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22 changes: 0 additions & 22 deletions docs/posts/2026-10-28-the-allowlist-that-lets-the-env-out.md
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## Submission drafts (remove before publishing)

**r/netsec.** *Agent tool allowlists that still leak .env, and agents that
rewrite their own policy.* I maintain an open-source, fail-closed gateway
between coding agents (Claude Code and Codex hooks, MCP servers) and their
tools, and after presenting it I found two classes of bugs in my own code: an
allowlisted binary, origin or path that becomes the exfiltration channel
(`curl -d @.env`, the key in an allowed URL's query string, `.env.local`,
`cat .ENV` on macOS), and an agent that can edit the files that load the
firewall. The write-up has minimal reproductions with before/after output, why
verb- and path-based allowlists cannot catch these, the fixes in 0.4.0, and
what is still not covered.

**Hacker News.** *Your agent's allowlist still lets the .env out.* Allowlisting
curl, an origin or a directory decides which tools a coding agent may use, not
which data may leave through them. This walks through the leaks I found in my
own agent firewall (curl's `@file`, a secret in an allowed URL, copies under
other names, a hook that forgot the session) and the agent rewriting the
settings that load the firewall, with the fixes and their limits.

---

# The allowlist that still lets the `.env` out

*Valentín Torassa, 2026-10-28. Code: [VT-Agent-Firewall](https://github.com/ValentinTorassa/VT-Agent-Firewall), Apache-2.0.*
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