State is always ~/.bloxwap, directory 0700, config/auth keys/logs/events/audit 0600.
P-256 Privy authorization keys are PKCS8 base64 in private files or environment
references. The CLI does not import master keys, seeds or mnemonic phrases.
Every user owns their Privy account/app and runs the CLI/runner locally or on
infrastructure they control. App IDs and wallet IDs identify resources in that
user's app. App secrets and P-256 private authorization keys remain in the user's
environment or private local files; Bloxwap never receives or stores them. There
is no Bloxwap credential service, shared app secret, or signing proxy. The agent
wallet key is managed by Privy in the user's app, separate from the external
master wallet. The CLI never exports either wallet's key.
External master-wallet signatures are accepted only as 65-byte signatures.
Every CLI and RPC input is scanned before schema parsing so unknown fields cannot
smuggle key material. Hex 32-byte secrets and BIP39-like phrases are refused.
Trust boundaries: external master wallet → one-time Hyperliquid agent approval →
agent wallet in the user's Privy app → user-controlled local signing runner.
Read custody.md for the hash
preimage limitation of server policies. Anyone controlling this OS user can use
the authorization key and change limits. Socket/file modes exclude other users,
not same-user malware or root. Windows named pipes require current-user ACLs;
use direct mode in environments unable to enforce private IPC.
Logs and error envelopes recursively scrub sensitive fields, long hex values, Bearer tokens and known secret environment values. Signature hashes, never raw signatures, appear in the audit chain. A hash chain detects edits inside a retained journal; it cannot detect deletion of the entire journal without an external checkpoint. Back up checkpoints separately for stronger evidence.
Never put secrets in command args, repository files or issue reports. Environment references avoid plaintext config but do not protect against privileged process inspection. Revoke and rotate after suspected compromise. Unit tests use service mocks; real signing tests require explicit testnet/sandbox environment gates.