Briggs OS is a bootable, bare-metal x86 operating system that turns any old PC — or a QEMU / VirtualBox virtual machine — into a dedicated, offline hardware password vault. It is a self-hosted password manager you control: SSH into the appliance, or open the embedded web console, store credentials, and get out. No Linux underneath, no cloud, no Electron, no bloat.
Built from scratch for 32-bit x86 BIOS hardware. Post-quantum crypto, full-disk-style vault encryption, verified boot, and an audited security model — all in a 2 MB disk image.
Most password managers are cloud apps wrapped in Electron, or closed-source hardware dongles. Briggs OS is different:
- It is an operating system, not an app. Your secrets live on an appliance you own, in a tiny bare-metal kernel with no general-purpose OS underneath.
- It is offline by default. No telemetry, no sync server, no vendor cloud. If it is not connected, your vault still works.
- It runs on hardware you already have. An old PC, a laptop, a Raspberry-Pi-class x86 box, or a VM — if it is x86 with BIOS boot, it will run.
- Post-quantum ready. ML-KEM-768 key encapsulation on top of X25519 for session keys, so captured traffic resists a future quantum decryption of the key exchange.
- Reproducible and reviewable. Security software you can read, build, and verify yourself.
- Dedicated vault appliance — SUPERADMIN, TIER2 (shared-vault collaboration), and TIER1 (personal + granted shared vaults) role model.
- Remote admin over SSH — Dropbear-derived Briggs Transport (ident
SSH-2.0-briggs-tport) on port 22. No shell, just the admin protocol. - Embedded web console — HTTP + JSON-RPC admin API served in-kernel on port 80 (remote
build), so you can manage the vault from a browser at
http://<host>:8080. - Strong KDF — Argon2id at 256 MB, 3 passes protects user passwords and vault keys.
- Vault encryption — ChaCha20-Poly1305 with key commitment for all stored secrets.
- Post-quantum key exchange — X25519 + ML-KEM-768.
- Authenticated signing — Ed25519, with offline signing for kernel releases.
- Verified boot — the kernel verifies its Ed25519 signature and the SHA-256 hash of its public key (stored in ApplianceMeta on first boot) before running.
- TPM measured boot — kernel hash extended into PCR 8; TPM quote command in the admin shell.
- Optional two-factor authentication — TOTP or hardware token per account.
- Chained audit log — HMAC-SHA256, 256-entry ring, tamper-evident.
- Entropy fail-closed — RDRAND required or the machine will not boot.
- Deterministic builds —
SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH+-frandom-seedfor reproducible kernels.
The next release adds a full embedded HTTP server running inside the kernel with a custom JSON-RPC admin API, giving you a browser-based web console in addition to SSH:
- In-kernel HTTP server on port 80 — no userspace, no daemon, no Linux. The web console is served straight from the kernel image.
- Custom admin API (
POSTJSON over HTTP):/api/ssh/connect— authenticate, returns a session auth token/api/ssh/exec— run vault operations (list / add / edit / delete records, manage users, shared vaults, audit log) via the same audited backend the SSH transport uses/api/ssh/disconnect— revoke the session token
- Session auth tokens — short-lived, randomly generated, idle-expired; every admin call is authenticated and audited, not just TCP-whitelisted.
- Web UI — a single embedded HTML/JS page served at
/, talking to the custom API from the browser. No web framework, no dependencies. - Full duplex TCP handling — request segmentation, sequence-number validation, retransmit safety, and per-connection state machines implemented in the kernel TCP stack.
- TOTP login — two-factor accounts sign in from the browser with a TOTP code.
- Firewall ACL enforcement — the same
netmon_acl_check()rules that gate SSH now also apply to HTTP traffic, withacl-denyaudit events.
Status: the HTTP server, custom API, auth tokens, and web UI are built and passing in the remote dev build; they are being hardened for the next production release. Track progress in the releases tab.
- A/B partition scheme — two kernel partitions so an update can never brick the boot path
- Network update service — automated update checking over the network
- Delta updates — binary diffs to keep downloads small
- Signed loadable modules — kernel module signing and verified loading
- TPM attestation of update state — remote verification that the appliance is current
- Coverage-guided fuzzing (AFL / libfuzzer) for the network parsers (DHCP, TCP, SSH, HTTP)
- Offline TPM2_Quote verification tooling — verify quotes against the EK certificate
- Level 2 USB recovery token — recovery passphrase + physical USB token as a second recovery path
- Secure-boot keys in TPM NV storage
- Constant-time Ed25519 verification for defense-in-depth
- Privilege separation for SSH once the platform gains MMU support
- Tamper-evident logging for physical-security events
Run it in QEMU on any desktop:
qemu-system-i386 -drive file=briggs.img,format=raw \
-m 512M -no-reboot -serial stdio \
-cpu qemu64,rdrand=on \
-net nic,model=e1000 \
-net user,hostfwd=tcp::2222-:22,hostfwd=tcp::8080-:80Then either:
# SSH admin transport (host port 2222 -> guest 22)
ssh -p 2222 admin@localhostor open the embedded web console in a browser:
http://localhost:8080
First boot walks you through setup: create the initial admin superadmin account, choose
DHCP or static networking, and set a recovery passphrase. In dev builds the wizard is skipped
and an admin/admin superadmin is auto-created.
