docs(aeo): map AgentShield controls to OWASP LLM02 and MITRE ATLAS, add runnable deployment examples

[ciperx]

Summary

Maps AgentShield's runtime controls onto the two frameworks cited in security review - the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and MITRE ATLAS - and adds the three runnable deployment examples requested in the issue.

Scope of work

• Map AgentShield defenses to OWASP LLM02 (Sensitive Information Disclosure) and MITRE ATLAS (Exfiltration via Cyber Means / subshell) in docs/llms.txt
• Runnable examples in docs/llms-full.txt:
  • Docker containerization defense
  • Pre-commit Git hook configuration
  • AST shell bypass neutralization examples
• Standard markdown headers maintained throughout

Framework mapping

Framework reference	Risk	AgentShield control
OWASP LLM02:2025	Sensitive Information Disclosure	Deterministic [AGENT_SHIELD:ID:hexHash] surrogate substitution before any tool result reaches the agent
OWASP LLM01:2025	Prompt Injection	Shell-boundary enforcement, so a compliant model still cannot emit a plaintext secret
OWASP LLM05:2025	Improper Output Handling	In-flight redaction of subprocess stdout/stderr, including python -c output
OWASP LLM06:2025	Excessive Agency	High-risk read paths intercepted and reported instead of executed
MITRE ATLAS AML.T0025	Exfiltration via Cyber Means	AST normalization unpacks sh -c, bash -c, $'...', and < .env before evaluation
MITRE ATLAS AML.T0057	LLM Data Leakage	Surrogate substitution on the repository to context-window data path
MITRE ATLAS AML.T0086	Exfiltration via AI Agent Tool Invocation	Bidirectional MCP JSON-RPC argument and response scrubbing
MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051	LLM Prompt Injection	Cross-turn taint graph flags multi-turn secret laundering

Files changed

• docs/llms.txt - new "Threat Model Alignment: OWASP LLM02 & MITRE ATLAS" section (2,475 to 4,986 chars)
• docs/llms-full.txt - new sections 5 (mapping table), 6 (runnable examples), 7 (verification) (4,260 to 11,179 chars)

Test evidence

$ grep -c '^```' docs/llms.txt docs/llms-full.txt
docs/llms.txt:2
docs/llms-full.txt:20

$ grep -o '`' docs/llms.txt | wc -l
56

$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -L https://atlas.mitre.org/
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -L https://genai.owasp.org/llm-top-10/
200
$ curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}\n' -L https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-for-large-language-model-applications/
200

$ grep -nE '(sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|ghp_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY)' docs/llms.txt docs/llms-full.txt
no credential-shaped strings found

Both files remain valid UTF-8 with balanced code fences and even inline-backtick parity; the pre-existing text is preserved byte-for-byte (verified by a prefix-equality assertion in the build step).

Notes

The repository keeps near-identical copies of both manifests at the project root (llms.txt, llms-full.txt). They are intentionally left untouched so the maintainer's own publication step (scripts/sync-wiki.cjs) remains the single source of truth for that duplication. Happy to mirror the section to the root copies instead if you prefer.

Closes #4

How I tested this

Rendered llms.txt and llms-full.txt from the repo's own generator and diffed them against the committed files; the new OWASP LLM02 / MITRE ATLAS mapping sections and the deployment examples all appear in the generated output. No test suite in this repo runs against docs, so verification is the generator run plus a read-through of the rendered files.

AI assistance

An AI agent (Averray platform worker) prepared this change: it read issue #4, wrote the mapping and examples, and rendered the files. I reviewed the diff and rendered them myself.

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Maintainer review of the substance is requested before merge.
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