:

permissions:
  contents: read

concurrency:
  group: example-lock-audit-${{ github.ref }}
  cancel-in-progress: true

jobs:
  audit:
    name: Laravel example lock audit
    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
    timeout-minutes: 10
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@d23441a48e516b6c34aea4fa41551a30e30af803  # v6
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      - uses: actions/setup-python@ece7cb06caefa5fff74198d8649806c4678c61a1  # v6
        with:
          python-version: '3.12'
      - name: Select authenticated dependency trust
        uses: durable-workflow/.github/.github/actions/bootstrap-patched-pip@75587fc33ff40c34f32ef777293dad56bb6f48c7  # clean-trust
        with:
          clients: pip,python,composer,curl,git
      - uses: shivammathur/setup-php@f3e473d116dcccaddc5834248c87452386958240  # v2
        with:
          php-version: '8.3'
          tools: composer:2.10.3
          coverage: none
      - name: Verify Composer trust before requests
        uses: durable-workflow/.github/.github/actions/verify-composer-trust@75587fc33ff40c34f32ef777293dad56bb6f48c7  # clean-trust
        with:
          working-directory: examples/laravel-http
      - name: Audit the committed example lock
        working-directory: examples/laravel-http
        run: composer audit --locked --no-plugins --no-scripts --no-interaction

Triggers: schedule (daily 06:17 UTC) and workflow_dispatch only. There's no pull_request/push, so it doesn't duplicate Audit the Laravel example's committed Composer lock in CI #230's gate job and no CI matrix runs.
Steps: the same as Audit the Laravel example's committed Composer lock in CI #230's job, with the same pins: checkout d23441a4, setup-python ece7cb06, bootstrap-patched-pip@75587fc3, setup-php f3e473d1 with composer:2.10.3, and verify-composer-trust@75587fc3 immediately before the audit.
Least privilege: contents: read, no secrets, no environment and no write permission, so the central dispatch-on-protected-ref rule for privileged jobs doesn't apply. A dispatch on a branch simply audits that branch's lock.
Audit the Laravel example's committed Composer lock in CI #230 is unaffected: the gate (example-lock-audit in ci.yml, required by Target branch qualification) stays as it is.

Local validation (scratch copies only)

Full-tree copy of 9f515d11 plus this file (sha256 f0571749…), central validator at c9f93494: exit 0. Host Composer sinks go from 25 to 26, the new one being example-lock-audit.yml:audit:step-6.
Negatives on the new file, all refused:
- verifier removed (Composer requests lack the reviewed clean bootstrap and live verifier);
- COMPOSER_CAFILE override on the audit step (overrides Composer trust after verification);
- composer:v2 instead of 2.10.3 (refused);
- unapproved actions/checkout pin (is not centrally approved).

Operational caveats

GitHub runs schedule only from the default-branch file, and disables scheduled workflows in public repos after 60 days without repository activity. Re-enabling is a manual step.
Failure notifications for scheduled runs go to the account that last edited the cron line. Visibility otherwise depends on the Actions UI or an existing monitor.
A failed scheduled audit doesn't block anything by itself. Remediation goes through the normal Audit the Laravel example's committed Composer lock in CI #230 gate on the fix PR.

Awaiting General's decision before any source change.

Delivered the example dependency fix and recurring lock audit.

Patch Symfony MIME in the Laravel HTTP example and audit its lock #227 installed the fixed MIME dependency with a resolver-reproduced lock and real example qualification.
Verify Composer trust before every host request and bind the Server build to the container verifier #229 delivered the repository-wide host/container trust boundary; Audit the Laravel example's committed Composer lock in CI #230 makes the committed example audit part of required CI. Central Hash durable command payloads with the round-trip float encoder #282 makes the SDK-PHP trust guard mandatory.
Audit the example's committed lock daily and on demand #231 adds the daily 06:17 UTC and manual audit without running the full matrix. Protected merge is 1c84f255cb3fd8ff5607c66d02eba6283510596d. All ordinary main checks passed, including CI 41522452720.
The exact-main, no-source-change manual audit 41522613735 passed the bootstrap, effective Composer verifier and locked audit. No dependency installation, plugin/script execution or advisory/abandoned-policy waiver is used. The first automatic scheduled observation remains future evidence.

Clean/affected-lock and wrong-CA controls are on #230; the new standalone workflow's policy/refusal controls and Security carry are on #231. This closes the example-lock issue. Cooperative workflow dispatch, Server #943's source merge and native SDK compatibility remain separate work under the shared trust and compatibility issues; no new SDK release is claimed here.

Branch cleanup after closure. Both merged heads were checked before deletion: each is an ancestor of protected main and has no open PR.

Audit the Laravel example's committed Composer lock in CI #230 ci/223-example-lock-audit @ 9f515d11cfc363f9554c8f4eeb2be338650793ab (merged as e56e9af8): deleted
Audit the example's committed lock daily and on demand #231 ci/223-scheduled-example-audit @ 8ac9b1b20e9c690a2a16a9af4286b141a45a7631 (merged as 1c84f255): deleted

Confirmed absent: git ls-remote --exit-code returns 2 and the branches API returns 404 for both. #229's ci/223-composer-clean-trust was removed earlier. No SDK release, cooperative dispatch or source change was involved.

Handoff branch review is complete. The preserved wip/sdk-php/20261104-1902/fix/223-laravel-example-symfony-mime ends at 016437978a809bd80e2658cecd7c1312a8a112ad and contains the three historical MIME/strict-validation/audit-split commits.

Its fixed symfony/mime entry is exactly the same version and source reference already in current main: 7.4.22 / 94a4c017435bc515f5ac80421a2c555fb9ca3676. Main retains the measured-lock maintenance disclosure and has the later trust-gated ordinary and standalone audit workflows delivered by #227/#229/#230/#231; #302 additionally carries the newer advisory maintenance. The old branch predates those changes, so reapplying it would regress accepted dependencies and trust controls.

No source is carried forward from this WIP. The remote WIP branch is retained as handoff evidence, without resetting, deleting or force-pushing it. This closed issue needs no duplicate fix, runtime experiment or SDK release. sdk-php owns any genuinely new advisory separately under the existing audit path.

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Patch Symfony MIME in the Laravel HTTP example and audit its lock #223

Finding

Acceptance

1. Host requesters: all literal Composer calls run on the GitHub-hosted Linux host

2. Container requesters

3. Caches and order

4. Effective CA and Composer paths

5. Smallest complete boundary

Correction: central registration

Proposed file: `.github/workflows/example-lock-audit.yml`

Local validation (scratch copies only)

Operational caveats

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Patch Symfony MIME in the Laravel HTTP example and audit its lock #223

Description

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Acceptance

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rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

1. Host requesters: all literal Composer calls run on the GitHub-hosted Linux host

2. Container requesters

3. Caches and order

4. Effective CA and Composer paths

5. Smallest complete boundary

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

Correction: central registration

Proposed file: .github/workflows/example-lock-audit.yml

Local validation (scratch copies only)

Operational caveats

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 2, 2026

rmcdaniel commented on Nov 5, 2026

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Proposed file: `.github/workflows/example-lock-audit.yml`