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Security: Stelnyx/secgate

Security

SECURITY.md

░▒▓█ SECGATE · SECURITY POLICY █▓▒░

Security Policy

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security vulnerability in SecGate, please report it privately.

Do not open a public GitHub issue for security reports.

Preferred channels

  1. GitHub Security Advisory — open a private security advisory. This is the fastest route and is tracked via the GitHub Security Advisories (GHSA) workflow. This is the only fully private channel available right now.
  2. Email — security@stelnyx.dev. Plain email is accepted; encrypted email is not yet available (see below).

PGP Key

Status: not yet generated (tracked in issue #34). Encrypted email is unavailable until the key is published. Use the GitHub Security Advisory channel for fully private reporting.

Once generated, the key fingerprint and pgp-public.asc will be committed to the repo root and this section updated.

Include in your report

  • A description of the vulnerability and its impact
  • Steps to reproduce (minimal PoC preferred)
  • Affected version(s)
  • Any suggested remediation
  • Your disclosure timeline preference

Response SLA

We commit to the following response times from first triage acknowledgment:

Severity Acknowledge Initial assessment Fix / mitigation target
Critical 24h 48h 48h
High 48h 72h 7 days
Medium 72h 7d 30 days
Low 7d 14d 90 days

Severity follows CVSS v3.1. If we disagree with your severity assessment, we will state why in the initial response and propose a revised rating.


Coordinated Disclosure Timeline

We follow a 90-day coordinated disclosure policy by default:

  1. Day 0 — reporter files private advisory.
  2. Within SLA — we acknowledge and begin triage.
  3. During fix window — we work with reporter on patch, credit, and advisory text.
  4. Public disclosure — after patch is released, or at day 90, whichever comes first.
  5. Extension — we may request extension for complex fixes; reporter may decline.

If a vulnerability is being actively exploited, we may compress this timeline and coordinate expedited disclosure.

CVE assignment is handled via the GHSA workflow when GitHub is our CNA.


GHSA Process

We use GitHub Security Advisories as the primary tracking mechanism:

  1. Reporter files advisory → triage by maintainers.
  2. Maintainers request CVE from GitHub CNA when confirmed.
  3. Private fork used for patch development.
  4. Reporter credited in advisory unless anonymity is requested.
  5. Advisory published simultaneously with patch release.
  6. npm audit reports the advisory once it is in the GitHub Advisory Database.

Supported Versions

Only the latest main branch receives security fixes at this stage. Once v1.0.0 ships, we will support the current minor and the previous minor (N and N-1).


Scope

SecGate is a security scanning engine itself. Please report:

  • Bypasses of the scanning / remediation logic
  • Unsafe handling of scan artifacts, secrets, or intermediate files
  • Supply-chain concerns in declared dependencies
  • Any path traversal, command injection, or privilege escalation paths
  • Information disclosure via reports or logs

Out of scope:

  • Findings in third-party scanners invoked by SecGate (report upstream to Semgrep / Gitleaks / osv-scanner / Trivy / npm)
  • Misconfiguration in end-user CI environments
  • Denial of service caused by maliciously crafted scanned repos against upstream scanners (upstream concern)

See docs/threat-model.md for the full STRIDE model, trust boundaries, and known mitigations.


Supply-chain trust

State as checked on 2026-11-12 with gh release list, gh release view and git ls-remote --tags:

  • The GitHub Releases v0.2.9 to v0.2.13 carry the assets below.
  • v0.2.4 has a GitHub Release with no assets. The other tags before v0.2.9 have no GitHub Release.
  • 0.2.14 is on npm, but the repository has no v0.2.14 tag and no GitHub Release, so it has none of these assets.

From the next release, every vX.Y.Z tag produces them through .github/workflows/release.yml.

Artifact Filename pattern Purpose
Release tarball secgate-X.Y.Z.tgz Signed build of the npm package
CycloneDX SBOM secgate-X.Y.Z.sbom.cdx.json Full dependency manifest (CycloneDX 1.5+)
cosign signature *.sig, *.pem, *.cosign.bundle Keyless Sigstore signature over tarball and SBOM
SLSA L3 attestation secgate-vX.Y.Z.intoto.jsonl Non-falsifiable build provenance (SLSA Level 3; predicate type https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2)
Checksums SHA256SUMS SHA-256 manifest for tarball + SBOM

On the same date, npm view reported npm provenance for npm versions 0.2.9 and 0.2.11 to 0.2.13, and none for 0.2.14 (0.2.10 is not on npm). From v0.3.0, the Release workflow publishes the signed tarball to npm with provenance through npm Trusted Publishing. Check a version with npm view @stelnyx/secgate@<version> dist.attestations.provenance.predicateType (expected: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1; this is the npm package attestation, while the GitHub Release .intoto.jsonl carries https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2).

