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Security: TitanCSA/Browser-Control-SDK

docs/SECURITY.md

Local control, profiles and data

The native app runs as the current Windows user. Its automation endpoint is a local named pipe with a protected current-user/SYSTEM ACL, a medium-integrity label, remote clients refused and a fresh 256-bit instance token. It opens no TCP control port and exposes no host command bridge to website JavaScript.

Endpoint JSON files live by default under %LOCALAPPDATA%\TitanCSA\BrowserControl\instances. They are private capability files, not configuration to publish or commit. The token is sent only inside the private pipe; the app does not print it or put it in command-line arguments. Explicit endpoint/profile folders must be local and privately writable. Existing shared directories are rejected rather than having their permissions silently rewritten. The browser never imports another application's default profile. An OS file lock prevents two browser instances from concurrently writing one profile data root. Separate instances can use separate private data folders.

An authorized same-user client can navigate, evaluate scripts and explicitly read this browser profile's cookies and storage. Protect that user's session and scripts accordingly. This channel is not a boundary against an administrator or malicious code already running as the same Windows user. The renderer's ordinary Chromium sandbox and web security settings remain enabled.

Requests are length-prefixed UTF-8 JSON, bounded to 1 MiB and limited nesting; responses are bounded to 64 MiB. Workers and outstanding operations are bounded. Shutdown cancels pipe IO and releases waiting workers. A queued operation that times out before dispatch is skipped. An already-started browser operation may have effects despite a timeout: callers must inspect the may_have_executed detail or result_unknown before choosing whether to retry. Mutating actions are not silently retried by the clients.

Snapshot helpers execute in an isolated JavaScript world. The snapshot identifies visible interactive elements, redacts password input values and omits hidden fields. It does not certify a page's honesty: labels, URLs and visible content come from an untrusted website. Use explicit user instructions to decide actions. Public page evaluation runs in the page's main world by default; choose the isolated world explicitly when appropriate. A screenshot or explicit cookie/ storage operation can contain private data even if a text snapshot is redacted.

Downloads are disabled until configured. An enabled download is saved, never automatically executed. Keep output directories private and review downloaded files normally. SDK screenshot helpers write only where the calling script explicitly asks them to. Profiles retain their own ordinary browser data until you choose to remove it; closing a tab is not secure deletion. In-private contexts use the runtime's private profile mode, with no claim of memory-forensic secrecy.

Saved passwords use an additional current-user DPAPI vault in the private data root. Saving requires explicit native UI confirmation. Fills match an exact scheme/host/port and profile; private profiles cannot use the vault. List/status operations return metadata and login helper errors are sanitized. The SDK/MCP has no password-save or password-export endpoint. Ordinary observations redact passwords, username-autocomplete fields and text fields in password forms.

This protection is for data at rest: an authorized client can deliberately evaluate a page, and a website receives the password when its form is filled. Same-user malicious code and administrators remain outside the boundary. Temporary in-process copies are cleared where practical, without a forensic memory-secrecy claim. Session handling and limits.

Action plans are bounded and stop at the first error. Confirmed partial receipts are published to the transport without adding a timeout grace period. The host uses the original absolute deadline, including UI queue time. An in-flight step can still have effects; inspect its uncertainty before deciding what to retry.

The app provides general browser controls, not hidden-account login, challenge solving, block evasion or unrestricted operating-system automation. Third-party authentication restrictions can prevent an embedded browser from completing a site's login flow. For websites that permit automation, use authorized accounts, their supported login flow and applicable platform approvals.

Dependency versions and SHA-256 pins are recorded in ThirdParty/Dependencies.json and CMake. The released app is not a kernel driver and its executable is not Microsoft-signed. Security updates for the engine are supplied through Microsoft's WebView2 Evergreen Runtime.

Engine guidance: Microsoft's WebView2 security practices and Evergreen runtime deployment.

There aren't any published security advisories