docs(ops): add self-hosted operator harden pack

.gitignore

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ dist/
 .env
 .env.local
 .env.production
+.env.harden
 .env.*.local
 
 # IDE

ops/harden/.env.harden.example

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+# HAIP operator harden — live probe env
+#
+#   cp ops/harden/.env.harden.example .env.harden
+#   # edit values, then:
+#   set -a && source .env.harden && set +a
+#   pnpm harden:live
+#
+# Do NOT commit .env.harden — it contains bearer tokens.
+
+# API base ending in /api (compose default shown)
+HAIP_API_BASE=http://localhost:3000/api
+
+# Keycloak bearer JWTs (property_ids claim must match the property below)
+TOKEN_A=
+TOKEN_B=
+
+# Property UUIDs
+PROPERTY_A=
+PROPERTY_B=
+
+# Optional: reservation that belongs only to property B
+# RESERVATION_IN_B=
+
+# Optional: JWT missing property_ids or from wrong issuer (expect 401)
+# TOKEN_BAD=
+
+# Optional: override request timeout ms (default 15000)
+# HARDEN_TIMEOUT_MS=15000

ops/harden/CHECKLIST.md

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+# Production go-live checklist
+
+Use this before exposing HAIP to real guests or chargeable traffic.
+Details: [`docs/deployment.md`](../../docs/deployment.md) and
+[`.env.production.example`](../../.env.production.example).
+
+## Compose & boot
+
+- [ ] Copied `.env.production.example` → `.env.production` and filled secrets
+- [ ] Started with prod overlay + auth profile:
+  ```bash
+  docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml --profile auth up -d --build
+  ```
+- [ ] `AUTH_ENABLED=true` (required in production)
+- [ ] `HAIP_ALLOW_INSECURE` is **unset / empty** (never `true` in production)
+- [ ] `STRIPE_MODE` is `test` until ready for real charges; then `live` with live keys
+- [ ] API boots cleanly; `GET /api/v1/health` returns `status: ok`
+
+## Auth (Keycloak)
+
+- [ ] Keycloak runs in production mode with TLS (not `start-dev` exposed publicly)
+- [ ] Strong Keycloak admin credentials (changed from defaults)
+- [ ] Realm `haip` (or your realm) issues JWTs with `property_ids` and `roles`
+- [ ] Unauthenticated `GET /api/v1/reservations?propertyId=<uuid>` → **401**
+- [ ] Dashboard built / served with auth on (`VITE_AUTH_ENABLED=true` in prod overlay)
+
+## Multi-tenancy
+
+- [ ] At least two test properties exist
+- [ ] User A JWT has only property A; user B only property B
+- [ ] `pnpm harden:live` passes tenant-isolation probes (see [`TENANT_ISOLATION.md`](./TENANT_ISOLATION.md))
+- [ ] SPA routes always include `propertyId` on detail pages
+
+## Payments & Connect
+
+- [ ] Stripe secret + webhook secret match `STRIPE_MODE`
+- [ ] Stripe webhook endpoint receives events (signature verified)
+- [ ] `CONNECT_API_KEY` set when auth is on (OTAIP / Connect agents)
+- [ ] Booking engine keys generated under Settings → Booking Engine (when auth on)
+
+## Network & ops
+
+- [ ] TLS terminated at reverse proxy (Caddy/nginx/etc.)
+- [ ] `CORS_ORIGINS` set if browser origin ≠ API host
+- [ ] Night audit / group cutoff cron configured ([`docs/operations/cron.md`](../../docs/operations/cron.md))
+- [ ] Database backup + restore tested once
+- [ ] Rate limiting considered for public origins
+
+## Product smoke (manual)
+
+- [ ] [`SURFACE_SMOKE.md`](./SURFACE_SMOKE.md) completed on property A — zero Critical on check-in, rooms, folios, night audit, housekeeping
+- [ ] At least three desk [`vignettes/`](./vignettes/) exercised (recommend `base-01`, `base-07`, `base-15`)
+
+## Gate
+
+Do **not** put real hotel traffic on the instance while Critical surface failures or failed tenant-isolation probes remain open.

ops/harden/PRODUCTION.md

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+# Harden pack production pointer
+
+Before going live, run the operator harden pack:
+
+```bash
+pnpm harden:local
+pnpm harden:live
+```
+
+See [`README.md`](./README.md) and the root README **Production checklist** section.

