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Bare-metal x86 operating system that turns any old PC into a self-hosted, offline hardware password vault. SSH + embedded web console, Argon2id, ChaCha20-Poly1305, ML-KEM, Ed25519. No Linux, no cloud, no bloat.

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BRIGGS OS — Self-Hosted Hardware Password Vault Operating System

License: Personal Use Free Platform Release Audit

Briggs OS is a bootable, bare-metal x86 operating system that turns any old PC — or a QEMU / VirtualBox virtual machine — into a dedicated, offline hardware password vault. It is a self-hosted password manager you control: SSH into the appliance, or open the embedded web console, store credentials, and get out. No Linux underneath, no cloud, no Electron, no bloat.

Built from scratch for 32-bit x86 BIOS hardware. Post-quantum crypto, full-disk-style vault encryption, verified boot, and an audited security model — all in a 2 MB disk image.

Why Briggs OS?

Most password managers are cloud apps wrapped in Electron, or closed-source hardware dongles. Briggs OS is different:

  • It is an operating system, not an app. Your secrets live on an appliance you own, in a tiny bare-metal kernel with no general-purpose OS underneath.
  • It is offline by default. No telemetry, no sync server, no vendor cloud. If it is not connected, your vault still works.
  • It runs on hardware you already have. An old PC, a laptop, a Raspberry-Pi-class x86 box, or a VM — if it is x86 with BIOS boot, it will run.
  • Post-quantum ready. ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation on top of X25519 for session keys, so captured traffic resists a future quantum decryption of the key exchange.
  • Reproducible and reviewable. Security software you can read, build, and verify yourself.

Features

  • Dedicated vault appliance — SUPERADMIN, TIER2 (shared-vault collaboration), and TIER1 (personal + granted shared vaults) role model.
  • Remote admin over SSH — Dropbear-derived Briggs Transport (ident SSH-2.0-briggs-tport) on port 22. No shell, just the admin protocol.
  • Embedded web console — HTTP + JSON-RPC admin API served in-kernel on port 80 (remote build), so you can manage the vault from a browser at http://<host>:8080.
  • Strong KDF — Argon2id at 256 MB, 3 passes protects user passwords and vault keys.
  • Vault encryption — ChaCha20-Poly1305 with key commitment for all stored secrets.
  • Post-quantum key exchange — X25519 + ML-KEM-768.
  • Authenticated signing — Ed25519, with offline signing for kernel releases.
  • Verified boot — the kernel verifies its Ed25519 signature and the SHA-256 hash of its public key (stored in ApplianceMeta on first boot) before running.
  • TPM measured boot — kernel hash extended into PCR 8; TPM quote command in the admin shell.
  • Optional two-factor authentication — TOTP or hardware token per account.
  • Chained audit log — HMAC-SHA256, 256-entry ring, tamper-evident.
  • Entropy fail-closed — RDRAND required or the machine will not boot.
  • Deterministic builds — SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH + -frandom-seed for reproducible kernels.

Upcoming: next version — embedded HTTP server web UI + custom API

The next release adds a full embedded HTTP server running inside the kernel with a custom JSON-RPC admin API, giving you a browser-based web console in addition to SSH:

  • In-kernel HTTP server on port 80 — no userspace, no daemon, no Linux. The web console is served straight from the kernel image.
  • Custom admin API (POST JSON over HTTP):
    • /api/ssh/connect — authenticate, returns a session auth token
    • /api/ssh/exec — run vault operations (list / add / edit / delete records, manage users, shared vaults, audit log) via the same audited backend the SSH transport uses
    • /api/ssh/disconnect — revoke the session token
  • Session auth tokens — short-lived, randomly generated, idle-expired; every admin call is authenticated and audited, not just TCP-whitelisted.
  • Web UI — a single embedded HTML/JS page served at /, talking to the custom API from the browser. No web framework, no dependencies.
  • Full duplex TCP handling — request segmentation, sequence-number validation, retransmit safety, and per-connection state machines implemented in the kernel TCP stack.
  • TOTP login — two-factor accounts sign in from the browser with a TOTP code.
  • Firewall ACL enforcement — the same netmon_acl_check() rules that gate SSH now also apply to HTTP traffic, with acl-deny audit events.

Status: the HTTP server, custom API, auth tokens, and web UI are built and passing in the remote dev build; they are being hardened for the next production release. Track progress in the releases tab.

