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Security: deblasis/incoda

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Reporting

Report vulnerabilities privately to alex@deblasis.net (or open a GitHub security advisory on this repository). Do not open a public issue for something exploitable.

You will get an acknowledgement within 5 days, and a fix or a stated assessment as soon as practical afterwards. This is a one-maintainer project; that is the honest SLA.

Scope and threat model

incoda is a local developer tool. It runs commands you already had the authority to run, as your own user, and it coordinates them through files in a per-user state directory on a local filesystem.

The security boundary is the OS user. What is in scope:

  • A queue key escaping the state directory (key validation refuses path separators, .., and Windows device names rather than sanitising them).
  • Correctness failures that make two heavy jobs run when the tool said they would not: the locking probe in incoda doctor exists to catch filesystems that do not enforce locks.
  • Anything that would make a less privileged process able to influence a more privileged one through the state directory.
  • The answer channel typing at a job it should not reach: incoda answer writes into a pty job's console input, so it is double-gated — the owner gate attach shares (lane.MayAttach, checked by the command and again by the run against the live ticket) and a blocked gate (the run delivers only while the job's own OSC 7501 record says blocked with a kind). The typed text never echoes into the job's log, and a refusal carries its reason back through the same request file.

Out of scope: denial of service by a local user against their own machine (they have kill), and multi-user isolation on a shared host. State is per-user by design; two OS users on one machine get separate lanes and are expected not to trust each other.

There aren't any published security advisories