ops/harden/README.md

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+# HAIP operator harden pack
+
+Playbooks and a small CLI so operators can harden a **self-hosted HAIP**
+deployment (Keycloak + docker compose) before go-live and against a live URL.
+
+## What this is
+
+| Piece | Purpose |
+|-------|---------|
+| [`CHECKLIST.md`](./CHECKLIST.md) | Production go-live checklist |
+| [`TENANT_ISOLATION.md`](./TENANT_ISOLATION.md) | Cross-tenant deny criteria (Keycloak JWTs) |
+| [`SURFACE_SMOKE.md`](./SURFACE_SMOKE.md) | Full SPA surface walk before chargeable use |
+| [`vignettes/`](./vignettes/) | Desk ops stories (guest → staff → delight/block) |
+| [`cli/`](./cli/) | `harden:local` and `harden:live` HTTP probes |
+
+## Quick start
+
+### Pre-go-live (local / compose)
+
+From the HAIP repo root:
+
+```bash
+# 1. Configure production env
+cp .env.production.example .env.production
+# Edit .env.production — AUTH_ENABLED=true, Stripe, CONNECT_API_KEY, etc.
+
+# 2. Bring up the prod overlay (auth on)
+docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml --profile auth up -d --build
+
+# 3. Static + HTTP local checks
+pnpm harden:local
+```
+
+Then walk [`SURFACE_SMOKE.md`](./SURFACE_SMOKE.md) and a few [`vignettes/`](./vignettes/) against the dashboard.
+
+### Live instance
+
+```bash
+cp ops/harden/.env.harden.example .env.harden
+# Fill HAIP_API_BASE, TOKEN_A, TOKEN_B, PROPERTY_A, PROPERTY_B
+
+set -a && source .env.harden && set +a
+pnpm harden:live
+```
+
+Exit code `0` = all probes passed; non-zero = at least one fail. See the printed table.
+
+## Keycloak tokens
+
+Tokens must be JWTs issued by your Keycloak realm (`haip` by default) for the
+API client (`haip-api`). Claims the API expects:
+
+| Claim | Meaning |
+|-------|---------|
+| `property_ids` | Array of property UUIDs this user may access |
+| `roles` | HAIP roles (e.g. `admin`, `front_desk`, `readonly`) |
+
+**User A** should have `property_ids=[PROPERTY_A]` only.  
+**User B** should have `property_ids=[PROPERTY_B]` only.
+
+How you mint tokens (password grant, client credentials + user impersonation,
+or your IdP’s token endpoint) is up to your deployment — the CLI only needs the
+bearer strings.
+
+`HAIP_API_BASE` is the API origin **including** `/api` if your reverse proxy
+serves the API under `/api` (compose default: `http://localhost:3000/api`).
+Probes call `{HAIP_API_BASE}/v1/...`.
+
+## Modes
+
+| Command | Needs running stack? | Needs tokens? |
+|---------|----------------------|---------------|
+| `pnpm harden:local` | Preferred (for HTTP checks); file checks always run | Optional — if tokens are set, also runs live probes against local base |
+| `pnpm harden:live` | Yes (your URL) | **Required** |
+
+## Manual ops (after CLI green)
+
+1. Complete [`SURFACE_SMOKE.md`](./SURFACE_SMOKE.md) on property A.
+2. Run several vignettes from [`vignettes/`](./vignettes/) (start with `base-01`, `base-07`, `base-15`).
+3. Re-run `pnpm harden:live` after any auth or multi-tenancy change.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Automated full-SPA Playwright campaigns (use surface smoke + vignettes manually in v1)
+- Exhaustive penetration testing — this pack is an operator readiness gate, not a red-team suite