Roadmap (later releases)

Secure updates

  • A/B partition scheme — two kernel partitions so an update can never brick the boot path
  • Network update service — automated update checking over the network
  • Delta updates — binary diffs to keep downloads small
  • Signed loadable modules — kernel module signing and verified loading
  • TPM attestation of update state — remote verification that the appliance is current

Testing & tooling

  • Coverage-guided fuzzing (AFL / libfuzzer) for the network parsers (DHCP, TCP, SSH, HTTP)
  • Offline TPM2_Quote verification tooling — verify quotes against the EK certificate

Recovery & platform hardening

  • Level 2 USB recovery token — recovery passphrase + physical USB token as a second recovery path
  • Secure-boot keys in TPM NV storage
  • Constant-time Ed25519 verification for defense-in-depth
  • Privilege separation for SSH once the platform gains MMU support
  • Tamper-evident logging for physical-security events

Quick start

Run it in QEMU on any desktop:

qemu-system-i386 -drive file=briggs.img,format=raw \
    -m 512M -no-reboot -serial stdio \
    -cpu qemu64,rdrand=on \
    -net nic,model=e1000 \
    -net user,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22,hostfwd=tcp::8080-:80

Then either:

# SSH admin transport (host port 2222 -> guest 22)
ssh -p 2222 admin@localhost

or open the embedded web console in a browser:

http://localhost:8080

First boot walks you through setup: create the initial admin superadmin account, choose DHCP or static networking, and set a recovery passphrase. In dev builds the wizard is skipped and an admin/admin superadmin is auto-created.

Note: QEMU minimum is 512 MB RAM (stage2 E820 check). RDRAND must be present.

Screenshots

Briggs OS password vault SSH admin session screenshot Briggs OS vault login and authentication screenshot Briggs OS running in VirtualBox virtual machine

How it works

  1. Boot: boot.bin (BIOS/MBR) loads stage2, which locates the kernel on the disk image.
  2. Verified boot: stage2 passes the kernel and its Ed25519 signature to the kernel; the kernel verifies the signature and that the SHA-256 hash of its public key matches the one stored in ApplianceMeta on first boot. The kernel hash is also extended into TPM PCR 8.
  3. Auth runtime: Argon2id derives keys from your password; the vault is decrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 and stays encrypted at rest.
  4. Remote admin: the in-kernel transport listens on port 22 (SSH) and, in the remote build, port 80 (embedded HTTP + JSON-RPC web console). Both call the same audited auth_* / vault backend.

Crypto (all hand written, no libc)

  • Argon2id — 256 MB, 3 passes, for passwords
  • ChaCha20-Poly1305 — vault encryption with key commitment
  • X25519 + ML-KEM-768 — post-quantum key exchange
  • Ed25519 — kernel signing (done offline)
  • HMAC-SHA256 — chained audit log
  • RDRAND — entropy source; machine fails closed without it

Build from source

Three build profiles, isolated object directories:

make dev          # Development build: REMOTE_DISABLED, skips Argon2/Ed25519
make prod-local   # Local-only production: REMOTE_DISABLED, full crypto
make prod-remote  # Full production with Briggs Transport networking
make ci           # Build all three profiles in sequence (requires distclean)

Required tools: i686-elf-gcc (or host gcc -m32 for dev), i686-elf-as, i686-elf-ld, nasm, and python3 (with the cryptography package for Ed25519 signing).

Artifacts: build/briggs.img (bootable HDD image), build/briggs.iso (El Torito ISO), briggs_kernel.bin (raw kernel), briggs_kernel.sig (Ed25519 signature).

What's inside the repo

briggs.img               Bootable disk image (2 MB)
briggs_kernel.bin        The kernel (~397 KB)
briggs_kernel.sig        Ed25519 signature
virus_scan_report.pdf    Virus scan results
docs/                    Manual, audit report, TPM setup, update guide

Documentation

FAQ

Is Briggs OS free? Free for individuals using it for themselves. Businesses need a paid license. See LICENSE.md.

Does it need Linux? No. It is its own bare-metal operating system. There is no kernel, init, or package layer from a general-purpose OS underneath.

Is it a cloud password manager? No. It is self-hosted and offline by default. Your vault lives on hardware you control.

What hardware do I need? Any 32-bit x86 machine that boots from BIOS (MBR), with RDRAND and at least 512 MB of RAM. Also runs in QEMU and VirtualBox.

Do I need a TPM? No. TPM measured boot and TPM quote are supported when present, but the appliance works without one.

How is my vault encrypted? Secrets are encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 (with key commitment), and the keys are derived with Argon2id (256 MB, 3 passes). The disk image is safe to clone and store offline.

Is it post-quantum? Session key exchange uses ML-KEM-768 over X25519, so captured traffic resists quantum decryption of the key exchange.

How is it different from KeePass, Bitwarden, or 1Password? Those are applications on a general-purpose OS (or a cloud sync service). Briggs OS is a dedicated OS appliance: no host OS attack surface, no vendor cloud, no app-store dependency — an old PC becomes a single-purpose hardware password vault.

Alternatives

Looking at other options? Common approaches include cloud password managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass), file-based managers (KeePass), and commercial hardware keys. Briggs OS targets a different niche: turn spare x86 hardware into a self-hosted, offline password vault appliance with verified boot and post-quantum crypto.

License

Free if you are an individual using it for yourself. Businesses need a paid license. See LICENSE.md.

Security & disclaimer

This is security software. Do not trust it with real secrets until you have reviewed it yourself. The full security audit is in docs/PRODUCTION_SECURITY_AUDIT.md. Report vulnerabilities privately; see SECURITY.md.

About

Bare-metal x86 operating system that turns any old PC into a self-hosted, offline hardware password vault. SSH + embedded web console, Argon2id, ChaCha20-Poly1305, ML-KEM, Ed25519. No Linux, no cloud, no bloat.

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