DevCouncil provides local code analysis, task policy and verification evidence. The implementation-level reference is repository input and verification boundaries. Documentation index
- Code analysis does not require sending source to a model. A consuming agent or harness has its own provider and data-handling policy.
- Task leases and write-policy results apply to participating clients. Retired DevCouncil hooks do not intercept every shell command or editor write.
- Rigor includes secret, stub,
runner_hijack, andlean_tcbchecks (with optional Lean kernel checking viaDC_VERIFY_LEAN_KERNEL/DC_LEAN_KERNEL_TIMEOUT_MS) over the supplied diff, untracked files, recreated files, and dirty submodule commit ranges, paired withunattested_test_runandoracle_tamperinghard-safety gates. Git replace-refs are disabled at Go and Rust git seams to prevent hidden credential commits. - Verification errors suppress raw diff lines to prevent echoing detected secrets, and panic hooks suppress backtrace payload text.
- Session children (e.g. language servers under
devmap build --lsp) have their stderr drained and redacted for credentials withdc_redacton non-zero exit, retaining at most 4 KiB. - Prompt inputs and host configs (
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,GEMINI.md,mcp.json,.mcp.json, skill roots and plugin manifests) are protected against agent writes at any depth and across all postures, including yolo. - Missing and unavailable checks need explicit handling. Read gate mode, skipped reasons and coverage metadata in addition to the verdict.
The Go gateway executes task commands through a local shell
(/bin/sh -c) in the project root, with an allow-listed environment: the
base list in verify/env.go (PATH, HOME, the Go, Cargo, Rustup, Node, Python
and JVM roots, locale and temp variables) plus names a repository lists in
verify.env_allow: [NAME, NAME] in .devcouncil/config.yaml. A name shaped
like a credential (KEY, SECRET, TOKEN, PASSWORD, CREDENTIAL, AUTH, PRIVATE,
COOKIE) is refused there, and every admitted and refused name is recorded in
the run's evidence. Each command
is bounded by a 30-minute timeout (verify.CommandTimeout) and by
cancellation of the run, its process group is killed when it is stopped, and
at most 4 MiB of its output is kept. local is the only sandbox: verify.ParseSandbox refuses any
other --sandbox value (exit 2, or an MCP error) rather than recording a
sandbox that did not run. Docker/Nix isolation is an approved design and is
not scheduled; see the security-impact statement.
The environment scrub does not hide files: a command can still read
~/.aws or ~/.ssh through HOME. Review task command
lists and project configuration before running verification, as you would
review CI workflow changes.
The MCP host bounds each call. devcouncil_verify_task may run for
verify.CommandTimeout plus two minutes; every other tool gets 60 seconds.
DEVCOUNCIL_MCP_CALL_TIMEOUT_MS (milliseconds) replaces both, and the
timeout reply names it. notifications/cancelled stops the call it names and
its process group, a call that is cancelled is not answered, and closing stdin
cancels every running call before the host exits. A verification cut short by
its budget is still recorded, with its timeout gap.
Agents cannot overwrite instructions or MCP configuration that govern their own execution:
- Refused targets: Direct writes to
AGENTS.md,CLAUDE.md,GEMINI.md,mcp.json, and.mcp.jsonare refused at any directory depth. - Skill and plugin roots: Skill directories (
.claude/,.cursor/,.agents/) and plugin manifests discovered under plugin roots are protected from agent write mutation. - Posture independence: The prompt-input rung sits outside the policy
HardRulesblock, ensuring it enforces under all postures, includingyolo. - Read-only permission: The rule strictly targets write operations; models can always read instruction files to orient and execute tasks.
- Identity-based alias detection: Hard links and symlinks resolving to prompt inputs are
resolved and blocked by filesystem identity (
syscall.Statdevice/inode verification). - Residual boundaries: Shell interpreters (
sh -c), archive unpackers (tar/unzip), git state manipulators (reset,merge,pull,stash pop), and directorycp/mvunder all postures remain unmodelled external execution paths pinned by tests ingate/zadv_prompt_input_test.go.
Installing MCP configuration does not grant universal scope enforcement. Integration documents which settings and hooks are written; the task loop describes the verification contract. These tools assist review and do not replace a security assessment of the application under development.