ops/harden/SURFACE_SMOKE.md

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+# Full-surface smoke (self-hosted HAIP)
+
+Run this on every candidate production (or staging twin) deploy before putting
+real guests or chargeable traffic on the instance. Desk vignettes alone are
+**not** enough.
+
+## Environment
+
+- Dashboard served by your HAIP API (compose: `http://localhost:3000`)
+- Sign in via Keycloak with a staff/admin user for **property A**
+- Always open routes with `?propertyId=<PROPERTY_A>`
+- Never put passwords in notes or screenshots you share
+
+## Rule
+
+Click the real control. If nothing happens → **BROKEN**.  
+Pretty empty page with no path to do the job → **EMPTY_SHELL**.  
+Nav that lies / no feedback after a critical action → **CONFUSING**.
+
+Classifications: `BROKEN` | `EMPTY_SHELL` | `CONFUSING` | `PARTIAL` | `WORKS`
+
+## Checklist (engine SPA — no skipping)
+
+| # | Surface | Route | Must prove |
+|---|---------|-------|------------|
+| 1 | Dashboard | `/` | Loads for the property; not a dead shell |
+| 2 | Check-in / Front desk | `/front-desk` | Confirm check-in completes; walk-in path works; clear errors |
+| 3 | Reservations | `/reservations` | List + open a reservation; create/modify path clear |
+| 4 | Guests | `/guests` | Profile useful mid-shift (stay context / notes — not name-only) |
+| 5 | Rooms status | `/rooms` | Change status sticks + visible feedback |
+| 6 | Room types | `/rooms/types` | Types list/edit operable |
+| 7 | Housekeeping | `/housekeeping` | Tasks load (or clear actionable empty + generate works) |
+| 8 | Folios | `/folios` | See bill; post/settle path clear |
+| 9 | Cashier | `/cashier` | Post/settle flow usable when folio has balance |
+| 10 | Night audit | `/night-audit` | After run: success state + history; not “run again?” forever |
+| 11 | Rate plans | `/rate-plans` | Calculate/edits not decorative |
+| 12 | Reports | `/reports` | Primary reports load; errors visible |
+| 13 | Groups | `/groups` | Group block list/detail operable |
+| 14 | Channels | `/channels` | Connection path or honest “not configured” |
+| 15 | Communications | `/communications` | Connected path or honest “not configured” |
+| 16 | Reviews | `/reviews` | Sync/manual path clear — not a dead empty |
+| 17 | Settings / Users | `/settings` | Property settings + users/roles operable |
+| 18 | Booking admin | Settings → Booking Engine | Booking key generate/rotate when auth on |
+| 19 | Import | `/import` | Import entry honest (works or clear empty) |
+
+Also smoke Walk-In party link + Guest Details — but **never instead of** this list.
+Pair with [`vignettes/`](./vignettes/) for desk realism.
+
+## Outputs (suggested)
+
+Write under a local folder you keep private (e.g. `harden-runs/YYYY-MM-DD-surface-smoke/`):
+
+1. `AUDIT.json` — `{id, surface, route, classification, notes}` × each row  
+2. `SUMMARY.md` — counts of WORKS / BROKEN / EMPTY_SHELL / …  
+3. Screenshots only if useful; scrub guest PII
+
+## Gate
+
+**Invalid run:** skipped surfaces, or vignette-only run labeled as full product smoke.  
+**Valid run:** every row attempted.  
+**Go-live:** zero Critical on check-in, room status, folios, night-audit feedback, housekeeping.

ops/harden/TENANT_ISOLATION.md

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+# Tenant isolation gate (self-hosted HAIP)
+
+Run before enabling real hotel tenants. Uses two Keycloak users / properties.
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- HAIP API with `AUTH_ENABLED=true`
+- Two Keycloak users whose JWTs include:
+  - User A: `property_ids=[PROPERTY_A]`, roles include staff or `admin`
+  - User B: `property_ids=[PROPERTY_B]`
+- Environment (see [`.env.harden.example`](./.env.harden.example)):
+
+| Variable | Meaning |
+|----------|---------|
+| `HAIP_API_BASE` | API base ending in `/api` (e.g. `http://localhost:3000/api`) |
+| `TOKEN_A` / `TOKEN_B` | Bearer JWTs for users A and B |
+| `PROPERTY_A` / `PROPERTY_B` | Property UUIDs |
+| `RESERVATION_IN_B` | Optional — reservation id that belongs only to B |
+
+## Automated probe
+
+```bash
+set -a && source .env.harden && set +a
+pnpm harden:live
+```
+
+## Pass criteria
+
+1. `GET /v1/health` → **200** with `status: ok` (public)
+2. `GET /v1/reservations?propertyId=PROPERTY_A` with **no** token → **401**
+3. `GET /v1/reservations?propertyId=PROPERTY_B` with `TOKEN_A` → **403** (or **401** if claim missing)
+4. `GET /v1/reservations?propertyId=PROPERTY_A` with `TOKEN_A` → **200** (A may read A)
+5. If `RESERVATION_IN_B` is set: `GET /v1/reservations/RESERVATION_IN_B?propertyId=PROPERTY_B` with `TOKEN_A` → **403** or **404**
+6. Token without usable `property_ids` / wrong issuer → **401** (configure a bad token as `TOKEN_BAD` optional)
+
+## Multi-property owner invariants (same account)
+
+An owner JWT may hold `property_ids=[A, B]`. Still required:
+
+1. Request with `propertyId=A` + entity id that only exists under B → **404**
+2. `POST /reservations` with `propertyId=A` and a `guestId` only linked at B → **404**
+3. SPA property switch clears cached detail data; detail routes key by `propertyId`
+
+These owner invariants are checklist items in v1 (exercise manually or with your own scripts).
+The CLI covers the two-user cross-tenant deny path above.
+
+## After changes
+
+Re-run `pnpm harden:live` after any change to auth guards, property scoping, or JWT claim mapping.