Update setup.py#587
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amitaysh wants to merge 1 commit into
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The CI workflow uses pull_request_target and checks out untrusted pull request code (github.event.pull_request.head.sha) before executing a CodeBuild job with AWS credentials.
This creates a potential for arbitrary code execution in the CI environment with access to AWS credentials.
Although execution is currently gated by the integ-test environment approval, if this protection is misconfigured or bypassed, an attacker could execute malicious code from a pull request and gain access to AWS resources.
The workflow violates GitHub Actions security guidance by combining:
pull_request_target
checkout of untrusted PR code
privileged credentials (AWS access keys)
this PR comes to validate the flow and potentially becomes a bug bounty