fix: harden HTTP servers with timeouts and request body size limit#107
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danilaverbena wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
fix: harden HTTP servers with timeouts and request body size limit#107danilaverbena wants to merge 1 commit into
danilaverbena wants to merge 1 commit into
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Description
Two hardening fixes for the HTTP servers in op-enclave:
1. HTTP timeouts (server + enclave)
Both
cmd/server/main.goandcmd/enclave/main.gousedhttp.ListenAndServe()which sets zero timeouts by default. An attacker can open slow connections (slowloris) and exhaust server resources.Fix: Replace with
http.Serverwith explicitReadHeaderTimeout: 10s,ReadTimeout: 30s,WriteTimeout: 30-60s, andIdleTimeout: 60s.2. Request body size limit (server)
cmd/server/main.go:31reads the request body withio.ReadAll(r.Body)without any size limit, allowing memory exhaustion via oversized POST bodies.Fix: Wrap with
http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1MB)before reading.Impact
These are DoS vulnerabilities in the HTTP proxy facing external connections (:7333) and the enclave fallback HTTP server (:1234).