chore(deps): update flatt-security/setup-takumi-guard-pypi action to v1.3.0

[renovate]

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Type	Update	Change
flatt-security/setup-takumi-guard-pypi	action	minor	v1.0.1 → v1.3.0

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Release Notes

flatt-security/setup-takumi-guard-pypi (flatt-security/setup-takumi-guard-pypi)

v1.3.0

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What changed

• poetry installs are attributed. The token used to go only into PIP_INDEX_URL and UV_INDEX_URL, which poetry does not read, so poetry reached Takumi Guard without it. poetry now takes it from a job .netrc for every source on pypi.flatt.tech, whatever the source is named.
• The token is written to a .netrc for the job only. It goes to $RUNNER_TEMP/.netrc, which the runner empties at the start and end of every job, and NETRC points to it for the rest of the job. The file starts as a copy of your existing one (the file NETRC names, else ~/.netrc, else ~/_netrc), so entries for other hosts keep working. ~/.netrc is not modified, so no token is left on a self-hosted runner and concurrent jobs keep their own bot.
• Every uv index on Takumi Guard gets the token. UV_INDEX_<NAME>_USERNAME/PASSWORD is set for each uv index in pyproject.toml and uv.toml in the checkout that points at Takumi Guard, and for the new uv-index-name input (default takumi-guard) to cover an index the action cannot see. A name that any index in the checkout uses for another host gets no token, and the action reports it.
• Auth-only mode leaves your index alone. With set-index-url: false, the action no longer sets PIP_INDEX_URL and UV_INDEX_URL. An index variable you set that already points at Takumi Guard gets the token added.
• Indexes that skip Takumi Guard are reported. A uv index, poetry source, --index-url / --extra-index-url in a requirements file, or PIP_EXTRA_INDEX_URL / UV_EXTRA_INDEX_URL that points elsewhere produces a warning. An explicit index, which serves only the packages assigned to it, is not reported.

Client	Full protection	Auth-only
pip	PIP_INDEX_URL (unchanged), and the job .netrc	the job .netrc; PIP_INDEX_URL already pointing at Takumi Guard gets the token
poetry	the job .netrc (was anonymous)	the job .netrc (was anonymous)
uv	UV_INDEX_URL (unchanged), and named credentials	UV_INDEX_URL / UV_DEFAULT_INDEX already pointing at Takumi Guard get the token; named credentials

Behaviour changes for existing workflows

1. Auth-only mode no longer sets the index. v1.2.0 set PIP_INDEX_URL and UV_INDEX_URL to Takumi Guard after authenticating, even with set-index-url: false. Point pip, uv or poetry at https://pypi.flatt.tech/simple/ in your own configuration to keep installs going through Takumi Guard.
2. NETRC is set for the rest of the job. A later step that writes to ~/.netrc has no effect; write to $NETRC instead. This includes setup-takumi-guard-golang: run it before this action, or Go downloads go through Takumi Guard without the token.
3. New warnings may appear for indexes that do not go through Takumi Guard. They do not fail the step.
4. Run the action after actions/checkout so it can read the project's configuration.

v1.2.0

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What changed

• An authentication failure now fails the step. With bot-id set, a missing id-token: write permission, a failed OIDC request or an STS refusal used to print an error annotation and continue with PIP_INDEX_URL and UV_INDEX_URL already set without a token, so later installs reached Takumi Guard anonymously while the job stayed green. The step now exits with an error regardless of set-index-url. Omitting bot-id still runs in anonymous mode.
• Each failure names its cause. An unreachable STS fails with Could not reach the STS at <url>., and a response that is not JSON, such as an HTML error page, fails with STS returned non-JSON (HTTP <code>). followed by the start of the response in the log.
• The OIDC request and the STS exchange time out after 15 seconds and are retried up to 3 times on transient errors, so a brief outage does not fail the job.

Scenario (bot-id set)	v1.1.0	v1.2.0
Job lacks permissions: { id-token: write }	Error annotation, step succeeds, installs anonymous	Step fails: OIDC not available. Add 'permissions: { id-token: write }' to your job.
OIDC token request fails	Error annotation, step succeeds, installs anonymous	Step fails: Failed to get OIDC token.
STS refuses the exchange (unknown bot, trust condition mismatch)	Error annotation, step succeeds, installs anonymous	Step fails: Authentication failed: <STS message>
STS cannot be reached	Error annotation with no reason, step succeeds, installs anonymous	Step fails: Could not reach the STS at <url>.
STS answers with something other than JSON	Step fails with exit code 4 or 5 and no error message	Step fails: STS returned non-JSON (HTTP <code>).
bot-id omitted	Anonymous mode	Anonymous mode (unchanged)

Behaviour changes for existing workflows

A workflow that sets bot-id but does not authenticate today fails at this step:

1. The job lacks permissions: { id-token: write }. Add it to the job.
2. Pull requests from forks. GitHub does not issue OIDC tokens to them. Skip the step or omit bot-id for those runs.
3. A wrong Bot ID or trust condition. Correct it in Shisho Cloud byGMO; the error now shows the STS's message.

To run without a bot, omit bot-id.

v1.1.0

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New Feature

• New audience input controls the aud claim of the OIDC token requested for the bot token exchange. (#​3)
• Default aud change: with audience unset, the token is now requested with the STS URL (https://sts.cloud.shisho.dev, normalized without a trailing slash) as its audience — previously the hardcoded registry host pypi.flatt.tech. Built-in trust conditions do not validate aud, so existing setups are unaffected; CustomOIDC trust conditions using the default STS audience (e.g. GitHub Enterprise Server) start working without overrides.
• Set audience explicitly if your Bot trust condition expects a different value.

Note: v1 has not moved yet — workflows tracking v1 keep the previous behavior until the upcoming v1 retag. Pinned tags are unaffected.

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