Only the latest 0.x release receives security fixes. Upgrade with:

pip install --upgrade scpn-control

If you discover a security vulnerability in SCPN Control, please report it responsibly:

1. Preferred: GitHub Security Advisories
2. Email: protoscience@anulum.li (subject: [SECURITY] SCPN Control)
3. Do not open a public GitHub issue for security vulnerabilities.

We will acknowledge receipt within 48 hours and aim to provide a fix within 7 days for critical issues.

SCPN Control is a simulation and control library. Its default installation handles no user authentication or financial data and exposes no network service. The optional ws extra provides a WebSocket phase-stream server (scpn_control.phase.ws_phase_stream) with HMAC API-key authentication and optional TLS; it binds 127.0.0.1 by default and is a network service only once a user installs that extra and starts the server. Security concerns are primarily:

• Malicious input files (JSON configs, GEQDSK equilibria, NumPy .npz)
• Unsafe deserialization (serde, pickle, NumPy load)
• Numerical overflow / denial of service via pathological inputs
• Native code memory safety (Rust crates via PyO3)
• Supply chain integrity (dependency audit via cargo-deny)

• Input validation: Public API boundaries enforce finite-float, integer, fraction, and 1D-array checks via core/_validators.py.
• Rust: cargo deny supply-chain policy enforced in CI.
• Checkpoint hygiene: torch.load(..., weights_only=True) by default (no pickle code execution), plus a fail-closed weights-hash gate — when a digest is pinned (an explicit value or a <checkpoint>.sha256 sidecar) the disruption model is verified before deserialisation and a mismatch is a hard error.
• RNG isolation: All stochastic modules use scoped numpy.random.Generator.
• Pre-commit: ruff, mypy, cargo fmt, merge-conflict, private-key detection.

• No fuzzing harness yet (Hypothesis covers many paths).
• No third-party security audit.
• No CVE history.

Contributions to improve security coverage are welcome.