Use GitHub private vulnerability reporting for suspected vulnerabilities. Do not open a public issue for an unpatched security problem, credential exposure, authentication bypass, private-data disclosure, or dependency exploit.

Before publication, the repository owner must enable private vulnerability reporting, secret scanning, push protection, dependency alerts, and code scanning in the repository security settings.

Include the affected revision, a minimal reproduction, expected and observed behavior, impact, and any suggested mitigation. Do not include real credentials, governed review rows, provider responses, or production data in a report. Maintainers should acknowledge a valid private report before discussing disclosure timing.

Only the current default branch is supported. Historical snapshots, forks, local modifications, optional third-party integrations, and deployments made from this fixture Dockerfile are not supported security surfaces.

Source availability is not an authorization mechanism. A deployment derived from this code must independently enforce, at minimum:

• IAM authentication at the Cloud Run edge; application API keys are not a substitute for platform authentication.
• Application API keys generated by a CSPRNG with at least 128 bits of entropy. The stored SHA-256 value is an indexed bearer-token fingerprint, not a password verifier; human-chosen passwords are outside this contract.
• A dedicated least-privilege runtime service account rather than a default project-wide identity.
• Per-secret access in Secret Manager, with deployed versions pinned.
• Cloud SQL connector enforcement, encrypted connections, bounded connection pools, backups, point-in-time recovery, and deletion protection.
• Instance, quota, and billing limits suitable for an internet-discoverable workload.
• Log redaction for thesis text, model/provider payloads, credentials, and database connection material.

The included Dockerfile intentionally runs only the credential-free fixture UI. It does not implement production identity, migrations, or external-provider access.

The MCP source includes a SQL-backed, per-key weighted usage limiter as application-level defense in depth. Its units are protective request weights, not currency or token metering; it does not replace IAM, provider quotas, billing alerts, or deployment-level abuse controls.

• Never request that a reporter paste a secret into an issue or pull request.
• Revoke exposed credentials before attempting repository-history cleanup.
• Treat governed review data and external-provider payloads as private even when they do not contain credentials.
• Test security fixes with synthetic data and a non-production project.