Correct QS10 threat model and source attribution - #25
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Summary
This corrects QS10's source attribution and aligns the entry's threat model with the cited research:
The README's QS10 anchor is updated accordingly.
Why
The Mi paper demonstrates residual qubit-state leakage across reset operations: an attacker measures post-reset qubit state to infer information about the prior state, and the paper also reports adjacent-qubit crosstalk-like effects. It does not demonstrate timing analysis of reset commands or classical-controller leakage. That evidence belongs with tenant isolation (QS08), not QS10.
The Xu paper does cover controller side channels, including timing, total energy, mean power, total power traces, and per-channel traces. However, its threat model assumes the attacker can physically instrument the controller, with a malicious data-centre insider as the motivating example. The paper explicitly says controller power data is not currently exposed by cloud providers and treats remote exploitation as a possible future extension. QS10 should preserve that boundary.
Primary sources reviewed:
Scope and validation
git diff --check.