ci: every checkout turns the job's token off, and a guard asks each one - #118
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actions/checkout leaves the token it cloned with in .git/config, and the steps after it run go test over the pull request's own code, which can read that file. An outside review of #117 named it on the one job it was reading, and #117 turned the token off there. A fix at one job of twenty four was an inconsistency (O230). Checked per step before turning off all of them: no step in these workflows pushes, fetches or commits after a checkout. The only git commands are diff, cat-file and rev-parse, all local. The release, the attestation and the pages talk to GitHub through gh with a token in the environment, or through actions that carry their own, and none of that reads .git/config. The weight is small - a pull request's token from a fork is read only and the workflows ask for contents: read - and the class is real on every checkout alike. The guard reads each workflow through the YAML parser rather than the line under uses:, because in pages.yml the with block sits under a comment and the key can sit anywhere inside it. It self tests its predicate on six shapes the tree does not contain, since every checkout is off now and a rule that weakened would find nothing to let through. It counts what it saw and refuses a walk that found far fewer than the twenty four measured. Two mutations. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe workflows now disable persisted Git credentials for checkout actions. A Go guard test scans workflow YAML and verifies that every detected checkout explicitly sets ChangesCheckout Credential Hardening
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 2 (Simple) | ~10 minutes Change: Bug fix Suggested labels: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to A workflow can evade the credential-persistence guard by using a .yaml extension or by reducing discovered checkouts. Tighten discovery and require the reviewed checkout count before merging. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 12 | ❌ 2❌ Failed checks (2 warnings)
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Full details: Safe File ParsingExplanation The new guard reads YAML through Resolution Before reading, use Full details: Scope, Duplication And DocsExplanation The PR scope is coherent and the title and description mention the workflow changes and guard. No duplicated helper or backward-incompatible public API is evident. However, the PR changes CI/build configuration in eight workflow files: all 24 checkout steps now set Resolution Update repository documentation, such as ✨ Finishing Touches📝 Generate docstrings
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
✨ Simplify code
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In `@internal/guard/checkoutcredentials_test.go`:
- Line 60: Update the workflow scan to include files ending in both .yml and
.yaml, define expectedCheckouts as 24, and require the recorded checkout count
to equal that constant rather than allowing a shortfall. Apply these changes in
the directory-entry filter and checkout-count validation logic.
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Check GitHub Actions security: third-party actions pinned to a full commit SHA, minimal `permissions:` block, no `pull_request_target` with checkout of PR code, no untrusted input (`github.event.*.title/body`, branch names) interpolated dir...
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.github/workflows/attest-release.yml.github/workflows/tool-versions.yml.github/workflows/dependency-review.yml.github/workflows/pages.yml.github/workflows/dev-build.yml.github/workflows/verify-release.yml.github/workflows/release.yml.github/workflows/ci.yml
…unt agree An outside review of #118 made two points about the guard. The first is right: actions/checkout in a file ending .yaml would run and go unasked, where the pinning guard beside it takes both suffixes. The second mixed two things - a checkout the walk sees without the key is reported whatever the count says, and the count guards against a parser that stopped seeing steps - but the floor of twenty was a number from nowhere. The proposed exact constant of twenty four is turned down: kept by hand, it goes stale with the next workflow and would turn red on a good change, a new checkout with the key and no bump. Instead the text is read once more, for a second count of "uses: actions/checkout@" outside comments, and the YAML walk has to find the same number. No constant, and a parser dropping part of the steps is caught by the disagreement. A third mutation proves it: the walk stops recognising a checkout, the text still holds twenty four. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
persist-credentials: falseon all twenty fouractions/checkoutsteps across the eight workflows, and a guard that asks each one (O230).Why
actions/checkoutleaves the token it cloned with in.git/config, and the steps after it rungo testover the pull request's own code, which can read that file. An outside review of #117 named it on the one job it was reading, and #117 turned the token off there. A fix at one job of twenty four was an inconsistency.The weight is small - a pull request's token from a fork is read only and the workflows ask for
contents: read- and the class is real on every checkout alike.Checked per step, not assumed
No step in these workflows pushes, fetches or commits after a checkout. The only
gitcommands arediff,cat-fileandrev-parse(ci.yml,dev-build.yml), all local. The release, the attestation and the pages talk to GitHub throughghwith a token in the environment, or through actions that carry their own (deploy-pages,attest-build-provenance), and none of that reads.git/config.The guard
TestEveryCheckoutTurnsItsTokenOff(internal/guard/checkoutcredentials_test.go) reads each workflow through the YAML parser rather than the line underuses:, because inpages.ymlthewithblock sits under a comment and the key can sit anywhere inside it. It self tests its predicate on six shapes the tree does not contain, since every checkout is off now and a rule that weakened would find nothing to let through. It refuses a walk that found far fewer than the twenty four measured.Proven red by removing the key from one checkout before the commit, and by two mutations after it (key removed from
pages.yml, predicate readingtrueas off) - both caught.What this does not prove
That the token is unreadable by other routes:
GH_TOKENin the environment of aghstep is visible to that step by design. The guard asks only about.git/config.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
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