Trust root (keyless cosign)

SecGate uses keyless cosign via Sigstore and GitHub OIDC — there is no long-lived signing key to steal or rotate. Verification binds the artifact to the exact workflow that produced it:

  • Expected OIDC issuer: https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com
  • Expected signer identity (regex): ^https://github\.com/Stelnyx/secgate/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/tags/.*

This identity applies from v0.3.0. The repository was renamed from Stelnyx/SecGate to Stelnyx/secgate, and cosign matches the identity case-sensitively. Releases v0.2.9 to v0.2.13 were signed under the old name. Their certificates name https://github.com/Stelnyx/SecGate/.github/workflows/release.yml@refs/tags/<tag> (v0.2.9, v0.2.11, v0.2.12) or ...release.yml@refs/heads/main (v0.2.10 and v0.2.13, built from main), and their provenance names the source github.com/Stelnyx/SecGate at the same ref. The commands below do not verify them as written.

The npm publish and the release-artifact signatures come from the same workflow, .github/workflows/release.yml. When the npm Trusted Publisher record names the npm GitHub environment, npm accepts publish tokens only from the publish-npm job, which runs in that environment and executes no project code.

The Sigstore transparency log (Rekor) entry is the public record. There is no "public key" to rotate; if the signer identity or issuer ever changes, that is the signal, and release notes will call it out.

One-line verification

curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Stelnyx/secgate/main/scripts/verify-release.sh \
  | bash -s -- v0.3.0

Or from a clone:

scripts/verify-release.sh v0.3.0

The script verifies: SBOM presence + CycloneDX shape, SHA256SUMS, cosign keyless signature on tarball + SBOM, and SLSA L3 provenance on both.

Manual verification

Install cosign (>= 2.0) and slsa-verifier (>= 2.4), then:

VERSION=v0.3.0
BASE="https://github.com/Stelnyx/secgate/releases/download/${VERSION}"
TARBALL="secgate-${VERSION#v}.tgz"
SBOM="secgate-${VERSION#v}.sbom.cdx.json"
ATT="secgate-${VERSION}.intoto.jsonl"

for f in "$TARBALL" "${TARBALL}.sig" "${TARBALL}.pem" "${TARBALL}.cosign.bundle" \
         "$SBOM" "$ATT" SHA256SUMS; do
  curl -fsSLO "${BASE}/${f}"
done

# 1. Checksums
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS

# 2. cosign keyless signature on the tarball
cosign verify-blob \
  --bundle "${TARBALL}.cosign.bundle" \
  --certificate "${TARBALL}.pem" \
  --signature "${TARBALL}.sig" \
  --certificate-identity-regexp \
    '^https://github\.com/Stelnyx/secgate/\.github/workflows/release\.yml@refs/tags/.*' \
  --certificate-oidc-issuer https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
  "$TARBALL"

# 3. SLSA L3 provenance
slsa-verifier verify-artifact \
  --provenance-path "$ATT" \
  --source-uri github.com/Stelnyx/secgate \
  --source-tag "$VERSION" \
  "$TARBALL"

Release gate

The release workflow fails closed: the GitHub Release is not published, and npm publish does not run, if either the SBOM or SLSA attestation is missing or empty. cosign signatures are likewise gated before release assets are uploaded.

If verification fails for an artifact you downloaded, do not install it — open a private security advisory immediately.


Safe Harbor

Good-faith security research following this policy will not be subject to legal action by Stelnyx. Please:

  • Do not access, modify, or exfiltrate data beyond what is needed to demonstrate the vulnerability.
  • Do not publicly disclose before coordinated disclosure timeline ends.
  • Do not test against production systems of SecGate users (test against your own installs).

Hall of Fame

Security researchers who report valid vulnerabilities will be credited here (with consent) after public disclosure.

No reports received yet.

There aren't any published security advisories