Note: QEMU minimum is 512 MB RAM (stage2 E820 check). RDRAND must be present.
- Boot:
boot.bin(BIOS/MBR) loadsstage2, which locates the kernel on the disk image. - Verified boot: stage2 passes the kernel and its Ed25519 signature to the kernel; the kernel verifies the signature and that the SHA-256 hash of its public key matches the one stored in ApplianceMeta on first boot. The kernel hash is also extended into TPM PCR 8.
- Auth runtime: Argon2id derives keys from your password; the vault is decrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 and stays encrypted at rest.
- Remote admin: the in-kernel transport listens on port 22 (SSH) and, in the remote
build, port 80 (embedded HTTP + JSON-RPC web console). Both call the same audited
auth_*/ vault backend.
- Argon2id — 256 MB, 3 passes, for passwords
- ChaCha20-Poly1305 — vault encryption with key commitment
- X25519 + ML-KEM-768 — post-quantum key exchange
- Ed25519 — kernel signing (done offline)
- HMAC-SHA256 — chained audit log
- RDRAND — entropy source; machine fails closed without it
Three build profiles, isolated object directories:
make dev # Development build: REMOTE_DISABLED, skips Argon2/Ed25519
make prod-local # Local-only production: REMOTE_DISABLED, full crypto
make prod-remote # Full production with Briggs Transport networking
make ci # Build all three profiles in sequence (requires distclean)Required tools: i686-elf-gcc (or host gcc -m32 for dev), i686-elf-as, i686-elf-ld,
nasm, and python3 (with the cryptography package for Ed25519 signing).
Artifacts: build/briggs.img (bootable HDD image), build/briggs.iso (El Torito ISO),
briggs_kernel.bin (raw kernel), briggs_kernel.sig (Ed25519 signature).
briggs.img Bootable disk image (2 MB)
briggs_kernel.bin The kernel (~397 KB)
briggs_kernel.sig Ed25519 signature
virus_scan_report.pdf Virus scan results
docs/ Manual, audit report, TPM setup, update guide
- Production user guide — deployment and operations manual
- Security audit report — 18 findings, all handled
- TPM integration — measured boot and quote
- Secure update — signed firmware-style updates
- Briggs Transport port — Dropbear-to-transport port notes
Is Briggs OS free? Free for individuals using it for themselves. Businesses need a paid license. See LICENSE.md.
Does it need Linux? No. It is its own bare-metal operating system. There is no kernel, init, or package layer from a general-purpose OS underneath.
Is it a cloud password manager? No. It is self-hosted and offline by default. Your vault lives on hardware you control.
What hardware do I need? Any 32-bit x86 machine that boots from BIOS (MBR), with RDRAND and at least 512 MB of RAM. Also runs in QEMU and VirtualBox.
Do I need a TPM? No. TPM measured boot and TPM quote are supported when present, but the appliance works without one.
How is my vault encrypted? Secrets are encrypted with ChaCha20-Poly1305 (with key commitment), and the keys are derived with Argon2id (256 MB, 3 passes). The disk image is safe to clone and store offline.
Is it post-quantum? Session key exchange uses ML-KEM-768 over X25519, so captured traffic resists quantum decryption of the key exchange.
How is it different from KeePass, Bitwarden, or 1Password? Those are applications on a general-purpose OS (or a cloud sync service). Briggs OS is a dedicated OS appliance: no host OS attack surface, no vendor cloud, no app-store dependency — an old PC becomes a single-purpose hardware password vault.
Looking at other options? Common approaches include cloud password managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass), file-based managers (KeePass), and commercial hardware keys. Briggs OS targets a different niche: turn spare x86 hardware into a self-hosted, offline password vault appliance with verified boot and post-quantum crypto.
Free if you are an individual using it for yourself. Businesses need a paid license. See LICENSE.md.
This is security software. Do not trust it with real secrets until you have reviewed it yourself. The full security audit is in docs/PRODUCTION_SECURITY_AUDIT.md. Report vulnerabilities privately; see SECURITY.md.